UK military problems & policies

[Ron Humphrey]

As I understand it, Dannatt's comments arise from the British Army's experiences in southern Iraq, starting from April 2003. They had taken control of Basra and were trying to fill in the gaps caused by the collapse of Iraqi government structures. I remember the CO of 7 Armd Brigade sitting in his office in the palace, describing how he was running the local main bank out of an ISO container in the grounds, administered by TA soldiers with a finance background.

I believe the Army has formed the view that it cannot rely on the UK civilian agencies and ministries to stand up when they are needed, especially in non-permissive environments in Iraq and southern Afghanistan. This has been particularly notable in the MoD's (and again the Army, via 52 Brigade) development of new SSR doctrine. They have come to the view that in order to successfully exit from operations such as those in Iraq, they will need to have organic stablisation assets and capabilities, because their civil counterparts can not or will not fill the gap.

Yep:

... we have a winner. Yep, it ain't our job but somehow we always seem to be required to fill the vaccuum when our Phase IV buds are UA / AWOL from the game.

SWJ ED:

The issue is not "can we do it" or "we have to, there is no one else" -- the issue is who should do it. The Armed forces, if given the mission will do it, no question -- but is it really their job? Should it be their reponsibility? Been my observation that if one is willing to accept a responsibility, even if it is not rightly theirs, the world will readily accede to that and walk away. I think that's probably the genesis of the phrase 'mission creep' and the word 'overcommitment.' Just because it can work doesn't mean it's right -- or should remain that way...

This is one of those 'be careful what you want, you may get it' issues.

(emphasis Ronexcept for the first should ,that was ken)


Do you think those who need to are going to get that or not?