Stryker collection (merged thread)

[Cavguy]

...and everyone of those can be fixed. Not just a bit, but a lot. The Aussies, Canuks and Norgies have all done it to varying degrees and the Israelis and still tinkering with some stuff. By any analysis, M-113 can be upgraded into an extremely capable APC, with the same comms, optics and weapons as Stryker, or better.

Now I am not going to insult anyone's intelligence by getting into the track v wheels argument. "We is all adults here". M113 capability could be significantly extended, for a fractional cost. Do you want to is another question.

The Fan boy you speak of is Mike Sparks.

No real issue here. No one seriously doubts the wheeled Stryker was chosen over the M8 AGS/M113 upgrade option mostly because of one word - transformation, or the need to create a perception of change in the Army. The Task Force Hawk debacle (Albania) forced the Army to get deployable or become irrelevant. It faced the perception that it was stodgy (maybe true) and not adapted to the future. That was beginning to impact funding in favor of the USAF and Navy, even before Rumsfeld. A new look was needed to sell congress on the new approach, and rebuilding/upgrading forty year old vehicles (M113's)and adding another tank (remember, tanks were the weapon of the past), even a light one, wasn't going to break the mold.

Hence, a wheeled, air-transportable, air supportable, mobile system that could be rapidly deployed using theater (C-130) only lift, at least on paper. Welcome the LAV-3, or Stryker. Add a fancy new beret and wham ... transformation you have.

I realize that's a little cynical, but there was as much an IO message in the Stryker as anything, for the Army, DoD, and Congress.

That's not to say it's a bad vehicle per se. The wheels/tracks argument was an uproar in Armor branch. As a reformed skeptic, I have walked away impressed (except for the MGS, I suppose).

[Distiller]

So the SBCTs are concepted as little more than protected and reinforced constabulary troops, but since they are here, they are or will be used in roles that are basically beyond their concept and capabilites. I see them always in danger of being employed in the wrong spot of the sequence of Armor - Cavalry - MechInf - MotInf. Basically for tasks like Irak cavalry would be right for the "heavy" part. Problem is they are equipped with 35 metric tons M2/M3. Should have bought the CV90 - are the same weight as Strykers and look much more real to me (I have no experience in either of those vehicles). Of course, if "wheeled" is the buzzword ...


But something else: Given the fact that the whole IBCT thing is just a placeholder for FCS, and the idea is having a protected/armored air portable system, maybe the answer does not lie in keeping things within C-130J limits, but in a new transport plane, like e.g. licence produce the Airbus A400M.

Now that the FCS looks more like 30 tons (and I think it will go to 35) the Hercules is out of the picture anyway (for the lower part of the C-130 mission the C-27J is the right thing). Or if somebody doesn't like Eurostuff, proceede with that Northrop ESTOL Stelath-BWB (Future Tactical Airlifter or something) concept.

And to turn one of the arguments here on its head - when not willing to use an APC stemming from the 1950's, why base whole formations like IBCT or FCS-UAs on the transport capabilities of the 1950's (C-130)? I think what we see here is the lack of coordination from the leadership, to force the USAF to create/buy the right sized tactical airlifter for Army requirements.

[William F. Owen]

So the SBCTs are concepted as little more than protected and reinforced constabulary troops, but since they are here, they are or will be used in roles that are basically beyond their concept and capabilites. I see them always in danger of being employed in the wrong spot of the sequence of Armor - Cavalry - MechInf - MotInf. Basically for tasks like Irak cavalry would be right for the "heavy" part. Problem is they are equipped with 35 metric tons M2/M3. Should have bought the CV90 - are the same weight as Strykers and look much more real to me (I have no experience in either of those vehicles).

Whoah there! The infantry man that falls out of the back of Stryker is most likely as capable as the man falling out of the back of a CV90, Bradley or Namera. - or an MRAP of X or Y capability.

When you boil SBCT concept down to its bare bones its about increasing the capability of Light Infantry, using protected mobility, and the huge range of pluses that gives you.
That's all.
IMO, a good the idea started to go badly wrong once it went beyond that, and then defending the decision was left to people who didn't understand the idea. - That's what I take away from Rob Thornton's experience.

Stryker really could have been one of those ideas that "changed infantry." Unfortunately it transformed itself into something different.

[Kreker]

No real issue here. No one seriously doubts the wheeled Stryker was chosen over the M8 AGS/M113 upgrade option mostly because of one word - transformation, or the need to create a perception of change in the Army. The Task Force Hawk debacle (Albania) forced the Army to get deployable or become irrelevant. It faced the perception that it was stodgy (maybe true) and not adapted to the future. That was beginning to impact funding in favor of the USAF and Navy, even before Rumsfeld. A new look was needed to sell congress on the new approach, and rebuilding/upgrading forty year old vehicles (M113's)and adding another tank (remember, tanks were the weapon of the past), even a light one, wasn't going to break the mold.

Hence, a wheeled, air-transportable, air supportable, mobile system that could be rapidly deployed using theater (C-130) only lift, at least on paper. Welcome the LAV-3, or Stryker. Add a fancy new beret and wham ... transformation you have.

I realize that's a little cynical, but there was as much an IO message in the Stryker as anything, for the Army, DoD, and Congress.

That's not to say it's a bad vehicle per se. The wheels/tracks argument was an uproar in Armor branch. As a reformed skeptic, I have walked away impressed (except for the MGS, I suppose).

Hi Cavguy,
Very succinct.
Let's not forget that there was a platform demonstration conducted for all off-the-shelf vehicles, be they wheel or track, at Ft Knox, as part of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) modernization effort. The LAv variant won out over the 113 variant.
As Eden pointed out the Stryker was to be an interim stop-gap until FCS was fielded, thus only seven SBCT (believe the original total was six.) Eden is also right, in that SBCT were to be used in SSCs and LICs, and could be used in MICs by being augmented/reinforced.
Also remember that FCS is a track vehicle and not wheel. Good discussions.
Best
Kreker

[Cavguy]

Hi Cavguy,
Very succinct.
Let's not forget that there was a platform demonstration conducted for all off-the-shelf vehicles, be they wheel or track, at Ft Knox, as part of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) modernization effort. The LAv variant won out over the 113 variant.
As Eden pointed out the Stryker was to be an interim stop-gap until FCS was fielded, thus only seven SBCT (believe the original total was six.) Eden is also right, in that SBCT were to be used in SSCs and LICs, and could be used in MICs by being augmented/reinforced.
Also remember that FCS is a track vehicle and not wheel. Good discussions.
Best
Kreker

Sir,

Glad to see you back! No disagreements with anything above. As I stated earlier, I'd pick the LAV over a M113. I would have liked the M8 AGS, but you can't have it all. I remember there was a lot of recrimination over the shoot-off, about the decision criteria. Didn't bother me much then or now, I simply was noting the "IO" effects of choosing the Stryker.

Is the FCS going to use banded or linked track? I've heard about them wanting banded track if the technology matured. Would take care of the most unpleasant part of tanking (breaking track).

[Kreker]

Cavguy,
Please don't call me sir...that day is long past. Hace bee on vacation and travel, thus the hiatius. To answer you question the FCS MGVs will be using banded track.
Cheers

[Yrkoon9]

To give you some perspective on the MGS from an MGS platoon leader I can tell you a few things.

First and foremost the MGS' biggest asset, as with all Strykers is speed. These suckers can do 70mph. They fly. With that comes stealth. They roll up quick and quiet in comparison to say....the Bradley.

How does that factor in todays conflicts? Simply put we always get beat to the punch. The insurgents and terrorists can hit us quick and get away. To counter that kind of speed and agility the MGS/Stryker is the best thing we have right now. Some would argue that humvees do that. But humvees die quick. The MGS and Stryker survive.

Huh?

Yeah. What most people don't want to let out is that Strykers are resilient as all hell. They don't just blow up when an IED hits them the way a Bradley will. The MGS & Stryker is light. It just gets knocked over. No kidding. People inside might be hurt - but they aren't killed nearly as often.

Okay. Speed. Resilience. What else?

Well the MGS is the quick firepower. Mainly we use it to breach buildings, hit vehicles, and create intimidation. Usually we roll with ICV's (infantry carrier vehicles), which are just Strykers rolling with a .50 and a squad of infantry. So you have a couple of ICV's and a big 105mm as backup. When the trunk monkeys jump out the back of ICV's the MGS is a helluva overwatch. With enhanced thermals and overkill firepower nobody really wants to keep fighting.

Insurgents see the MGS and they disappear. At first they were a novelty and these guys shoot at anything that is new. Like the ATGM system Stryker. But when the turret starts to rotate all hostile fire stops. They think we can see through walls and stuff. LOL!

The bad side is that the MGS is mechanically complex. The autoloading system is cumbersome. We can't carry organic infantry support. We can't self-recover.

But none of that matters after you see a cannister round hit a car!

[Cavguy]

To give you some perspective on the MGS from an MGS platoon leader I can tell you a few things.

First and foremost the MGS' biggest asset, as with all Strykers is speed. These suckers can do 70mph. They fly. With that comes stealth. They roll up quick and quiet in comparison to say....the Bradley.

How does that factor in todays conflicts? Simply put we always get beat to the punch. The insurgents and terrorists can hit us quick and get away. To counter that kind of speed and agility the MGS/Stryker is the best thing we have right now. Some would argue that humvees do that. But humvees die quick. The MGS and Stryker survive.

Huh?

Yeah. What most people don't want to let out is that Strykers are resilient as all hell. They don't just blow up when an IED hits them the way a Bradley will. The MGS & Stryker is light. It just gets knocked over. No kidding. People inside might be hurt - but they aren't killed nearly as often.

Okay. Speed. Resilience. What else?

Well the MGS is the quick firepower. Mainly we use it to breach buildings, hit vehicles, and create intimidation. Usually we roll with ICV's (infantry carrier vehicles), which are just Strykers rolling with a .50 and a squad of infantry. So you have a couple of ICV's and a big 105mm as backup. When the trunk monkeys jump out the back of ICV's the MGS is a helluva overwatch. With enhanced thermals and overkill firepower nobody really wants to keep fighting.

Insurgents see the MGS and they disappear. At first they were a novelty and these guys shoot at anything that is new. Like the ATGM system Stryker. But when the turret starts to rotate all hostile fire stops. They think we can see through walls and stuff. LOL!

The bad side is that the MGS is mechanically complex. The autoloading system is cumbersome. We can't carry organic infantry support. We can't self-recover.

But none of that matters after you see a cannister round hit a car!

Yrkoon9,

Thanks for posting. That tracks with most of what I have heard regarding survivability of the Stryker. I've only worked around, not on them. The unit I worked with didn't have the MGS yet, just the infantry variants.

Be sure to post a intro in the appropriate thread.

[Distiller]

Sounds like cavalry. I guess nobody doubts that as long as you stay off soft or wet grounds the wheeled approach is viable. And for colonial warfare without armored resp modern anti-armor-enabled opposition like Iraq the Stryker is sure quite suitable.

But I still see the danger of SBCTs being deployed outside their capabilities of, lets put it "protected infantry mobility". Versions like the TOW, the MGS, the 120mm Mortar (and the howitzer) make that quite tempting.

Question on the MGS: Is there a specific reason for the long barrel? Wouldn't a 105mm howitzer like, say, the L119 do? Is there a long-range fire requirement for the MGS?

[Rob Thornton]

Man - has this thread gone in some interesting directions. There was one post back aways that I do need to clear up - I think the folks above did listen to us - not on everything, but there are some things that just can't be changed for one reason or another - sometimes there are things that need to be the way they are for some other reason. By and large, the Army did a pretty good job I think in the bottom up refinement that came along with implementing the SBCTs - and I think they continue to do so through the mechanisms they've put in place down at Benning and at the locations where we've grown SBCTs, and from Iraq.

The discussion about where they are best suited only gets you so far though. There are just no panaceas for all the conditions which we might face. However, that has never stopped us from putting one type of force into conditions to which is what not ideally suited for before. I can tell you I had a heckuva lot more organic combat power in platoons, companies and BN in the SBCT then I had in 1/187th out the 101st AASLT. From the concepts of mobility, firepower, C2, survivability to the flat out 170 men within the company - it is an incredibly versatile formation. Combine that with modularity - i.e. you want to add AH-64s, or other capabilities, and the higher echelon CDRs can tailor the force to better suit its conditions - never probably a perfect fit, but closer then we've probably gotten before.

I'll tell you with the right terrain, and some good situational awareness I'd be comfortable employing the SBCT against most enemies (meaning in terms of not only composition, but size) I might envision having to fight - not to mention that we have a superb Air Force, and other capabilities that we can increasingly draw on - I don't have to meet somebody’s tank DIV head on to wreck it - I just have to get to a place where I have an advantage that I can exploit better then he can - being able to identify what the enemy is trying to do, and where he might be going, move faster then he can to the place so I grab the good ground, place allot of Infantry with sophisticated ATGMs like Javelin in places that he has to bring his armor in close to get at (with Javelin I already have good fire and forget, soft launch, good acquisition capabilities) - lay in a good fire plan with the 10 x 120mm per IN BN, andthe 18 x 155s in the Arty BN, lay out some good obstacles to include the advance mines we have, and tie it all together with allot of Infantry and I place him into a disadvantage our other asymmetric advantages can exploit - be they NLOS-LS, the USAF, Army ATK AVN, or a HBCT attacking from a flank. If its an away game that has limited the amount of heavy formations that we've been able to get in, then those formations can be used by the higher echelon CDR to exploit opportunities, and meet the enemy on our terms vs. his.

I'm not saying that the SBCT acn only be seen as a defensive force against armor either - I'm saying that you have to recongize what your strengths and weaknesses are, and employ them accordingly - I never, ever want a fair fight - I always want to catch the other guy while he's eating chow, refueling, unable to defend himself, screwing off in a place he thought he was safe, etc - with some good intelligence (meaning the type that comes from applying thought to information) I can get that - if I can then exploit in ways the enemy could not expect - I'll probably hand him his lunch - and everybody will be better off. Oh - and I always want more resources to do it with then I should legitmately expect - but with the caliber of men and women we have I'll probably find a way to make do with what I'm given.

I guess my point is, we have a pretty well rounded force which we should not and do not expect to employ divorced from our other capabilities. We also have a good menu of capabilities from which we can put a better package forward to provide an enemy who only has a limited suite of options at his disposal off balance. Our medium (SBCT), AASLT, Airborne, SOF, Mech/Armor, and light forces offer force planners and commander a host of capabilities that can compliment each other, and keep the enemy off balance. Add to that our incredible logistics capabilities, ATK and other Aviation, ENG and other Maneuver enhancement capabilities and our RSTA assets and the U.S. Army can put forward forces that campaign in most places where we have interests that will put us there. Further combine that with the Marines expeditionary amphibious warfare capability - that includes a fixed wing air force larger then most countries, and you further place adversaries at a disadvantage when trying to deny us entry, or meet us with a superior force. Without going into the detail of our Air and Naval capabilities, lets just limit it to saying that while we may not be able to control everything at once - we can dominate and pretty much control everything we need to in order to support our employment of land power.

We should not look at any of these capabilities in a vacuum - we must look at the way we wage war from a Joint perspective - be it fighting an insurgency, fighting a conventional force, or some hybrid (or blended or hwoever you choose your descriptive words). Further, we must leverage where possible the Inter-Agency. Regardless of the formation, or what equipment they carry into battle, winning the war begins in our minds - and is probably where it gets lost as well. I think SWC member Frank Hoffman's piece (on the SWJ Blog) is a good place to start when considering the range of conditions that will face us - while enemies have always sought to disadvantage their opponents a in time an space, the opportunites and possibilites to do so have perghaps gone up in a number of ways - we will have to massage the old grey matter real good to seize and retain the advantage - particularly given our LOCs and the domestic policy issues we confront in pursuit of our foreign policy objectives - without the equipment between the ears in good working order, it won't matter what the type of equipment we bring to the fight can do.

Best, Rob