I think that some people fail to realize that there is no quick win in a COIN environment and the perceived success of the surge is also a result in part of seeds planted and actions taken long before the surge was devised or implemented. Although this article is defensive in nature I think it also illustrates a potential problem that could arise within the ranks – a “we-they” among those whose units served at different times. But in the end, as we all know, the only ones who can achieve success are the Iraqis themselves. The real success of the surge is not due just to the increased presence of US forces, but because of actions of Iraqi security forces, actions of the (though still troubled) Iraqi government, and most importantly actions of the Iraqi people and the choices they are making (and the choice is not to side with terrorists/insurgents or Americans; the real choices are side with terrorists/insurgents, be indifferent or apathetic, or side with the Iraqi government – in the end it is always a fight for legitimacy – the insurgents or the indigenous government – and we can only be the external support to that indigenous government – we cannot win the COIN fight for it)

And of course COIN takes presence, patience, and persistence. You have to have security forces present in sufficient forces engaged with the population and providing the necessary secure environment. You must have patience because change does not happen over night, the enemy has a vote and most importantly the essence of COIN (as in all warfare) is about dealing with human behavior. And finally you must be persistent because not all strategies and tactics work in every situation. You must adapt strategies and tactics to suit the specific conditions and most importantly the changing conditions.