UK military problems & policies

[Fuchs]

Germany attempted a two-speed military in the 90's until recently.
In the end, the higher readiness, deployable part of the military got about what it needed (normal business) and the rest was starved of resources, usually operating old crap equipment.

I was amazed the Brits could be stupid enough to follow a path proved to be stupid (with the benefit of hindsight !) when I saw those plans for the first time.

[davidbfpo]

A scathing article by Max Hastings on the UK's defence policy; a taster:

David Cameron’s Government is cutting the regular Army to its lowest manpower strength for centuries: 82,000. When the downsizing is complete, more than 20 per cent of our soldiers will have gone. I must confess that I am profoundly sceptical whether it will prove possible to recruit the 30,000 reservists the Defence Secretary promised this week.

Soon, we shall be capable of deploying only a single battlegroup of 7,000–8,000 men for sustained operations overseas. Compare this tiny force to the 35,000 troops deployed in Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles in the 1970s, or the 30,000 military personnel sent to the First Gulf War in 1991.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...or-nation.html

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.

[Fuchs]

Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.

This sounds confused.

The U.S.'s allies have plenty to fill up a sizeable share of "security responsibility".
OK; Luxembourg has only a battalion and some AWACS and Iceland only has bases and a coast guard, but all others have real military forces.


Now what exactly don't they have, what exactly are the Brits going to have less than many are used to?
Ready-to-go land forces for great power gaming in distant places.
Why won't they have them any more in large numbers?
Because they're not worth the expense.


Furthermore; which treaty other than the Charter of the United Nations says that China is relevant to UK security policy? I suppose they don't need to care about East Asia, just as the U.S. could stay at Hawaii and not care about East Asia any more. That's a sovereign option.

Russia "significantly increasing the size of" its military is news to me. Their army converts to a border region crisis quick reaction force, their navy is replacing ships at a rate sufficient only for a coastal navy and their air force will probably need a decade to get substantial numbers of new generation combat aircraft operational.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuchs

This sounds confused.
The U.S.'s allies have plenty to fill up a sizeable share of "security responsibility".

I won't debate your point on China primarily because I agree with you. Nations have enduring interests and not all of them are common with their allies, but we do have many shared security interests and NATO's shortfalls that were demonstrated in Libya in my view effectively counter your argument that NATO countries have real militaries. Furthermore, if the US is going to shift more effort to the Asia-Pacific (agree, disagree, or indifferent doesn't matter), then there will be less US capacity and capability in Europe. Capacities and capabilities that the EU and NATO militaries are dependent upon. It is one thing to claim to have a real military and another to actually have that one that can independently conduct combat operations because it has invested in all needed support and enabling systems in addition to the shooters.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/op...le-moment.html

President Obama, who pressed hard for NATO involvement, rightly insisted that Europe, along with Canada, take the lead. It is reasonable to expect the wealthy nations of Europe to easily handle a limited mission in their own backyard that involved no commitment of ground troops. Reasonable, but, as it turned out, not realistic.

For decades, European nations have counted on a free-spending Pentagon to provide the needed capabilities they failed to provide themselves. The Pentagon is now under intense and legitimate pressure to meet America’s security needs more economically. It can no longer afford to provide affluent allies with a free ride.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/ar...ulnerable.html

And with the U.S. increasingly looking across the Pacific as it reshapes its defence policy to counter China, we may find we have to be more reliant on ourselves — but with very little to rely on. A Labour government defence review in 1998 — before the threat of Muslim extremism was exposed by 9/11, and when Chinese power was far less than it is today — concluded we needed a minimum of 32 destroyers and frigates to be equal to our responsibilities.

We now have just 19.

The Army’s manpower is being cut from 102,000 to 82,000, with the MoD claiming that a boost in the reserves to 30,000 will cover the shortfall. However, it is feared that these part-timers would provide no more than the equivalent of 2,000 full-time soldiers, and that an unsustainable strain would be put on them and their employers.

[Fuchs]

Concerning "Libya":

I suppose we have a different idea of what a military force is supposed to be capable of.

Extended cruise missile diplomacy does not rank high on my list.


There's something about military power that got lost by small wars-minded people: If you go to war, you mobilise it.
We (Europeans) could have swamped Libya with three million soldiers IF we had been serious about fighting Ghadafi. We were not serious. We pushed him a bit with the left-hand small finger, and this was a political choice - not a limit of our military capability.

As far as I can tell, insufficient mid-air refuelling and guided munition stocks were among the main criticisms during and after the Libya thing. I would be most surprised if such things were taken seriously as sufficient indicators for having a "real" military.
Guess what? The German general staff panicked after the 1939/-9 Poland invasion because ammunition stocks were badly depleted. Three or four weeks of intense military action with France and the Heer would have folded by 1939-11.
Range of German fighters back then? About 500 km.
I have yet to see anyone who asserts that Germany had no "real military" by fall 1939.

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs,

I don't think you're accounting for political reality today, even if you and I don't agree with the general trend of political decisions to get involved in so called small wars, they are a fact of life. Maybe the economic crisis will bring us all to our senses, but in the mean time the challenge is having armed forces sufficiently large enough to support the current enduring occupation and peace keeping missions around the world, and in addition have enough strike capacity to conduct offensive/coercive military operations on short notice. I think you over estimate Europe's capacity to do so.

Of course a nation can attempt to mobilize to go to war, though I wonder how effectively modern, liberal democracies could actually do so if a real mobilization was actually required? Could Britian have sufficiently mobilized its industry to support and sustain major combat operations during WWII without extensive US support? Our industrial mobilization to support the UK and others at that time lifted us out of depression and perhaps enabled the allies to win.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.

For too long both the UK & USA have leaned on each other; with one major exception when each has used large-scale military force, respectively Suez and Vietnam. Often the UK has made strategic choices to act and since the end of 'The Cold War' intervene simply as the 'Special Relationship' was seen to be at risk if we didn't.

The USA, especially with the historically close military to military relationship, has looked for support from the UK - from the low profile to the high profile, mass support seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Westminster-Whitehall-Cheltenham circles the 'special relationship' is seen as (pause) embedded for ever.

As an aside the differences between the DoD and State Dept in the Falklands War are a good illustration of how this can alter the situation.

In a curious way the UK's downsizing of military capability could enhance 'smart power' and doing more with less for the USA. This I suspect explains why UK SOF and intelligence escaping downsizing (and a few other capabilities).

Politics though come first.

It is easy to see US officials and politicians asking if the UK and others will not share the burden, do we need to engage with them? Engagement of course takes many forms, two examples: intelligence sharing and sales of equipment.

This has happened before: with New Zealand after its stance on nuclear weapons (which has just ended), Canada when its military capability and will evaporated in the 1970's and there's France - with whom the USA has well, a different relationship.

The significant implication for US strategy? Shared and shallow relationships with new partners for the USA, rather than the in-depth embedded 'special relationship' with the UK.

In the interests of contrary views try this:http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.c...l-warrior.html