Stryker collection (merged thread)

[SWJED]

18 September Associated Press - Army's Newest Stryker Vehicle Boasts More Firepower.

Soldiers at Fort Lewis have begun training on the Army's 10th and final version of the Stryker armored vehicle.

Five years in the making, the Mobile Gun System looks a lot like its predecessors but has a 105 mm cannon, and Army officials say it packs more power than other versions armed with a heavy machine gun, a grenade launcher or anti-tank missiles...

The MGS, as the Army calls the new vehicle, is designed to back up infantry with a gun that can blast through walls, knock out fortified sniper nests, stop other armored vehicles and clear streets of enemy fighters...
The 49,000-pound MGS is operated by a three-man crew: a driver, a gunner and a vehicle commander, said Thomas Crooks, the company's service leader at Fort Lewis. The gunner and commander track targets on computer screens inside their hatches in the turret.

The vehicle can carry up to 18 rounds, and the gun is loaded by an automated hydraulic handler. Its computerized fire-control system is virtually identical to the one in the M1 Abrams, the Army's main battle tank.

The MGS will carry four types of ammunition: a depleted-uranium armor-piercing round, a high-explosive anti-tank round, a high-explosive plastic round for blowing through walls and barricades, and a canister round filled with 2,300 tungsten ball bearings for firing on enemy fighters.

The MGS packs "exactly the same, if not a little more enhanced" firepower as the much heavier 70-ton Abrams tank, but is not as sturdy defensively, Cooper said...

The MGS also does not need as much logistical support as the Abrams, gets better gas mileage and is built on the same basic chassis as other Stryker vehicles.

[Tom Odom]

the MGS packs "exactly the same, if not a little more enhanced" firepower as the much heavier 70-ton Abrams tank, but is not as sturdy defensively, Cooper said...

Dumb statement. An Abrams' armor is an OFFENSIVE tool because it provides mobility under fire. Too many folks tend to look at Strykers as tanks already and this sort of PR encourages that line of thought. A Stryker (MGS or otherwise) is a troop carrier. Period.

For the risks of such thinking see: No. 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (PDF)
at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/downlo...ubs/gabel2.pdf

Best

Tom

[RTK]

As an Armored Cavalry officer, I have some issues with all this.

105mm v. 120mm: You've got to be kidding me that it has as much, if not more, than an Abrams.

It carries less than half the UBL of an Abrams. After the ready rack is expended, you have to expose a soldier to reload the bloody thing.

This is not a replacement to the MBT. It's an enhancement for Stryker units. Comparing the MGS to an Abrams is mixing apples and oranges.

[pcmfr]

Ok, obviously SFC Cooper made a bit of a stretch comparing the firepower of this vehicle to an M1A, but don't you guys think this is a great thing to provide more infantry units in Iraq with better fire power? Also, the lighter weight, mobility, and logistics footprint makes MGS a good platform to support future expeditionary ops.

Tanks are great, but we only have so many of them and they are a difficult to transport anywhere in a hurry and support them once we get there.

[Jones_RE]

The mobile gun system isn't exactly easy to ship overseas in a hurry either - unless they've fixed the problem where you have to lift the turret off with a crane before the thing'll fit inside the airplane . . . .

Still, the MGS will probably perform fine in the field - or at any rate it's problems will be more or less manageable. Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training. If the army spent half the money that went into Stryker on counter insurgency training for the current (heavy) force, we'd have gotten a lot father a lot faster in Iraq.

And no, the thing is not a tank. However, it won't be employed that way. Stryker doctrine calls for two mobile gun systems in each company to support infantry operations with direct fire. While the lessons of the Tank Destroyer Corps are important to keep in mind, the Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly. They should be vastly more effective thank Tank Destroyer battalions.

[RTK]

Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training.

I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.

The Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly.

Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.

The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.

In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.

[pcmfr]

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight.

I think most references to heavy armor's lack of mobility refer to its lack of strategic mobility, ie, it's great once it gets there, but it's tough to bring to the fight. The Bradley's and M1As you rode in Iraq took a long time and a lot of manpower to get there via MPF ships and trucks from Kuwait.

[Shek]

I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.

RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).

Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.

The RSTA squadron is made up of 19Ds. No change is needed since scouts are performing the scout missions.

The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.

In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.

The Stryker concept is based on the infantry squad. It brings infantry units to an OBJ fresh to fight and allows them to be protected. Too much emphasis has been made on the false concept that Stryker Brigades were designed to fufill a similar role to mech units, which is not the case. They are meant to bridge the gap between the light and heavy force, and if augmented properly with ADA, MP, aviation (this problem will go away once aviation becomes organic to the SBCTs), can fight in major combat operations. SBCTs would have been the perfect force to follow 3ID, having the mobility to keep the LOCs open, the protection and firepower to destroy the Fedayeen threat, and the infantry to clear urban terrain.