UK military problems & policies

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this superb critique of UK national security policy as it tries again to decide what it needs to do and then do it:http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the...ion-and-power/

He starts with:

In the winter of 2015, as Britain released its latest statement of its national orientation, there was every sign that the wishes that had underpinned its statecraft were being blown away.

[davidbfpo]

After the Chilcot Report there has been a flurry of media attention, but the report being so large it will take time for a fuller analysis. Meantime here are two SME, both British, giving their viewpoint.

Professor Michael Clarke, ex-RUSI Director:https://rusi.org/commentary/chilcot-judgement-history and he opens with:

The Chilcot Report reinforces the view that Tony Blair will not be held criminally responsible for taking Britain to war in Iraq. That is no surprise. But Chilcot’s devastating critique is a surprise insofar as it reveals just how systemic was the policy failure over which he presided. Tony Blair was determined to exercise prime ministerial leadership and he led the country into a strategic blunder from which neither Britain nor the region has so far recovered.

(He ends with) But like the tragic Shakespearean figure he now appears to cut for himself in the light of the Chilcot Report, he will face the judgement of history, which may be a good deal harsher.

Thanks to WoTR for the next historical analysis by Huw J. Davies is a senior lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London @ Shrivenham Staff College amd he ends with:

What does this mean, then, for the future of British military interventions? If the military historical examples I have cited are anything to go by, then there is little chance that we will learn the lessons of the Iraq War in the long-term. Each of the mistakes committed in the lead up to the invasion in 2003 was committed in one form or another previously. Sir John Chilcot hopes that a decision to go to war will not again be made without careful and considered analysis. It seems likely that this odd statement of the obvious will prevail in the short-term. But Britain’s history of political-military relations suggests that this simple objective is far from obvious, and even less likely to be adhered to. Politicians will do what politicians want to do. The Chilcot report merely confirms yet another example of a failure of the political and military interface. I suspect it will not be the last.

[davidbfpo]

A good review of the Chilcot Report by a long serving political journalist:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/...blair-and-iraq

[davidbfpo]

A concise explanation how the Royal Navy has shrunk and is no longer the capable ally the USN likes to work with:http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-uk-...-idUKKCN10L1AD

I don't recall such a full explanation in the UK press, but six of the RN's most modern destroyers, Type 45, have engines that do not work, each costing £1 billion and the MoD say they need 'deep maintenance':http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016...dodgy-engines/

[Windows97]

For those like me that scratch their heads when trying to get to grips with Army 2020 the following is funny, insightful and ever so sarcastic in a very Monty Python-esque way and is specifically aimed at the new Strike Brigade idea (I won't grace that with the epithet "concept"). Gen. Carter you magnificent bastard!!!!! I wonder, do you have a silly walk too?



http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogs....html?spref=fb

[Windows97]

No sure if posted elsewhere but a damning indictment of HMGs procurement and management of the Type 45 destroyer (precise: it's not all BAe's fault, surprisingly)

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/...roject-Ma.aspx

[davidbfpo]

Recently SW Journal had this article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...s-transparency and the author referred to a forthcoming report on the theme. I spotted it this week via the Oxford Research Group's e-briefing, as the project comes from their sub-group the Remote Control Project.

A grand title 'All Quiet On The ISIS Front : British Secret Warfare In The Information Age' as yet unread (63 pgs). The summary says:

Remote Control’s latest report tracks the UK’s secretive but growing military commitments abroad by analysing the rise in the use of drones for targeted killing, the use of Special Forces, and the provision of capabilities such as intelligence and embedded troops to allied forces. The deniability of these operations may bring flexibility, which can create opportunities when it comes to dealing with fluid and complex security threats. But we question the notion that greater secrecy is always better strategy, particularly in an age when leaks of information are seemingly inevitable, demand for political accountability is high, and trust in politicians and the wider expert community is low.

Link:http://remotecontrolproject.org/repo...formation-age/