With three caveats:

1. The Geographic Commands were not designed to be the point men in US foreign relations but fell into that mode by default. That needs to be rectified, probably by adequate funding of State, the establishment of Ambassadors Plenipotentiary, aligned with the GeoComs, who take back that responsibility. Revitalization of USIA and USAID are also required.

2. Someone has to do it -- and here in the US, the Army has gotten into the business as a result of WW II experience (Again... ) AND the default of the US government and Congress in particular to prepare for contingency operations. I suspect the same problem exists in the UK and the legislators are unwilling to pay the bill for what's needed in order to avoid having to tell voters their votes will no longer be bought. What's required is an assessment of what may occur and adequate funding for the foreign policy establishment and those government agencies that should be doing this kind of work.

2. In the US, we have tabbed FID and allied efforts to USSOCOM -- who'd really rather not (in the case of some) be involved -- recall that initially, SOCOM had the whole ball of wax, SF, JSOC, PsyOps and ALL Civil Affairs. While there were and are problems with that organizational concept as illustrated by the current situation, what's now required is a multi-agency assessment and review to establish a new model.

But the bottom line is that it is not really an Army or Marine mission other than in the first 30 days or so after major combat. Not least because in an era of highly paid and exorbitantly equipped volunteer forces in a healthy global economy, the cost in spaces is too high for the services. You can have war fighters or nation builders but not both in adequate numbers for the long missions.