UK military problems & policies

**Granite_State** · 01-25-2016

Trident may seem to David Cameron to be a very useful weapon for attacking Jeremy Corbyn. But does it keep Britain safe?

Actually, no. There is a good, hard, patriotic argument for getting rid of this unusable, American-controlled monstrosity before it bankrupts us and destroys our real defences. And lazy, cheap politics shouldn’t blind us to these facts.
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WE do not even control Trident, relying on the USA for so much of its technology and maintenance that we could never use it without American approval. How independent is that?
Meanwhile the Army is visibly shrivelling, demoralised, ill-equipped, historic regiments hollowed out and merged, experienced officers and NCOs leaving. Something similar is happening to the Navy, saddled with two vast joke aircraft carriers whose purpose is uncertain, even if they ever get any aircraft to carry. The RAF is a little better off, but not much.
This is caused mainly by the giant bill for renewing Trident, which will probably end up more than £100 billion, at a time when we are heavily in debt already. If there were any obvious or even remote use for it, then maybe this could be justified. But there isn’t. We could easily maintain a small arsenal of H-bombs or nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, just in case, for far less.

http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co....-of-money.html

Pretty persuasive to this Yank.

**Red Rat** · 01-25-2016

Of course it is recent accounting innovation to bring Trident into the core defence budget. Previous nuclear programmes were kept separate simply because while their strategic utility was not questioned, neither was their lack of tactical utility.

The problem with Hitchen's analysis is that he is basing the utility of Trident on the world now, not the world in 20 years time. Having started my erstwhile military career facing 3rd Shock Army on the Inner German Border and then less than 15 years later finding myself with German Fallschirmjaeger on the Tajikistan border operating alongside Uzbeks against the Taleban, I am not sure I would want to make that prediction.

**Firn** · 01-28-2016

Originally Posted by Red Rat

Of course it is recent accounting innovation to bring Trident into the core defence budget. Previous nuclear programmes were kept separate simply because while their strategic utility was not questioned, neither was their lack of tactical utility.

Certainly any such drastic change in budgeting raised eyebrows, as consistency is for very good reasons a key principle in accounting. Such a shift should have a much better arguments on it's side as the previous stance supposedly also had its pros.

There is no doubt that facilitating the ill-conceived and poorly executed austerity policy of the recent government was a major factor in this decision. Maybe supported by the ability to show 'strong British commitment' to it's Nato partners by puffing up the percentage of British military spending by subtracting x on one side and adding x on the other.

Even if it's sounds ridiculous this shift pretty likely had already on impact on British defence spending. The specific accounting logic certainly influences more or less the way countries and companies operate. In this case the rest of the defence budget should be under heavier pressure then with the former accounting policy.

**davidbfpo** · 01-30-2016

A short interview with the British Army's top soldier (CGS), the headline is focused on legal actions against soldiers, but I thought this was of note:

One of the challenges I face as CGS is that, paradoxically, we’ve never been more popular, with 91 percent approval rating. But I also think that I cannot remember a time when we were less well understood.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...ral-staff.html

**davidbfpo** · 03-07-2016

Hat tip to WoTR for this superb critique of UK national security policy as it tries again to decide what it needs to do and then do it:http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the...ion-and-power/

He starts with:

In the winter of 2015, as Britain released its latest statement of its national orientation, there was every sign that the wishes that had underpinned its statecraft were being blown away.

**davidbfpo** · 07-08-2016

After the Chilcot Report there has been a flurry of media attention, but the report being so large it will take time for a fuller analysis. Meantime here are two SME, both British, giving their viewpoint.

Professor Michael Clarke, ex-RUSI Director:https://rusi.org/commentary/chilcot-judgement-history and he opens with:

The Chilcot Report reinforces the view that Tony Blair will not be held criminally responsible for taking Britain to war in Iraq. That is no surprise. But Chilcot’s devastating critique is a surprise insofar as it reveals just how systemic was the policy failure over which he presided. Tony Blair was determined to exercise prime ministerial leadership and he led the country into a strategic blunder from which neither Britain nor the region has so far recovered.

(He ends with) But like the tragic Shakespearean figure he now appears to cut for himself in the light of the Chilcot Report, he will face the judgement of history, which may be a good deal harsher.

Thanks to WoTR for the next historical analysis by Huw J. Davies is a senior lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London @ Shrivenham Staff College amd he ends with:

What does this mean, then, for the future of British military interventions? If the military historical examples I have cited are anything to go by, then there is little chance that we will learn the lessons of the Iraq War in the long-term. Each of the mistakes committed in the lead up to the invasion in 2003 was committed in one form or another previously. Sir John Chilcot hopes that a decision to go to war will not again be made without careful and considered analysis. It seems likely that this odd statement of the obvious will prevail in the short-term. But Britain’s history of political-military relations suggests that this simple objective is far from obvious, and even less likely to be adhered to. Politicians will do what politicians want to do. The Chilcot report merely confirms yet another example of a failure of the political and military interface. I suspect it will not be the last.