"Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?

[Ken White]

The CRS and I go back a long way...

They and the GAO bear considerable watching -- and skepticism. There is ALWAYS an agenda...

[Rob Thornton]

that if you start yanking on the "O" thread in the DOTLMPF (that being the "Organizational" one), you have to remember that the other threads are attached - some more, some less. You start impacting the number of folks available for "full spectrum" operations - those missions left over after you create a specialized force to be used under a specified set of conditions - you start to gamble that you're remaining force structure will be of adequate capacity when called on to do those "other missions". At that point there are some less then happy choices left - one of which is re-equip & re-train that specialized force to meet some immediate need - which puts that force in a bad position. At that point conditions may have made the situation worse then if we could have responded more appropriately.

In an unconstrained resource world - where everybody got everything they needed to meet every possible contingency, at no penalty - I'd say go for it, but this is not the way of the world, and any increases in force could be whittled away as soon as the politics call for it - we tend not to remember more then about 5 years at a pop - and we tend to look at history in a very deterministic and linear fashion vs. a contingent and non-linear fashion - this sets us up to see things as we prefer vs. as they are or were.

I've thought about this quite a bit, an I personally believe there are better ways to meet those challenges through other parts of the DOTLMPF non-linear equation. I think first and foremost, its a matter of doctrine and training - I think the doctrine piece includes training in it - you don't inculcate it by osmosis (although you can get it by practicing it - even if you don't realize you are practicing it) This I believe also includes education - but all of them are not mutually exclusive - they go hand in hand, and often occur in the same place at the same time. To me proof of what is capable in terms of the quality of our leaders and soldiers is their effectiveness in carrying out the missions they are assigned - be they engaging in a counter-insurgency, participating in SFA (Security Force Assistance - training and advising of foreign forces), or conducting a BCT level Combined Arms attack on a uniformed enemy - all of which we've done pretty well in terms of adapting over a short period of time and turning the supertanker by any historical military standard I'm aware of - it speaks to the quality of both the men and women of the military and the institutions which support them.

The thing I think could help us do things better is in the "P" area (Personnel) - we have to get better at identifying skills, attributes and experiences, and then matching those folks up with the right jobs. Most of this has to do with how we decide to track these folks, but it can be done, and progress is being made in doing so (we do it in other areas). The second part is once we've identified them, getting them into the right slots at the right time.

The easy fix seems to be to go for the "O" or the "M" - but both create all kinds of waves that few anticipate, or wind up having to deal with once they launch the idea. Our ability to get folks to PME is linked to OPTEMPO - if we can't break them free because OPTEMPO is too high, or the mandated fills (the must dos) claim these bodies - we hurt the larger force - the one that is both capable and winds up doing the full range by default - #### happens after all.

The rest of the Inter-Agency (IA) does not have the PME opportunities we do - if they send a guy or gal to a school, the job goes unfilled - as such, not many IA folks get to go to professional schools throughout their career which enhance both the individual, the organization, and the mission - we often don't realize how fortunate we are until you show up and compare your professional education opportunities with your Inter-Agency peers. Put a larger OPTEMPO requirement on a smaller portion of the force in order to create specialized units - and you jeopardize your PME some. With regard to the "M" - Material - it creates lots of other requirements that ripple across the spectrum - because it effects logistics, training, facilities, etc..

So first - my answer is that I don't think we need another specialized force - we're doing pretty well, but can probably do better through better personnel management - I think we are doing this, but it takes awhile to even nudge the super-tanker.

I don't mind people asking a good question - it gets people thinking, but I've come to believe that when the GIF (Good Idea Fairy) visits there are a few things that should be asked prior to introducing it to the general public (unless the intent is stated to generate discussion)

Some of these questions are: what are the repercussions, consequences and impact of this idea in related areas?; what is the scope which it will impact?; is this a problem or a condition I'm proposing a solution for?; Is there an easier answer, that while not optimal, will get the job done, and will not unravel other areas and create other problems?; what are the potential un-intended consequences that will have to be dealt with?; who is going to have to live with my GIF?

If you can reasonably answered those questions, and feel the risk is justified or mitigated, then its probably safe to introduce and pursue a GIF.

Best, Rob

[Old Eagle]

This is a core issue at an on-going symposium at Ft Leavenworth. Interestingly, very early on panelists moved from GPF to full spectrum forces. I'll try to update you on any conclusions/results.

[Jones_RE]

It seems to me that the authors were just assuming that this specialized force would be 1) ready when needed for a future conflict, 2) available at the time and 3) in the right area with its resources.

I sincerely doubt a specialized counterinsurgency unit could meet any of those criteria. Had such a unit existed in 2003, it's personnel, equipment and training resources would probably have been raided to make up for shortages in the line units getting ready for OIF. It also would already have deployed everyone else to Afghanistan. Finally, the process of readying and moving the unit to Iraq would have taken quite a long time.

Even when such a unit is up and running, there's no guarantee that a high intensity force would be needed to deal with a blowup like Fallujah, Ramadi or Najaf. And all three of those happened at about the same time! This hyped up advisory corps would have been storming Fallujah by itself when their Iraqi recruits folded. In Ramadi, they'd have been overrun.

General purpose forces will never be ideal for any mission. But it seems to me (as a civilian) that in war doing something now is more important than doing it perfectly.

[William F. Owen]

"Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?"

I assume I am not alone in considering the nature of the question as part of the problem. There maybe no stupid questions but this one indicates a real lack of understanding.

The Manoeuvre Warfare crowd always tout the old focus on "the enemy and not terrain" and yet that has clearly produced a very limited mindset, where enemy and terrain are seen as defining the problems and not opportunities.

One well trained and rationally equipped army can do anything you want it to. What someone needs to ask is why some armies fail to be able to do it.

[Gian P Gentile]

Sullygoarmy uses this quote from "The Centurions" after his posting. Although this is a tengent from the main thrust of this thread the quote he used got me to thinking:

I'd like to have two armies: one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, fanfares, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals and dear little regimental officers...

The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflaged battle dress, who would not be put on display, but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That's the army in which I should like to fight.

The Centurions

Well it seems to me that we have it the way Larteguy wanted it. We have the American combat soldier and combat marine who fights in Iraq and Afghanistan everyday in their "camouflaged battle dress" and then we have the Army back on display here in the United States. That display force is actually the metaphor of perfectness created of the American fighting soldier by the supporters of both wars; that is to say the notion that the American fighting soldier can do no wrong, that he is perfect in his actions because he supports and carries out a righteous ideological cause. The image at the President's state of the union address of the service members in full regalia sitting behind the president's family are examples of our actual fighting army that is on "display" to the American people. The sad irony during the President's speech is that as we looked at those brave service members on TV just hours before 5 American combat soldiers were killed in Mosul. Such is the two armies that the author of "The Centurions," Jean Larteguy called for.

[selil]

Colonel Gentile,

At first I read this and thought, "smoke on the water and lucy in the sky with diamonds", then I realized, dang he's right. Unfortunately I think you will always need a political Army and a fighting Army. I don't know if you can have both.