Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006

[Peter Mansoor]

Our strategy failed in 2006, just as it failed in 2003-2004 when my brigade was stationed in Rusafa and Adhamiya (not Sadr City). I have admitted as much in a book I have written on that experience, "Baghdad at Sunrise," which will be published this fall. This statement has nothing to do with units being "goofed up." Rather, it has everything to do with strategy and doctrine. In the spring of 2004, we withdrew from our forward operating bases inside Baghdad to the super-bases on the city's periphery. The fear was that our continued presence inside Iraq's cities would cause the Iraqi people to view us as occupiers. News Flash - they already did. But by withdrawing to the large bases on the outskirts, we ceded the streets to the insurgents and militias. And I disagree with you that patrols conducted from Camp Victory are as effective as combat outposts positioned 24/7 amidst the neighborhoods of Baghdad.

The 2006 Campaign Plan stated, "Our actions during liberation, occupation and partnership have enabled the Coalition and successive Iraqi governments to set the conditions for the stabilization of Iraq and for the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. Completing this transition during the tenure of this Consitutionally-elected government is the focus of the Campaign Plan."

Not "a focus," Gian, but "the focus." This statement is the reason why the commander of Multi-National Force-West in Al Anbar could state publicly that he did not have enough troops to protect the people of the province, but he did have enough to accomplish his mission.

Compare the above with what is written in the 2007 version of the same plan, "In the near term, the downward spiral of sectarian violence will be halted by further developing existing security lines of operation to protect the population and render irreconcilable groups less effective, while concurrently developing and employing political, economic and diplomatic policies and initiatives that will move reconciliable groups and the political establishment of Iraq towards political accommodation."

Perhaps the difference in these two vastly different visions of the campaign plan for Iraq is not apparent to you, but the maturation of our thinking on Counterinsurgency is evident to me.

By the way, none of what is written above came from the so-called "neo con spin machine." And "my surge" and "my purported new doctrine" actually belong to the nation and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, respectively. We are all in this together.

We are going to have to agree to disagree on this issue, Gian.