Macgregor's latest shot at the matrix: "Sheikhs For Sale"

[Cavguy]

If by your own admission the program is a socialist make work project, isn't it fair to point out that socialist make work programs never work? Isn't if fair to point out that when we stop the payments, and they will stop, the people will still have no alternatives and in fact will have lost whatever capitalistic skills they may have had? Don't we need to have a little good old fashioned Reagan economic common sense, even in Iraq?

Reaganist models of economics work much better in societies with low corruption, stability, and rule of law. Trust me, the Arabs don't lack entrepreneurial skills. They do lack a market - i.e. a populace with the means to buy the goods. Without that means, the entrepreneurs can't expand/hire/etc.

Imagine every factory worker and civil servant in America being fired at the same time, and the effect on the economy. That's what happened in Iraq. In its place we told the "free market" to fix it, and generate new jobs. Also you should be aware that every Iraqi was on the equivalent of "food stamps" for daily needs. An entire generation under the age of 16 knows nothing but food handouts.

Like the tribal security, state supported jobs programs are not a long term fix, but perhaps a necessary one to getting an economy going. What investor would build a new factory in Iraq in 2008? Degrading infrastructure, limited power, and extortion from terrorists and gangs make Iraq and very risky proposition. There is no enforceable contract law. The free market can't fix Iraq until Iraq gets stable, and that includes giving families work, building stability, and begins to repair its critical infrastructure. Human infrastructure such as governments and courts are equally critical. The government must provide conditions for a free market to work. So in the meantime, state programs are critical.

[Steve Blair]

Have to admit that I do like Macgregor's ideas on military reform, but I'm starting to find some of his commentary on UW/LIC to be a bit tedious if not poorly informed. I know Ricks' "Fiasco" has some harsh words about him, and if memory serves "Cobra" also takes some shots at his "go in small" ideas.

[Cavguy]

Have to admit that I do like Macgregor's ideas on military reform, but I'm starting to find some of his commentary on UW/LIC to be a bit tedious if not poorly informed. I know Ricks' "Fiasco" has some harsh words about him, and if memory serves "Cobra" also takes some shots at his "go in small" ideas.

I just hate to see him head down the Hackworth/Peters path. Starting out with some really on-target stuff and get bogged down on kooky side issues and rants that alienate most people from the gold nuggets found in their writing, allowing people to dismiss their writings out of hand.

25% of Hackworth's stuff was absolutely brilliant. 75% was craptastic ranting. After "About Face" was published he went steadily downhill as his ranting drove those originally receptive away. Same with Peters. His stuff up until "Beyond Terror" was insightful and brilliant, and he's had a few since then. (I worshipped his "Parameters" articles from the 90s) However, todayit gets so lost in the vitrolic "New York Post" op-eds that now getting people to take him seriously is a challenge.

[Steve Blair]

I just hate to see him head down the Hackworth/Peters path. Starting out with some really on-target stuff and get bogged down on kooky side issues and rants that alienate most people from the gold nuggets found in their writing, allowing people to dismiss their writings out of hand.

25% of Hackworth's stuff was absolutely brilliant. 75% was craptastic ranting. After "About Face" was published he went steadily downhill as his ranting drove those originally receptive away. Same with Peters. His stuff up until "Beyond Terror" was insightful and brilliant, and he's had a few since then. (I worshipped his "Parameters" articles from the 90s) However, todayit gets so lost in the vitrolic "New York Post" op-eds that now getting people to take him seriously is a challenge.

Agreed on all counts. Peters' early stuff was fascinating, and at least was serious enough that it got some people to think and debate it based on its merits. Now, like you say, he's really wandered down the Hackworth path.

[Rob Thornton]

Kudos to CAVGUY and others for thinking about why, when and how you use money. We do this on a policy scale - using it as a diplomatic tool to shape our environments, to get players to see things more our way, to bring multiple regional players closer on issues which are mutually beneficial to us and them. There are many ways we do this - from FMS, to IMF and a host of other modifications - we've seen it as a strategic tool since we've been able.

What seems to be new to us, is the idea of money (in its raw form) as a tool to achieve tactical and operational goals - be they interim or others. Maybe it just seems at odds with our military culture to use money vs. other means - I don't know - that is probably a serious question that deserves serious thought.

However, I do see great utility in thinking about money, and how to spend it to achieve tactical and operational goals. DoD Directive 3000.5 basically says (paraphrased) where the (more) appropriate civilian agency is unable (due to conditions, or capacity?) to perform those functions & roles better suited to them, the military will assume (interim?) responsibility. This is going to create conditions where money (in its various incarnations) is handled at the tactical and operational levels to achieve tactical and operational objectives - it may have strategic effects/consequences to boot.

The conditions that will require that probably will include - SSTR type conditions like those found in Anbar (and other places in Iraq). I like CAVGUY's analysis:

Like the tribal security, state supported jobs programs are not a long term fix, but perhaps a necessary one to getting an economy going. What investor would build a new factory in Iraq in 2008? Degrading infrastructure, limited power, and extortion from terrorists and gangs make Iraq and very risky proposition. There is no enforceable contract law. The free market can't fix Iraq until Iraq gets stable, and that includes giving families work, building stability, and begins to repair its critical infrastructure. Human infrastructure such as governments and courts are equally critical. The government must provide conditions for a free market to work. So in the meantime, state programs are critical.

Folks can argue about it, but one thing that was bought (that is hard to buy at any price) was time - operational, and I think strategic time. In this case I think we got what we paid for and then some.

We've been very cognizant of its (money's) limitations, but I'm not sure we've considered its advantages - we're back to a culture issue. Its some of the same issues we have with contracting - but I'm not sure its fair to lump them in the same category. In theory - you are purchasing something with both - but with a contract, you get exactly what you pay for (although you might get less, or adverse consequences) - there is little potential for any greater return. However, if you can invest in people - as CAVGUY lays out, you may get a much better return (like investing, if you read the conditions wrong, you could see that money used against you, or no return on your investment - i.e. hollow) - this is not a fire and forget sort of transaction - but should be managed.

This is something I think we're going to have to get comfortable with. This is not exactly the same thing I think as SOF and/or CIA teams funding Northern Alliance chieftains. I have a buddy on a PRT who took suitcases full of money to do business all over Eastern Iraq - it was just the way business was done. He primarily did contracting type transactions - but those monies went into more then just providing services and materials for projects. It created action - it paid for trucks to move, stuff to be built, calls and visits to be made, etc.-some of it inside Iraq, some of it outside of Iraq. This was also tactical level Inter-Agency type stuff with operational and strategic effects.

I acknowledge there is both risk and difficulty in accurately attributing cause and effect relationships (both good and bad), but we have the same issues with other actions - lethal, or non-lethal. However, we still have to do our best analysis and make decisions on it, and conduct continued analysis, etc. - it is a dynamic and inter-active process.

At certain points on the "full spectrum" line, I think using money as a tool to achieve tactical and operational objectives makes sense - we do it because we can, and because in certain circumstances constraining ourselves to purely lethal ways of achieving those objectives may only worsen the operating conditions we have to overcome.

One of our SWC members "Stone" has some good experience as a contracting officer. I think this maybe something we're going to need more of to take advantage of money as a tactical and operational tool - certified contracting officers and NCOs - these tactical units will be the first to reach these remote places and alter the conditions where insurgency and instability have taken root. These same tactical units will also be the ones to more accurately gauge how that money is being spent, how it is impacting the local communities. These units will have to do this until conditions permit the more appropriate civilian folks in to manage it - as we've seen that is largely contingent on security - and in a environment charged with domestic politics (our own), the faster we can move to alter, modify, change the conditions to purchase more time for us or the HN to achieve its goals the more options we will find available to us. This is why it might be a good idea to bring "lawyers, guns and money"( couldn't resist) along with the other tools in our tool bag.

Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

MacGregor (who's obviously lost the bubble) is aware of the fact that we've done this for a great many years, right?

We've paid our allies since the Philippines in the early years of the last century. We've paid people not to fight us for longer than that -- unless we wanted something they had, then we attacked 'em instead of paying.

The only difference between what we're doing now and what we did in WW II, Korea and Viet Nam is inflation.

And, as Cav Guy pointed out, some here are making the same mistake MacGregor made -- judging this by western standards. You have the luxury of doing that, the Iraqis do not. They will judge by their standards and what we're doing makes perfect sense to them.

[Rex Brynen]

I agree with both Ken that deploying money to influence people (and to buy, or more accurately, rent, some immediate security) is hardly new, and with CavGuy that there was little realistic alternative. It was the smart response to a situation where AQI missteps, growing Sunni fear of Shiite power, and an ironic combination of both medium-term US staying power ("you can't chase us out") and long-term doubts about the US presence ("there's no pointing fighting them, they'll leave eventually, and then we'll have to face the Shiites..") all created potential alliances that money could help consolidate.

Given that, I think that casting it in a money good vs money bad debate (which I don't think many, if any, are doing here) rather misses the key issue: how do you maximize the benefits and minimize the potential negative consequences?

In Iraq, the benefits are further weakening AQI, reducing US and GoI casualties, enhancing security (and hence the potential for economic development) in Sunni areas, and perhaps using this as a basis for constructing local governance networks.

The downside is that it alarms the Shi'ites and Kurds, can be used by Iran to strengthen its local influence ("Look! They're arming Ba'thists!") strengthens groups that sometimes/often have both murky pasts and fairly extensive involvement in criminal networks, potentially undermines the rule of law and established institutional channels of authority (where these groups emerge as independent power centres), is potentially vulnerable to considerable corruption and diversion of funds, and can deter local investment (where armed groups start using their power and freedom of action to engage in parasitic business practices).

All of this, in turn, links to a complex set of issues--how payroll is handled, the extent to which the central government will authorize/regularize these groups, command and control, monitoring of intimidation/extortion/criminality, whether US forces on the ground have a firm grasp of the tribal/clan/family/political/economic dynamics at work, how this combined with a political strategy to move Iraq forward on the "big issues" (governance reform, inclusion, constitutional evolution, fiscal redistribution, etc).

So much of this depends on the nitty-gritty of who is doing what, how, where, and when that I certainly don't have any good answers (or even any grasp of how carefully its all being thought through, in a strategic sense).

[Rank amateur]

In response to a number of people above, the problem is welfare economics 101. If you keep sending people a check until the find a job, they don't look for work. If you pay sheiks until they create a nice stable country, they won't create a nice stable country.

Undoubtedly, we've made a bad situation slightly less worse, but when the best arguments intelligent people can make in favour is "We had no other choice," and "the government wastes money at home too," I think you need to concede that it's not exactly the equivalent of raising the stars and stripes atop Mount Suribachi.

(or even any grasp of how carefully its all being thought through, in a strategic sense).

It's nice to know that I'm not the only one.

[Rank amateur]

So in the meantime, state programs are critical.

I know you were there, so no disrespect to you, but it's not an economic development program, it's the worst kind of welfare: open ended. It's fine as a short term measure - most short term welfare has some value - but at some point we need to ask: so what and now what?

[Cavguy]

I know you were there, so no disrespect to you, but it's not an economic development program, it's the worst kind of welfare: open ended. It's fine as a short term measure - most short term welfare has some value - but at some point we need to ask: so what and now what?

I'd just say we're not at "some point" for quite awhile. Right now we've taken the patient from critical condition into intensive care, the life support's going to have to be on for awhile.

[J Wolfsberger]

I know you were there, so no disrespect to you, but it's not an economic development program, it's the worst kind of welfare: open ended. It's fine as a short term measure - most short term welfare has some value - but at some point we need to ask: so what and now what?

I think you may have misunderstood the point. Iraq is not a Western State with a well established social, economic and political infrastructure. I agree with what you are saying - if you were speaking of that type of state. The problem in Iraq is to provide, through whatever means, some level of subsistence while the infrastructure develops.

[Danny]

" ... If by your own admission the program is a socialist make work project, isn't it fair to point out that socialist make work programs never work?"

I never said that it was a socialist make-work project. Those are your words. I would think that I was working pretty hard if I was risking my life protecting my neighborhood every day and manning a checkpoint.

Besides. What would you like to do with them? Kill them all?

The solution was always seen to be temporary. And finally, of all of the detractors and all of the criticisms of the tactic, I have yet to see a plausible alternative proferred.

Your objections fall on deaf ears until you can pose a realistic alternative. Have at it. Let's hear your ideas.

[Cavguy]

I know you were there, so no disrespect to you, but it's not an economic development program, it's the worst kind of welfare: open ended. It's fine as a short term measure - most short term welfare has some value - but at some point we need to ask: so what and now what?

Don't get me wrong, there's a lot of small business efforts underway as well. But it doesn't solve the economy.

And I guess I'll ask my favorite question on this thread - what's the realistic, practical alternative to fix the Iraqi economy in the short term without creating a welfare state? (i'm serious about this)

EDIT: Didn't see Danny's response. I'm channeling him today....