Stryker collection (merged thread)

[RTK]

As an Armored Cavalry officer, I have some issues with all this.

105mm v. 120mm: You've got to be kidding me that it has as much, if not more, than an Abrams.

It carries less than half the UBL of an Abrams. After the ready rack is expended, you have to expose a soldier to reload the bloody thing.

This is not a replacement to the MBT. It's an enhancement for Stryker units. Comparing the MGS to an Abrams is mixing apples and oranges.

[pcmfr]

Ok, obviously SFC Cooper made a bit of a stretch comparing the firepower of this vehicle to an M1A, but don't you guys think this is a great thing to provide more infantry units in Iraq with better fire power? Also, the lighter weight, mobility, and logistics footprint makes MGS a good platform to support future expeditionary ops.

Tanks are great, but we only have so many of them and they are a difficult to transport anywhere in a hurry and support them once we get there.

[Jones_RE]

The mobile gun system isn't exactly easy to ship overseas in a hurry either - unless they've fixed the problem where you have to lift the turret off with a crane before the thing'll fit inside the airplane . . . .

Still, the MGS will probably perform fine in the field - or at any rate it's problems will be more or less manageable. Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training. If the army spent half the money that went into Stryker on counter insurgency training for the current (heavy) force, we'd have gotten a lot father a lot faster in Iraq.

And no, the thing is not a tank. However, it won't be employed that way. Stryker doctrine calls for two mobile gun systems in each company to support infantry operations with direct fire. While the lessons of the Tank Destroyer Corps are important to keep in mind, the Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly. They should be vastly more effective thank Tank Destroyer battalions.

[RTK]

Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training.

I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.

The Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly.

Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.

The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.

In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.

[pcmfr]

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight.

I think most references to heavy armor's lack of mobility refer to its lack of strategic mobility, ie, it's great once it gets there, but it's tough to bring to the fight. The Bradley's and M1As you rode in Iraq took a long time and a lot of manpower to get there via MPF ships and trucks from Kuwait.

[Jones_RE]

I think the traditional concern has been tactical mobility. See battle reports on Grozny, for example. The preconception is that urban terrain forces the tanks to move in predictable paths, while exposing the vulnerable roofs, flanks and rears to enemy anti-tank gunners. In fact, the difficulties suffered by tanks in urban warfare are most often compounded by poor training and employment.

In fact, I believe that armor which is properly supported by infantry and properly employed (i.e. by well trained crews, with adequate maintenance) is extremely effective in a streetfight. The key factor remains training - both by tankers and supporting infantry, however sound employment and numerical superiority can make up for deficits in individual abililty (at the expense of materiel and personnel casualties, increased time and increased collateral damage).

[jcustis]

Dumb statement. An Abrams' armor is an OFFENSIVE tool because it provides mobility under fire. Too many folks tend to look at Strykers as tanks already and this sort of PR encourages that line of thought. A Stryker (MGS or otherwise) is a troop carrier. Period.

What do we make then, of the USMC LAV? Troop carrier? Wanna-be IFV? Consider the way in which they have been employed the past 20 years.

[Shek]

I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.

RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).

Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.

The RSTA squadron is made up of 19Ds. No change is needed since scouts are performing the scout missions.

The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.

In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.

The Stryker concept is based on the infantry squad. It brings infantry units to an OBJ fresh to fight and allows them to be protected. Too much emphasis has been made on the false concept that Stryker Brigades were designed to fufill a similar role to mech units, which is not the case. They are meant to bridge the gap between the light and heavy force, and if augmented properly with ADA, MP, aviation (this problem will go away once aviation becomes organic to the SBCTs), can fight in major combat operations. SBCTs would have been the perfect force to follow 3ID, having the mobility to keep the LOCs open, the protection and firepower to destroy the Fedayeen threat, and the infantry to clear urban terrain.

[RTK]

RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).

Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.

The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.

Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.

As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.

As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.

[Shek]

Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.

The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.

Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.

As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.

As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.

RTK,
Whoever you are getting your information from is giving you bad information. The SBCT is not built around the RSTA or the LRAS3. Infantry rifle companies do not have LRAS3. As far as the warranties go, soldiers know how to maintain the items that are warrantied - the issue is that a contractor from the company that supplies the item must be the one working on it. For example, the engine in the Stryker is the exact same as the FMTV (minus the turbo). However, for a certain time period, we couldn't perform certain maintenance tasks on the engines in the Stryker even though the 63s were hanging parts on the FMTV engines.

Next, you don't need to ground mount your 120mm mortars anymore because the MC-B has been fielded.

Lastly, you are conflating COIN with asymmetrical threats/irregular threats or however you want to label the Fedayeen.