Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006

[Cavguy]

So consider this counterfactual, if we had not bought off our former enemies to stop attacking us and become our allies against alqueda and if Sadr had not made his related decision to stand down attacks, would your Surge and your purported new doctrine and tactics produced the dramatic downturn in violence that occurred in the Summer of 2007 by itself?

I wish you would stop with the downright, untrue lie that we simply "bought off" the Sunni tribes. We didn't. Yes, money was used as an incentive in several ways. But the Sunnis wanted to get rid of Al Qaeda on their own. We simply had the fortitude to help them. It's as much as an demeaning insult to those who worked that hugely significant turnaround as you feel it is an insult to your soldiers that some perceive they weren't doing things right, or trying hard.

Using money as a weapon is critical, as you know. What’s cheaper – gassing up your M1 at $13/gal (KBR delivered cost) , 504 gals, and probably twice a day = $13,104. Using that money to support actions that prevent having to use the tanks = much better deal. I know how much CL I/III/V my guys used during the Sadr rebellion,. The extension for 1AD cost $1bil for three months. We probably could have prevented it if we had spent $250mil in Sadr City to create jobs in late 2003. (Impossible for policy reasons). And with a payout of $500k + death funds for each soldier killed, I think using money to create stability sounds like a damn good deal.
And again, was Iraq truly better off in 2006 than today in 2007? Are we in a worse strategic position? Operational? Tactical? Does the US have less options today than in late 2006? Are the people less secure? Are more US soldiers dying? Are more Iraqis dying?

The answer to all of those is no. The change of tactics and mindset in the force weren't exclusive to GEN P, 1/1 AD, or 3ACR. Lots of units were moving that way before the doctrine hit. What Gen P did was impart that across the force, and temporarily shift the strategic goal from building and empowering ISF to population security. Once everyone focused on that through varying ways, including COP's, councils, and other tools, we saw a direct decrease in violence. I keep seeing you cast stones at lots of other’s actions, personal attacks at some FM 3-24 authors, and COIN doctrine, but still fail to hear what your productive alternative is.

LTC Gentile, you make some very good arguments in your writings regarding the pendulum shift to COIN in the force. However, your contempt those with differing opinions and who have pushed for some measure of change don't reflect well on you or your argument.

I understand this is personal for you, it is for me too. No one here is minimizing your hard work or sacrifice. Don't minimize ours. There is something to be learned from all of our diverse experiences. I’ll agree that we weren’t as screwed up in 2004-2006 as Tom Ricks would have us believe, but we were much better as a whole force in 2007 with new leadership, mindset, and doctrine. I think you can concede that some of those same factors might have had some effect in the transformation that took place in Iraq.