Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006

[Cavguy]

I'm going to be a little direct in this one, understand that I respect you, and your men's accomplishments. I know firsthand about losing soldiers, and have spent 29 months of my life in Iraq. So take these as candor from another point of view.

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Few points of fact. First, your timeline is off.

1) 1/1 AD (COL Mansoor's BDE), was in Baghdad May 2003 (July 03 with him in command) - April 2004 based out of the Martyr's monument. It had everything from the amusement park in the north to the Martyr's monument. 2ACR was responsible for east baghdad from Sadr City to Rustimayah. 1/1 AD, 2ACR, and the rest of 1AD was extended in April 2004 to fight the Sadr Rebellion. 1/1 subsequently re-took the city of Kerbala from the Mehidi army and 2ACR re-took Diawanyah and Najaf to the south. (although Najaf would be re-cleared in Aug 2004 by the Marines and 1st Cav in the 2d Sadr rebellion).

2) My BN, 2-37 AR, was cross attached from 1/1 to 2ACR under COL (now BG) Brad May. We were the ones that helped COL (P) Abrams' 1st Cav out of the fire in Sadr City on April 4, 2004. See the book "The Long Road Home" by Martha Radditz for details. Also a great ARMOR article about it here. There was a huge mistake in March 2004 of letting 2/2 ACR (which had Sadr City) depart for home without a replacement for a month and other units covered down until the arrival of 1st Cav. During the March-April 2004 period, almost all the company and battalion bases which were distributed throughout Baghdad in OIF 1 were shut down, including the base on the edge of Sadr city as part of the decision to move into the newly constructed uber-FOB's such as victory, Taji, Rustaymah, Falcon, and WarEagle. We ceded both territory and presence to a security vacuum as there was no ISF to replace our forces. Within a month, the Sadr rebellion started, and Baghdad began its descent into serious chaos.

Now into the meat ....

You overstate the idea of a new doctrine being applied during the Surge. The American Army by and large has largely in Iraq been conducting correct counterinsurgency doctrine and practice since the middle of 2004. Are you to say that your Brigade that was in Sadr City in 2004 was all goofed up? General Chiarelli certainly didnt think so in the essay that he wrote in Mil Review in 2005 upon returning from Iraq.

I think you're letting your emotion get out of control. You're not the only one that has buried soldiers over there doing the best they know how. I know COL Mansoor has, I have, and several others you have passively dismissed and taken barbs at in this forum and in print. Your vitrol filled posts against those who have sought smarter ways to do this, and a doctrine more in tune with successful COIN in the past, don't do credit to yourself, your argument, or your soldiers. It really is coming across as sour grapes rather than substantive argument for the forums it’s in. We’re all fiercely proud of our units and the Soldiers who we fought, suffered, and worked beside. Mixing your policy critique with emotional bromide isn’t helping.
One can be proud of his unit's performance and sacrifice and still be able to recognize one's shortcomings, that's why it was a learning army. 1/1 (and many others) didn't do everything perfect in OIF1, especially in the early months. I'm sure COL Mansoor would tell you the same. But they did learn, and get better, which culminated in its ability to re-take Kerbala and design a peace that has held to this day using the principles that later went into FM 3-24. Like your unit, every man of that BDE tried hard, the best they can, but sometimes it just wasn't enough. (Adamyiah and Sadr City a case in point) That isn't an insult to the men who struggled there, just how it came out. One can argue the whys, but in the end, it just didn't meet the bill. Did those commanders try? Certainly! Did they reach out to the population as best they could? Of course! Did they do it smartly - sometimes so, sometimes not. If trying hard was the only metric required for success we would be out of there a long time ago.

Lots of units try hard. Not all succeed, for a variety of reasons, some they can control and some that can't.

You also overstate by using hyperbolic words like "commuting" and conducting "periodic patrols." What are you implying with those terms, especially the latter? My squadron conducted over 3000 combat patrols and operations during 2006 and contrary to the myth created by the neo con spin machine we didnt just drive by and look; we got out, walked, talked, fought, worked hard to protect the people. So too did the other outfits that i served along side.

No one doubts your men dismounted and worked with the people, and did a lot of patrols. But the moment they left the sector the insurgents owned it. Simple fact. Building bases enables better population control, providing 24/7 security, quick response to the populace, and encouraging those who were passive before to stand up for security. "Commuter COIN", as I call it, doesn't mean you never dismount, it simply means you aren't living in your sector 24/7, and therefore can't influence it for periods of time. The enemy can observe and predict your movements easier, and has a longer lead time. Taking down our company and BN bases in Baghdad early 2004 directly contributed to its instability and downfall, ceding many areas to the gangs, insurgents, and criminals.

You also overstate the notion of "living in the neighborhoods." The narrative that has emerged from Iraq is that American soldiers are living Galula-like in almost EVERY Iraqi neighborhood and there presence has been decisive in separating the enemy from the people. Briefs really well and Galula smiles in his grave but i have looked at briefing maps and the number of cops emplaced betray the ideal of "living with the people." Not to get into specifics but I saw the number of cops in my old ao and i know the terrain the size of the population, they were not the primary mechanism as you suggest that lowered the violence. "

Can't speak to your AO. However, the COP's also send a significant IO and mindset message - "we're here to protect you, and are closer than ever. We've left our big bases and nice life to make a real effort at securing you."

Have they really "sided" with us? Or, are they siding with their own side and using us and our money to prepare for a bigger fight down the road that they know is coming?

Can you honestly state that we are worse off with Anbar and Baghdad stable due to alliances made with local tribes? Gosh, I can't help but to think how many more options we would have with Baghdad, Anbar, and West Ninewah in continued chaos. Are the local alliances a long term solution? Absolutely not, in and of themselves. Do they open a door to a long term solution by providing the stability necessary to de-flame the passions in Iraq? Certainly.

.... continued next post