Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
The basic theme of the presentation is that we hinder ourselves by building a unitary model based on our most recent experience, and then trying to cram everything into state. For decades we treated every insurgency like it was a reflection of the Viet Cong, and now I'm afraid we're going to approach everyone like it is a variant of the AQ network. I identify ten dimensions of violent, non-state movements:

formal/complex------------informal/simple
ideological---------------------nonideological
self-serving-------------------constituency serving
homogenous-----------------heterogeneous
limited goals-----------------revolutionary goals
tightly bound------------------loosely bound
non-threatening-------------most threatening
less violent--------------------more violent
autonomous-----------------dependent
linked----------------------------unlinked


You can use these to build two or three dimensional models which allow greater granularity than the one-size-fits-all approach we currently use.

The appropriate strategy against such a group depends, in part, on whether we seek to weaken it, moderate it, or crush it. Again, our current strategy (as codified in doctrine) is a one size fits all and that does not serve us well.
How about flexible...rigid? (Or some other verbiage to express that concept.) Sunni tribes were willing to negotiate. AQI wasn't. That was one of the key factors that allowed us to drive a wedge between them. UBL will never negotiate with the "infidels," but some members of the Taliban are apparently willing to discuss political compromise. The practitioner can probably make use of that difference.