Larger Problem
This should not be seen in the abstract, divorced from the larger, more systemic problem with leadership. This yank is sad to watch this happen. Britain is suffering from a leadership problem at the highest levels, and she should demand better of her leaders.
More complete response:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...army-problems/
This has been a deacade and a half in the making, and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have provided the tipping point. The British Armed Forces in general, and the Army in particular, have almost completely burned out: too many committments, too few resources, and weak military leadership. Not to mention Government policies. There is a real danger of an institutional breakdown in the not-so distant future.
14 weeks of initial training? That's only enough to cover Recruit training; there's no time for real Infantry training, and that takes at least 3 more months on top of that 14 weeks to get right. This is very disturbing, sending partially-trained troops to war.
Last edited by Norfolk; 02-03-2008 at 10:46 PM.
Lions, Donkeys, and Dinosaurs
Anyone here (particularly British servicemen) read this? Are his horror stories about procurement and the basics of his argument right on? Sure seems that way just from reading the Telegraph every couple of days.
Oh for a leader not a politician
What can I say, this has been going on since Options for Change, an amazing programme where we reduced the armed forces, so that the MOD could take on more civil servants - to er manage the change?
As always the soldiers are the political football, all parties mouth their support then turn around and shaft them. Unfortunately I beleive that GB has an over inflated opinion of its ability to influence world affairs - too many FCO Civil Servants who haven't got round to updating their maps, since the Raj. As a consequence we (GB) believe that we can "punch above our weight". The Armed Forces are used as a projection of this "punch" and inevitably suffer the consequences from muddled foreign poilcy thinking and a genuine desire to show that Britain is still no 1.
What we need is a genuine leader who can accept the reality, state the desired goal, plot the steps to reach that goal and then actually do something about it, this includes what the Armed Forces are going to do for GB, and what they will be used for.
Sorry for the rant - feeling a bit hot under the collar
Geoff
My take on this is that UK forces suffer from serious insecurities, in that we are always trying to be clever and complex, when our great strength was being obvious and simple. The IDF is currently making the same serious mistake, by trying to ape the US.
The UK always talks a good game, but real analysis of actual operational achievement never matches the pre-game hype. We are unnecessarily emotional about our armed forces and still have way too many technical and intellectual delusions (FRES being a great example) which let us down badly when we start trying to be too clever.
...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
We resemble that remark...
"...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps!
Outside looking in, confused.
Although I am British I am a complete outsider, militarily, and do not even know anyone who has served. From this vantage point the problems seems to be confusion over what is expected from the armed force by the public, politicians and - to a lesser extent - the military. This is aggravated by the radically different time scales that politicians and military procurement operate on. As alluded to earlier some sections of the public, and some politicians, seem to be confused about our military capabilities expecting us to be able to project force unrealistically. The politicians try to buy a seat at the big table by volunteering our armed forces' services in all corners of the globe but historically have not funded for that. Due to the very long lead times involved in any major weapons system the politicians need to decide what they expect the forces to be able to do, set long term guaranteed funding to match that goal, with agreed periodic reviews for course adjustments, and then leave well alone. At the moment it seems each government thinks it wise to campaign on 'a new vision for the Army', to differentiate it to the electorate, leading to frequent reviews of the role of the military, with commensurate changes to their budgets, manpower levels and raison d'etre. The result of all this tinkering is vast amounts of wasted money, a military with some bits of good kit but not to the same level in all areas and a compromised ability to operate effectively outside of a coalition. In the military's defence I am generally impressed by how well they seem to manage the tasks they are given - considering how small they are.
They're not nice chaps...they're pr!icks, yes men and amateurs. The Canucks and Yanks have cut to the chase. Weak military leadership. UK has traditionally suffered from crap Generalship in peacetime, with Marlboroughs, Wellingtons,Slims and Thompsons being forged from the opportunities of war. The US model of Generalship based on Character has a lot to offer. To progress in the UK system one must deliver 1) perception of intellect 2) work ethic to support ambition and drive subordinates 3) delivery of the answers the chain of command wishes to hear.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps!
Actions or discussions which go Off-piste will result in being marginalised and quietly filed to the sideline as a 'maverick' or 'unsuitable'. And its certainly not class related. Some of the most ambitious grey men are the most shocking oiks and nouveaus...probably because they know if they stay the course and keep their heads down all the good blokes will get hacked off and self select and make money/see their families/work in the commercial sector where risk taking and success is rewarded.
Apart from that, I think we're doing OK.
From my three years of exchange duty with the British Army, I think the largest frustration among my coworkers was the length of time required for new equipment to be fielded. I was the subject of good natured geering or taking the p*ss as far as the "Yanks, and all their Gucci kit". There were some exceptions. The Puma and Panther showed up rather suddenly. The various programs to replace CVR(T) and associated simulation kit is one area that received some heated debate.
The US Army's reserve forces are still very much like you describe.
I am hugely impressed with you Coldstreamer! I have a feeling that your post may have been the product of a long lonely night in the mess doing orderly officer, but I cannot argue or improve on one word you say.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Actions or discussions which go Off-piste will result in being marginalised and quietly filed to the sideline as a 'maverick' or 'unsuitable'. And its certainly not class related. Some of the most ambitious grey men are the most shocking oiks and nouveaus...probably because they know if they stay the course and keep their heads down all the good blokes will get hacked off and self select and make money/see their families/work in the commercial sector where risk taking and success is rewarded.
At the risk of swimming against the tide I feel I should point out that many (and an increasing number) of the serving officers in the UK's MOD do not fit the described charicature. Instead, they have accrued a significant amount of operational experience and it is that (especially commendations and combat awards), not their academic aspirations, face-time and sycophancy which is propelling them through the command chain. I would agree that in peacetime mavericks can be sidelined, but the enduring ops in Iraq and Afghanistan are providing an opportunity for people of real talent to shine. Naturally, a number of 'grey men' continue to occupy desks but in a bureaucratic system it pays to have bureaucrats in your team. 'Whitehall warriors' might not be considered to have much value outside of the M25, but to reject their utility within a government department (which the Ministry is) is to lose sight of the landscape. For what its worth, I think the underlying problem is that the substantial mismatch between the MOD Equipment Programme and the available Defence budget has persisted for too long. For years, perhaps hope, smoke, and mirrors have been allowed to sustain an unrealistic expectation. The imminent Planning Round 08 may be extremely painful, but it might bring a healthy dose of reality to a situation where there is a dangerous disconnect between Ends and Means.
Last edited by marct; 03-20-2008 at 11:00 PM. Reason: fixed quotation
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