UK military problems & policies

[davidbfpo]

I don't know if the USA has a similar "season", but when the UK parliament adjourns for it's summer holiday, a "silly season" starts with all manner of press reports occupying the space created.

General Dannat's views have been reported before in several newspapers, notably The Times and the Daily Telegraph. It will be interesting if they are picked up by the tabloids and those papers which generally support the government.

Yes, the plight of the UK forces now has a higher public profile, so far expressed mainly in more sympathy, rather then a vocal demand for rectifying many of the weaknesses. Any "fixing" will take a long time, like better vehicles and more helicopters for two well known examples. To date there is no sign of the UK government making policy changes or allocating extra spending.

Anti-war sentiments I would suggest have not changed; the vast majority of the UK public oppose our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those opposed to the wars have singularly failed to mobilise support.

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

I don't know if the USA has a similar "season", but when the UK parliament adjourns for it's summer holiday, a "silly season" starts with all manner of press reports occupying the space created.

Though it does speed up a bit when congress is not in session...

General Dannat's views have been reported before in several newspapers, notably The Times and Daily Telegraph. It will be interesting if they are picked up by the tabloids and those papers which generally support the government.

As long as Page 3 is not displaced...

From my possibly ill informed perspective, Dannat seems to make more sense than did Mike Jackson in the job...

[davidbfpo]

This blog provides an excellent commentary on Sir Richard's views and plans for military stabilisation teams: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...d-of-game.html

The author is Richard North, who I've read elsewhere on his better known views opposing the European Union.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, will say that the Army should consider creating “permanent cadres of stabilisation specialists” so that soldiers can deliver “civil as well as military effects within areas as diverse as governance, town administration, finance and banking, law and order and sanitation”.

I respectfully and strongly disagree with the General. This is not the Army's job and never should be (and never was! Generally we had civil servants to do this). The Army creates a security environment where others, with the appropriate, mandate, resources and expertise, can function.

The Army is not there to deliver "civil effect" - what ever that is ?

In "extremis", the Army should be able to deliver very basic humanitarian services. What the General is talking about should be done by another Government Agency. Army can barely do it's own job well. Why do we want to take on others?

[Ken White]

With three caveats:

1. The Geographic Commands were not designed to be the point men in US foreign relations but fell into that mode by default. That needs to be rectified, probably by adequate funding of State, the establishment of Ambassadors Plenipotentiary, aligned with the GeoComs, who take back that responsibility. Revitalization of USIA and USAID are also required.

2. Someone has to do it -- and here in the US, the Army has gotten into the business as a result of WW II experience (Again... ) AND the default of the US government and Congress in particular to prepare for contingency operations. I suspect the same problem exists in the UK and the legislators are unwilling to pay the bill for what's needed in order to avoid having to tell voters their votes will no longer be bought. What's required is an assessment of what may occur and adequate funding for the foreign policy establishment and those government agencies that should be doing this kind of work.

2. In the US, we have tabbed FID and allied efforts to USSOCOM -- who'd really rather not (in the case of some) be involved -- recall that initially, SOCOM had the whole ball of wax, SF, JSOC, PsyOps and ALL Civil Affairs. While there were and are problems with that organizational concept as illustrated by the current situation, what's now required is a multi-agency assessment and review to establish a new model.

But the bottom line is that it is not really an Army or Marine mission other than in the first 30 days or so after major combat. Not least because in an era of highly paid and exorbitantly equipped volunteer forces in a healthy global economy, the cost in spaces is too high for the services. You can have war fighters or nation builders but not both in adequate numbers for the long missions.

[gh_uk]

As I understand it, Dannatt's comments arise from the British Army's experiences in southern Iraq, starting from April 2003. They had taken control of Basra and were trying to fill in the gaps caused by the collapse of Iraqi government structures. I remember the CO of 7 Armd Brigade sitting in his office in the palace, describing how he was running the local main bank out of an ISO container in the grounds, administered by TA soldiers with a finance background.

I believe the Army has formed the view that it cannot rely on the UK civilian agencies and ministries to stand up when they are needed, especially in non-permissive environments in Iraq and southern Afghanistan. This has been particularly notable in the MoD's (and again the Army, via 52 Brigade) development of new SSR doctrine. They have come to the view that in order to successfully exit from operations such as those in Iraq, they will need to have organic stablisation assets and capabilities, because their civil counterparts can not or will not fill the gap.

[SWJED]

... we have a winner. Yep, it ain't our job but somehow we always seem to be required to fill the vaccuum when our Phase IV buds are UA / AWOL from the game.

[William F. Owen]

I believe the Army has formed the view that it cannot rely on the UK civilian agencies and ministries to stand up when they are needed, especially in non-permissive environments in Iraq and southern Afghanistan.

The Army can't rely on the civilians for a lot, and the Army doing it, reduces the abilities of the army instead of demanding the civilians get up to speed. Servants of the Crown can demand and force the other servants to pull their weight!

They have come to the view that in order to successfully exit from operations such as those in Iraq, they will need to have organic stablisation assets and capabilities, because their civil counterparts can not or will not fill the gap.

...and this view is in error. The Army must create a "permissive" environment for the other agencies to work in. Someone needs to risk their career (more dear than life to senior UK officers) and tell the FO, DIFD and all the other work shy clowns that they need to go buy some 511 pants and get their flabby backsides out into the bundu.