Stryker collection (merged thread)

[RTK]

RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).

Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.

The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.

Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.

As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.

As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.

[Shek]

Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.

The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.

Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.

As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.

As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.

RTK,
Whoever you are getting your information from is giving you bad information. The SBCT is not built around the RSTA or the LRAS3. Infantry rifle companies do not have LRAS3. As far as the warranties go, soldiers know how to maintain the items that are warrantied - the issue is that a contractor from the company that supplies the item must be the one working on it. For example, the engine in the Stryker is the exact same as the FMTV (minus the turbo). However, for a certain time period, we couldn't perform certain maintenance tasks on the engines in the Stryker even though the 63s were hanging parts on the FMTV engines.

Next, you don't need to ground mount your 120mm mortars anymore because the MC-B has been fielded.

Lastly, you are conflating COIN with asymmetrical threats/irregular threats or however you want to label the Fedayeen.

[RTK]

RTK,
Whoever you are getting your information from is giving you bad information. The SBCT is not built around the RSTA or the LRAS3. Infantry rifle companies do not have LRAS3. As far as the warranties go, soldiers know how to maintain the items that are warrantied - the issue is that a contractor from the company that supplies the item must be the one working on it. For example, the engine in the Stryker is the exact same as the FMTV (minus the turbo). However, for a certain time period, we couldn't perform certain maintenance tasks on the engines in the Stryker even though the 63s were hanging parts on the FMTV engines.

Next, you don't need to ground mount your 120mm mortars anymore because the MC-B has been fielded.

Lastly, you are conflating COIN with asymmetrical threats/irregular threats or however you want to label the Fedayeen.

Never said it was built aroudn the RSTA. I said ISR systems. Surely LRAS isn't the only ISR asset in the SBCT, as the sensor platforms in the SBCT were the highly touted and much celebrated additions that, at the risk of talking about systems we shouldn't talk about, we won't. I acknowledge your point about SBCTs formed around squad sized elements. A secondary focus, if you will, is the ISR platforms, particularly EW, SBCTs have that other BDE organizations either don't have or didn't have when the SBCTs first were established.

Whether we wanted to call Fedayeen asymmetric threats or insurgents; when little dudes pop out of the woodwork wearing civilian clothes (not many adhered to the black pajama uniform) it doesn't matter what you call them. They're still a problem that needs to be addressed whose effect on the battlefield will not be negated by a piece of equipment.

[Shek]

Never said it was built aroudn the RSTA. I said ISR systems. Surely LRAS isn't the only ISR asset in the SBCT, as the sensor platforms in the SBCT were the highly touted and much celebrated additions that, at the risk of talking about systems we shouldn't talk about, we won't. I acknowledge your point about SBCTs formed around squad sized elements. A secondary focus, if you will, is the ISR platforms, particularly EW, SBCTs have that other BDE organizations either don't have or didn't have when the SBCTs first were established.

The RSTA is definitely built around ISR capabilities, with the appropriate MOS assigned to carry out the mission. Infantry companies are not built around organic ISR capabilities - it's the dissemination of the ISR "hits" via FBCB2 that increase the capability of these units.

Whether we wanted to call Fedayeen asymmetric threats or insurgents; when little dudes pop out of the woodwork wearing civilian clothes (not many adhered to the black pajama uniform) it doesn't matter what you call them. They're still a problem that needs to be addressed whose effect on the battlefield will not be negated by a piece of equipment.

Agreed that they were a threat and that we didn't focus on them properly. However, they were not an insurgent threat, but rather an irregular threat. An insurgent is a subcategory of an irregular threat. I'm not trying to slice and dice your argument, but do want to make sure that you understand that there is a difference. Also, I wasn't offering the Stryker as a panacea to COIN, but rather highlighting that a SBCT (if it had been ready and available for the march to Baghdad) would have been a great asset against the irregular threat that the Fedayeen presented.