LAVs fight as LAV battalions do they not? That means they can mass and move rapidly in roles suitable for light armor. Neither system, however, was built to attack and breach a defensive line as 1st ID did in 1991 or to hit Iraqi armor as 2ACR did at 73 Easting (with then Captain H.R. McMasters as the lead troop commander).
Tom,

Yes, the battalion is the primary tactical formation for ops. We in the USMC LAR community adhere to a hodgepodge of cav/recce and in-house doctrine, but (and I say this hesitantly) I think that as a community, we also believe that we would fight against anything in order to gain the information.

It's funny that you mention the 73 Easting and 1st ID's breach. I was assigned to be the breach force commander for the breach, marking, and improvements of lanes astride Hwy 80 into Safwan. Although 3d LAR was a supporting effort and I totally expect a DAG's worth of artillery to come raining down on us in the process, my company secured five breach lanes that were cut with, would you believe it, a commercial Caterpillar dozer. There wasn't much reconnaissance involved, just a plan for plain smashmouth tactics. Maybe it's the 25mm that provides the confidence to accomplish any task.

What's even more interesting is the background of Task Force Tripoli. LAR Bns were not employed in the Diyala crossing and Baghdad push in a very significant way, and most LAR guys believed because it simply wasn't our true role. Then came the tasker to ATK to SZ Tikrit. Three LAR Bns with an attached infantry force (can't remember if it was a Co or Bn(-)). Now that was interesting to say the least...We didn't face much resistance, and I shudder to think what would have happened if all the fighting positions, RPG cache sites, and Roland launchers had been manned. We still worked the planning process and looked at combat power, then launched forward.

I think a historian would have the guts of a good book if he were to look at all of the TF's actions as Phase III ops wound down.