Insurgoterrmilitia Ideogangs

[SteveMetz]

I don't know if this makes any sense even with the speaker notes but, for discussion or comment, this is a short presentation I'm giving Tuesday at a conference comparing criminal gangs and insurgency.

Fudge. Lost the attachment.

[Rob Thornton]

If you guys make this term mainstream, there are a bunch of us that are going to hunt you down and make you say it three times backwards

[selil]

Is this kind of antiestablishdestructoterrierism? You know that is defined as stopping the establshment of highly destructive terriers from eating your furniture?

[AdamG]

If you guys make this term mainstream, there are a bunch of us that are going to hunt you down and make you say it three times backwards

You do that and Tim Burton will show up looking for royalties.

[SteveMetz]

The subtitle of the presentation is "Toward a Unified Field Theory of Violent, Sub-National Groups." Still can't figure out how to post the presentation, though

[selil]

Depending on the format I can convert most things. If you have it send it to me or conact me via IM.

[William F. Owen]

The subtitle of the presentation is "Toward a Unified Field Theory of Violent, Sub-National Groups."

...and how does this help the practitioner? I am very curious how this such a characterisation will aid in their defeat, - which is why the study of such folks is important.

[Rob Thornton]

Well - on a humorous note, if we can convince them to all call themselves -Insurgoterrmilitia Ideogangs they'll have a harder time with their IO - unless they are recruiting Mary Poppins

[Beelzebubalicious]

Supercalifragotaticexplodocious!!

[SteveMetz]

...and how does this help the practitioner? I am very curious how this such a characterisation will aid in their defeat, - which is why the study of such folks is important.

The basic theme of the presentation is that we hinder ourselves by building a unitary model based on our most recent experience, and then trying to cram everything into state. For decades we treated every insurgency like it was a reflection of the Viet Cong, and now I'm afraid we're going to approach everyone like it is a variant of the AQ network. I identify ten dimensions of violent, non-state movements:

formal/complex------------informal/simple
ideological---------------------nonideological
self-serving-------------------constituency serving
homogenous-----------------heterogeneous
limited goals-----------------revolutionary goals
tightly bound------------------loosely bound
non-threatening-------------most threatening
less violent--------------------more violent
autonomous-----------------dependent
linked----------------------------unlinked


You can use these to build two or three dimensional models which allow greater granularity than the one-size-fits-all approach we currently use.

The appropriate strategy against such a group depends, in part, on whether we seek to weaken it, moderate it, or crush it. Again, our current strategy (as codified in doctrine) is a one size fits all and that does not serve us well.

[Rank amateur]

The basic theme of the presentation is that we hinder ourselves by building a unitary model based on our most recent experience, and then trying to cram everything into state. For decades we treated every insurgency like it was a reflection of the Viet Cong, and now I'm afraid we're going to approach everyone like it is a variant of the AQ network. I identify ten dimensions of violent, non-state movements:

formal/complex------------informal/simple
ideological---------------------nonideological
self-serving-------------------constituency serving
homogenous-----------------heterogeneous
limited goals-----------------revolutionary goals
tightly bound------------------loosely bound
non-threatening-------------most threatening
less violent--------------------more violent
autonomous-----------------dependent
linked----------------------------unlinked


You can use these to build two or three dimensional models which allow greater granularity than the one-size-fits-all approach we currently use.

The appropriate strategy against such a group depends, in part, on whether we seek to weaken it, moderate it, or crush it. Again, our current strategy (as codified in doctrine) is a one size fits all and that does not serve us well.

How about flexible...rigid? (Or some other verbiage to express that concept.) Sunni tribes were willing to negotiate. AQI wasn't. That was one of the key factors that allowed us to drive a wedge between them. UBL will never negotiate with the "infidels," but some members of the Taliban are apparently willing to discuss political compromise. The practitioner can probably make use of that difference.

[William F. Owen]

The basic theme of the presentation is that we hinder ourselves by building a unitary model based on our most recent experience, and then trying to cram everything into state. For decades we treated every insurgency like it was a reflection of the Viet Cong, and now I'm afraid we're going to approach everyone like it is a variant of the AQ network.

I would agree that a multi-facetted model will be better than a unitary one, but I'm not sure the parameters you use are those that describe an insurgency in a way that someone with a very limited academic background (eg: myself) could use. I may be wrong.

I look at insurgencies like cars. They are all different shapes and sizes, but you can use certain things to accurately describe them, like colour, engine size, Coupe, saloon etc.

All insurgencies have weapons, a criminal element, funding, a stated aim which is different from their actual aim etc. Having said that, maybe that is what you are attempting to describe, in which case I am all ears... or eyes.

[SteveMetz]

I would agree that a multi-facetted model will be better than a unitary one, but I'm not sure the parameters you use are those that describe an insurgency in a way that someone with a very limited academic background (eg: myself) could use. I may be wrong.

I look at insurgencies like cars. They are all different shapes and sizes, but you can use certain things to accurately describe them, like colour, engine size, Coupe, saloon etc.

All insurgencies have weapons, a criminal element, funding, a stated aim which is different from their actual aim etc. Having said that, maybe that is what you are attempting to describe, in which case I am all ears... or eyes.

What I'm suggesting is that part of the problem is our conceptization of insurgency itself. We fall into this logic trap where we first ask "Is this an insurgency?" If the answer is "yes," then we must address it the way that Galula et. al. dealt with Cold War era insurgencies.

I define "insurgency" as a strategy which may be used by a wide range of organizations. That a group uses a strategy of insurgency tells me something, but not everything I need to know.

That's why I'm searching for a unified field theory of violent, non-state groups, not just a method of counterinsurgency.

[selil]

The basic theme of the presentation is that we hinder ourselves by building a unitary model based on our most recent experience, and then trying to cram everything into state. For decades we treated every insurgency like it was a reflection of the Viet Cong, and now I'm afraid we're going to approach everyone like it is a variant of the AQ network. I identify ten dimensions of violent, non-state movements:

formal/complex------------informal/simple
ideological---------------------nonideological
self-serving-------------------constituency serving
homogenous-----------------heterogeneous
limited goals-----------------revolutionary goals
tightly bound------------------loosely bound
non-threatening-------------most threatening
less violent--------------------more violent
autonomous-----------------dependent
linked----------------------------unlinked


You can use these to build two or three dimensional models which allow greater granularity than the one-size-fits-all approach we currently use.

The appropriate strategy against such a group depends, in part, on whether we seek to weaken it, moderate it, or crush it. Again, our current strategy (as codified in doctrine) is a one size fits all and that does not serve us well.

Are these either/or only or continuum's of selection?

This is my last semester of course work on my doctorate and one of the courses I'm taking is social conflict and law enforcement a sociology course. You all make me feel out my depth, putting a technologist in a sociology course is torture for all involved. I'm sure their will be a war crime investigation soon.

In any regards.

The readings from Tilly, Sunstien and others are leading to some interesting conclusions and lack of clarity. On the subject of insurgency and violence in society there are some interesting corollaries between labor unions, civil strife, and war like insurgency. At some point the ideology has a switch thrown and the strife jumps to insurgency (beyond AQ type threats).

All that to make one point.

I think you need some more elements like;
evolutionary......de-evolutionary (coming from within something or destroying it)
flexible......inflexible (able to adapt to new forces or not)
Violence prone.......peace prone (Is the group militant and violent by nature or are they leave me alone and let it be?)
Ruling class..... peon class (Is this a rich elite chaffing under rule or a serf and servant supported which would effect resources and COG)

Make the whole thing into a Likert 1-10 scale make a spider web graph by collapsing sections onto each other and you'd have a nice graphical representation. I don't know what it would represent but they look really cool in journal articles.

[SteveMetz]

Are these either/or only or continuum's of selection?

This is my last semester of course work on my doctorate and one of the courses I'm taking is social conflict and law enforcement a sociology course. You all make me feel out my depth, putting a technologist in a sociology course is torture for all involved. I'm sure their will be a war crime investigation soon.

In any regards.

The readings from Tilly, Sunstien and others are leading to some interesting conclusions and lack of clarity. On the subject of insurgency and violence in society there are some interesting corollaries between labor unions, civil strife, and war like insurgency. At some point the ideology has a switch thrown and the strife jumps to insurgency (beyond AQ type threats).

All that to make one point.

I think you need some more elements like;
evolutionary......de-evolutionary (coming from within something or destroying it)
flexible......inflexible (able to adapt to new forces or not)
Violence prone.......peace prone (Is the group militant and violent by nature or are they leave me alone and let it be?)
Ruling class..... peon class (Is this a rich elite chaffing under rule or a serf and servant supported which would effect resources and COG)

Make the whole thing into a Likert 1-10 scale make a spider web graph by collapsing sections onto each other and you'd have a nice graphical representation. I don't know what it would represent but they look really cool in journal articles.

Continuua. I'm not sure on the flexibility. I thought the ideological continuum captured that. I had a violence continuum.