Stryker collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

The biggest problem with MGS is the concept or the idea mated with some very marginal physics. It's not founded in any operational reality that I am aware of, and I guess came from sometime of "flow down" reasoning based on the idea that a SBCT had to have some type of "Big Gun", as an article of faith, rather than any OA that may have suggested otherwise.

The Aussies put a 76mm gun a an M-113 using the turret we had on the Saladin 6x6, and then there was the 90mm Cockerill eqipped CVR-T. Those worked, because they were comparatively simple and easy to do. MGS strikes me as the opposite.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Will,

I think either of the two calibers you mentioned would have been adequate to provide me what I was after. When we had the ILOV ATGM I made a pitch to field us the CARL G as part of the package - based on what I'd seen it do it looked plenty adequate. I don't think it ever made it up too high

I've seen the MGS fire its 105 over the side (gun perpendicular to the hull) - there was no issue I could see. I'd heard there were issues prior to that, but when I saw it live fire - no issues. Maybe they'd fixed it by then - I don't know.

Ideally - what I'd like is a system that could be both mounted, fired and reloaded from inside, but.. could be dismounted when conditions made that more advantageous. I'd at least like a capability that I could dismount - there is just something about showing up somewhere with something the enemy did not anticipate and helped me achieve tactical surprise. While the AT-4 84mm is not a terrible thing, it does not have the variety of ammunition available to the Carl G, and as such is more limited. Having commonality in the CL V to be used in the vehicle mounted system and the one you could use on dismounted operations would be better. This is all pretty much OBE though - we got what we got, better to focus on the best ways to employ it.

best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

Hi Will,

I think either of the two calibers you mentioned would have been adequate to provide me what I was after. When we had the ILOV ATGM I made a pitch to field us the CARL G as part of the package - based on what I'd seen it do it looked plenty adequate. I don't think it ever made it up too high

It is extremely technically simple to fire Carl-Gustav 84mm from a remote weapons station, and to have an auto-slew that allows it to be re-loaded in the same way M2 reloads TOW.

What is more, thanks to the auto-stabilised fire control and range finder, the round can go 1,500m and even hit slow moving targets at 1,000m.

Javelin can be very easily fired from a remote weapons station, and would be cheap and easy to retro-fit on Stryker or similar vehicle.

This is why I believe MGS is a confusion of form over function.

[Van]

Rob,
Re:

MGS fire its 105 over the side (gun perpendicular to the hull) - there was no issue I could see. I'd heard there were issues prior to that

-
According to an eye witness, during the Saudi trials for LAV 105 system in the mid-90s, firing in this attitute caused the frame of the vehicle to warp.
As you say, they may have fixed the problem by now.

Doctrinally, the whole concept of 'tank destroyers', lighter armored vehicles with big guns, has always been problematic. The MGS was originally fielded in platoons of 3 vehicles, and an experienced armor NCO commented that all that arrangement was good for was TOC security, as the vehicles could not work in wing (two vehicle) teams. Given the intense 'infantry-centric" attitudes of the brains at work there at the IBCT (especially GEN Eaton), they may have envisioned tasking out single vehicles to support infantry companies or platoons, a concept that tankers choke on for good reason.

Actually, our language talking about this says a lot about the problem. The MGS is not a tank. But we don't have a clear designation for the folks who operate it. They'll either be disgruntled tankers who want a real tank or disgruntled infantry who want a real IFV (or to walk).

[MattC86]

Software bugs are seemingly universal in modern military equipment - the extreme example being the AMRAAM, whose software spent the better part of 15 years in development. Things like software bugs and logistical issues like spare parts don't seem to me to be that big of a deal - as long as they get sorted out ASAP, and aren't putting people's lives in undue risk in the meantime.

I don't understand a great deal about the thinking behind the MGS concept - as Van says, the tank destroyer concept has long been problematic. It's as if the Army is hybridizing a vehicle without a truly separate niche to fill. It's analogous - at least to me - to the battlecruiser concept of the early 20th century - cheaper, lighter, faster than a battleship, but more capable (in theory) than a cruiser. Of course, without a true combat niche, commanders used them like battleships, with disastrous results (Jutland, HMS Hood, etc, etc).

If the idea is to get tank-like gun firepower into an SBCT's TO&E, wouldn't it eventually end up like the battlecruiser? That is, when they really need an M1, an MGS just won't be up to the task? After all, the point of the ATGM was to enable a lighter vehicle (or infantry) to kill a hard target, correct?

One final question. What's the difference between the MGS and the canceled M8 'Buford' air-dropped light armor concept? I think a lighter vehicle could have real benefit in stability ops - firepower without the intimidation and nuisance factor of the 68-ton tank, and the airmobile idea would give airborne capabilities more like the old Soviet airborne had - some of which proved effective on occasion in Afghanistan.

But if the MGS's role is truly substituting for tanks in the SBCT, I think there exists the dangerous possibility of using them like tanks, which they are not.

Matt

[Tom Odom]

Van and Matt


Both good posts. Van you are at Leavenwoth and the US Army's historical expert on tank destroyers, Dr. Chris Gabel, is there with you.

Take a look at his LP if you have not already:

[QUOTE]No. 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (PDF)[/QUOTE]

Light armor (Stuart), tank destroyers (M18), or armored reconnaissance vehicles (Sheridan) are neither fish nor fowl. As soon as you hang a gun on an armored vehicle, it is inevitable someone is going to say it is a tank and try to use it as such. For that matter, I had a BC long ago who thought a TOW Jeep was a mobile gun platform.

There is an interesting parallel to this in the aerial community, fixed wing, rotary wing, manned and unmanned when it comes to the question of armed reconnaissance. When you arm a recce bird, the pilot starts acting like a fighter-bomber, regardless of true capabilities.

Tank destroyer doctrine hinged on this phenomenon. Consider these passages from Chris Gabel in LP

FM 18-5 opened with a statement that established the specialist nature of the tank destroyer: “There is but one battle objective of tank destroyer units, this being plainly inferred by their designation. It is the destruction of hostile tanks. Throughout all phases of training and during preparation for combat, this objective will be kept in mind by all ranks."

FM 18-5: Tank destroyer units are employed offensively in large numbers, by rapid maneuver, and by surprise . . . . Offensive action allows the entire strength of a tank destroyer unit to be engaged against the enemy. For individual tank destroyers, offensive action consists of vigorous reconnaissance to locate hostile tanks and movement to advantageous positions from which to attack the enemy by fire. Tank destroyers avoid “slugging matches” with tanks, but compensate for their light armor and difficulty of concealment by exploitation of their mobility and superior observation.

Best

Tom

[Eden]

I was the Chief of Concepts at Knox when we were developing the Stryker MGS (along with some other variants for the armor community).

The MGS was not in any way supposed to be a tank destroyer. It was envisioned to be an infantry support vehicle capable of delivering high explosives and/or antipersonnel rounds to enable infantry maneuver. It could fire anti-armor rounds, but these were only for the odd BTR or T-55 that might pop up on the mid-to-low intensity battlefields we would fight on. It did not need much armor because our greatly improved situational awareness (ta-daa!) would allow us to keep it out of harm's way. Remember, the MGS - like the SBCT - is not designed for high intensity warfare. Nor was the Stryker - or the SBCT - seen as final solutions. They were placeholders while we awaited the arrival of the FCS.

We recognized that the ignorant and the unwashed might mistake the MGS for a tank, and went to great lengths in preparing requirement statements and draft doctrine to ensure that this message got across.

The interbranch arguments that raged at the time were interesting. We selected the name Mobile Gun System over Armored Gun System or Assault Gun System to avoid making it sound like a tank or (gasp) allowing the infantry to gain control of it. Parenthetically, the WWII equivalent of the MGS is not a tank destroyer but an assault gun like the SGIII. It was decided that 19Ks should man these to allow Knox to maintain control of system development and because infantrymen would not be capable of running the type of gunnery training required or of grasping the subtleties of their tactical employment. For the same reason, we wanted MGS companies within the Stryker battalion, so that an armor officer could oversee their training and the professional development of the platoon leaders. No, I'm not making any of this up.

Finally, this system and its parent organization were definitely supposed to be transportable by air - C-130 to be exact. Our vision was that the Stryker battalions and brigades would be capable of 'operational maneuver' by air. In an Iraqi context, you could fly them from Mosul to Basra and they could basically fight within minutes of rolling off the ramps. Again, a WWII paralell might be the Air Landing units that did so well in Holland and Crete.

This was, oh, five years ago, so much water has passed under the bridge. I don't know if the Stryker air-transport capability is getting much of a workout in the war.

[patmc]

I don't know if the Stryker air-transport capability is getting much of a workout in the war.

In 2006, my BN escorted Strykers from Mosul to the capital, on HETs, if I remember right. It would have been a whole lot of flights. We were a little annoyed that they didn'tjust drive down there themselves, but that was a little above our level.

[William F. Owen]

I was the Chief of Concepts at Knox when we were developing the Stryker MGS (along with some other variants for the armor community).

The MGS was not in any way supposed to be a tank destroyer. It was envisioned to be an infantry support vehicle capable of delivering high explosives and/or antipersonnel rounds to enable infantry maneuver. .

That is truly intriguing. So why was it given a 105mm gun? The 105 certainly implies the desire to have something much beyond a "just in case" anti-armour capability. 105mm requires a far larger danger close stand-off than say 76 or 90mm, which have historically proved more than adequate.

[Granite_State]

Remember, the MGS - like the SBCT - is not designed for high intensity warfare.

Isn't that a huge problem? Especially with the surviveability of the relatively lightly armored Stryker being predicated on situational awareness, which is far less likely in the current environment in Iraq and Afghanistan?

My understanding is that the Stryker was almost a political move by the Army to get in on the post-Cold War peacekeeping role in a big way, by getting this medium-weight, rapidly deployable platform.

But correct me if I'm wrong, while most variants can fit in a C-130 (can MGS?), they need to be fitted with screens to be able to handle RPGs. Doesn't that almost defeat the whole concept?