"Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?

**selil** · 01-30-2008

From Steven Aftergood at FAS and passed along for you a CRS.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34333.pdf

This report is intended to provide information that might be of interest to Congress on the current debate surrounding the creation of special U.S. Army units and organizations, which some believe are needed to address current and future security requirements. While the Army has recently changed from a division-based force to a brigade-centric force, it has resisted the creation of special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations. In contrast, there have been a number of proposals to create new units and organizations better suited to address the challenges of these mission areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s recent challenge to the Army to organize and prepare for asymmetric warfare and advising and training foreign armies could renew and elevate this debate.

**Ken White** · 01-30-2008

That's always scary...

All in all not a bad review though my antennae twitch in frenzied disagreement at the way he's pointing. He says early on; "While the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and future military operations may indeed require that Army leaders be “pentathletes,” it may prove to be an unrealistic expectation that the majority of Army NCOs and officers will attain this extremely high standard of performance." That's garbage, the Officers and NCOs can handle it, all the Army has to do is train 'em right. He pronounces the soft bias of low expectations -- and he very subtly continues to head that way.

All the while ignoring one simple fact -- a volunteer Army and its costs today can only be so big. With an Army of a given size, if you over specialize, you decrease your capability in all specialties and I question whether we can afford to do that. We have no guarantee that we will conduct any COIN or stability operations in the next few years and we have proven that we can adapt to do that if required. We do generally agree that we can afford to bobble COIN -- we cannot afford to lose a major conventional war. Ergo we have to be prepared for the big one and cope with the smaller ankle biters.

One thing of interest; "For example, the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, used to include only about 30 hours of counterinsurgency course work for the majors attending the year-long course but now includes 200-plus hours of counterinsurgency core courses and another 40-plus hours of counterinsurgency electives." Don't know whether that's true or not but it would seem to directly contradict something said on the topic only last week on this board.

**Cavguy** · 01-30-2008

Originally Posted by Ken White

One thing of interest; "For example, the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, used to include only about 30 hours of counterinsurgency course work for the majors attending the year-long course but now includes 200-plus hours of counterinsurgency core courses and another 40-plus hours of counterinsurgency electives." Don't know whether that's true or not but it would seem to directly contradict something said on the topic only last week on this board.

First, no way of 200 hours devoted to COIN.

From what I understand, It's all in the definition. There is no separate class on COIN at CGSC in the core, as I understand from my friends currently in it and some briefs I have seen. Instead it is "integrated" into the curricula to varying degrees.

I would reference again to the post on Abu Muqawama's blog here, from a current student. I know several CGSC professors lurk here, maybe they could add some clarity.

**CR6** · 01-30-2008

Originally Posted by Cavguy

First, no way of 200 hours devoted to COIN.

From what I understand, It's all in the definition. There is no separate class on COIN at CGSC in the core, as I understand from my friends currently in it and some briefs I have seen. Instead it is "integrated" into the curricula to varying degrees.

I would reference again to the post on Abu Muqawama's blog

Krepenevich discussed a similar trend at CGSC in the 1960s. In The Army and Vietnam he discusses how Leavenworth responded to directives to increase the hours in the curriculum devoted to low-intensity conflict by labeling core courses as LIC-related, while continuing to teach standard Corps and DIV operations. Thus the new requirement was "met" with no substantive change to business as usual on the banks of the Missouri.

**sullygoarmy** · 01-30-2008

Having finished CGSC last year,we had about 7 classes (figure 21 hours) dedicated completely on COIN. We did some base analysis then looked at case studies in Malaya, Algiers and Afghanistan (1979). Now there were history classes which touched on COIN and I believe that counted towards the total hours. But there is no way you hit 200 hours of COIN instruction. I did take the COIN elective (A527). That consisted of somewhere around 12 class meetings totally dedicated to studying both the theory (Galula, Trinquer, etc) and practical applications. Additionally, the terrorism electives (A529 and A538), to me covered just as much COIN, if not more than the CGSC core course.

This is dated by about a year now. Regardless, I though that background report brought out some good points by highlighting the pluses and minuses of each argument. It also, however, gives the politicians the ability to spin the report any way they choose!