Provided a crash program is up and running to train up Afghan soldiers and security forces (para-military and police), extra UK troops in Helmud Prov. is a sound idea and exactly where those extra soldiers are needed right now.
UK additional soldiers
Provided a crash program is up and running to train up Afghan soldiers and security forces (para-military and police), extra UK troops in Helmud Prov. is a sound idea and exactly where those extra soldiers are needed right now.
Do they have any personnel to spare though?Originally Posted by George L. Singleton
Got the manpower, the right manpower?
From an outsider's "armchair" yes there is capacity, in manpower, whether there are the right people for a training and mentoring role is a moot point. As others within have commented somethings are broken. I fear the UK has not thought about sending 2,000 trainers, which is clearly indicated elsewhere as necessary.
davidbfpo
UK National Security Strategy
KEY POINTS:
The UK Government today, 18 October 2010, published Britain's National Security Strategy (NSS). Together with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) it sets out the UK's strategic choices on how to ensure the security of the UK.
The National Security Strategy and SDSR together provide direction for national security policy, capabilities and resources for the next 5 years. The NSS allows UK Government Departments to prioritise their resources according to the risks set out in the document published today.
The NSS sets out two high-level objectives which will guide the UK's strategic approach overall:
- To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting its people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can affect it directly; and
- To shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying its instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.
The NSS decides the UK's priorities for action, and identifies 15 priority security risks to the UK. The following Tier 1 risks are judged to be the UK's highest priorities for UK national security:
- Terrorism
- Cyber attack
- Major natural hazards and accidents
- International Military Crisis
Afghanistan will remain the UK's top priority while British troops are deployed there.
The details of the capability and resource decisions, the 'ways' and 'means' of achieving the National Security priorities are in the SDSR which will be published on 19 Oct 10. The National Security Strategy has informed the policy, resource and capability choices that will be set out in the SDSR.
DETAIL:
Context and Foreign Policy Baseline
1. Through a globalised 'networked' world the risk picture is likely to become increasingly diverse with no single risk dominating. This means achieving security will become more complex.
2. The UK's ability to remain adaptable for the future will be essential, as will be the ability to identify risks and opportunities at the earliest possible stage and maintaining highly capable and flexible armed forces.
3. Through NATO, the EU and other alliances the UK will share its security needs and gain collective benefits. As a result, the UK faces no major state threat at present.
4. We will continue to play a major role in shaping the international architecture - reinforcing the UN, NATO, G20 and EU and building bilateral ties with rising economic powers such as China and India.
The National Interest and British Values
5. The National Security Strategy explains that the UK's national interest comprises its security, prosperity and freedom and that these are interconnected and mutually supportive.
6. National Security is about protecting the UK's people, including their rights and liberties.
7. Promoting civil liberties and upholding the rule of law are fundamental principles which underpin the UK's approach to national security.
8. Security and Liberty are complementary and mutually supportive. The UK needs security to protect the liberties it holds dear.
National Security Priorities (Risk Management Tiers 1, 2 and 3)
9. For the first time, the UK Government has assessed and prioritised all the major national security risks that the UK faces to ensure that it has the right means to address them.
10. The 15 priority risks to UK national security, split into three tiers are:
Tier 1 Priorities (the most pressing risks to the UK over the next five years)
Terrorism
Cyber attack
Major natural hazards and accidents
International Military Crisis
Tier 2 Priorities (the next highest priorities)
State-led Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks
Instability And Conflict Overseas
Organised Crime
Space security
Tier 3 Priorities (The next highest priorities after Tier 1 & 2)
Conventional military attack on UK
Significant increase in flows of terrorsits, organised criminals, illegal migrants etc across our border
Energy Security and Resources
Accidental Release Radioactive Material
Article 5 - Attack by a State on another NATO or EU Member
An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.
Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (for example, food, water) essential to the UK
Terrorism
11. The risk to the UK from terrorism continues to be one of the highest priority national security risks.
12. The UK has therefore decided to give a high priority to counter terrorism compared to other areas of national security.
Cyber Attack
13. Cyberspace is now vital for the UK's prosperity and way of life.
14. The rapid growth of cyberspace means that the UK must act now to ensure its cyber security.
15. Some states continue to try to gain advantage over the UK through hostile intelligence activity and cyber attack, and the UK must do all that it can to protect the valuable government and commercial information we possess.
Hazards and Accidents
16. Certain civil emergencies are among the most severe of all threats to UK national security.
17. In a more resource constrained environment, the UK will act in a more targeted way in the future, which means, among other things, focusing relatively more on the highest priority civil emergency risks;
18. The top three civil emergency risks to the UK for continued action to improve preparedness: (i) terrorist attacks using unconventional materials (ii) major tidal or coastal flooding; (iii) severe influenza pandemic.
International Military Crises and Instability
19. An international military crisis involving multiple states in a region which drew in the UK or its Allies would have a major impact on global stability.
20. The UK will continue to work internationally to address such risks before they develop, but must ensure that it is prepared to act should diplomatic solutions fail.
Alliance and Partnerships
21. The UK will intensify its bilateral defence and security relationships with a wide range of partners, working more effectively together to tackle threats and exploit opportunities where interests coincide.
22. The UK will be active in the multilateral organisations central to its national security: committed to a reformed UN Security Council, a robust and credible NATO, and an EU that uses its collective weight to promote shared interests and values.
Full details can be found at: UK Cabinet Office
Last edited by Red Rat; 10-18-2010 at 05:10 PM. Reason: typo
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
First some experts
IISS has quickly published a viewpoint:Link:http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/?blogpost=69Like many such documents from NATO members over the past decade, it tries to set a framework for dealing with an 'age of uncertainty' a world in which there is a wide range of possible threats to security and a lack of clarity about which might be the most serious....
Several points are noteworthy about this ranking: first, the threat from cyber attacks has been upgraded, in line with the remarks made by Iain Lobban, head of the government listening post GCHQ, at the IISS last week. Secondly, there is relatively little emphasis in the document on two elements which have tended to loom large in such threat assessments: nuclear proliferation and the dangers from fragile and failing states. Iran's possible acquisition of nuclear weapons is included in a paragraph that also mentions organised crime, and is not mentioned again. Thirdly, by referring specifically to a military crisis 'between states', the strategy appears to downgrade the risks from the kind of regional instability that has prompted UK military action on several occasions since the mid-1990s.
This is a document explicitly predicated on the need to deal with a fiscal deficit, with defence cuts to be announced tomorrow.....
davidbfpo
This is a strategy? No.
A scathing, indirect comment on the UK decision-making:Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...arry-jets.htmlOne of the Navys new £3 billion aircraft carriers will never carry aircraft and will sail for only three years before being mothballed and possibly sold, ministers will announce on Tuesday....(much later)
Scrapping the Harriers will create a capability gap of nine years, with Britain unable to fly fast jets from an aircraft carrier until 2020, when the new JSF enters service.
Now to another London "think tank" RUSI:Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...4CBC6D8637AB7/The problem with it, as it presently exists, is that it is not really a strategy as such, but a methodology for a strategy. It does not make hard choices between real things - which is what strategists have to do. It creates all the right boxes and describes how we should fit them together - who should lead in this or that area, who else should be involved, and so on - but it doesn't put anything specific enough into the boxes.
(Near the end)But it is hard to avoid the feeling that the reason the story and the numbers are being kept apart is that they don't fit together as well as ministers and officials hoped they would.
Now my own viewpoint. The carrier aircraft "gap" has been clear for months and we must realise UK policy today is now far more dictated by public / state financial position. We have been through this before, notably with the East of Suez withdrawal, IIRC in 1968, after a "run" on the UK Pound.
This is "spin" and "smoke" creating a structure to show decisions are strategic and fit together. Remaining with the example of the two aircraft carriers, where do they fit in the priorities of the national security strategy?
davidbfpo
UK's top military leader speaks
Moderator's Note
This thread until today (30th April 2013) was entitled 'UK Army 2020' and was merged with a smaller thread on Sir David Richards 2010 speech (below). It was re-titled 'UK Defence Policy' (catch all) to enable wider use (ends).
On Monday General Sir David Richards, now the UK Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), gave the annual Colin Cramphorn Lecture, in London, organised by the "think tank" Policy Exchange and last year it was a General Petraeus.
Link to website, with very short bio:http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/eve...ent.cgi?id=278
The talk is on Youtube and included. It is just over an hour, with a lengthy Q&A session; most of the questions were by journalists and listen carefully for one. A couple of interesting points made, notably on cyber warfare, the purchase of two aircraft carriers and of course Afghanistan.
It was well reported, but many other more newsworthy items pushed it to the "inside pages".
Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-30-2013 at 06:42 PM. Reason: This post was in a separate thread until today, with one other post and Mod's note.
davidbfpo
Listened to it. Picked up nothing earth shattering did you?
Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-30-2013 at 06:35 PM. Reason: This post was in a separate thread until today, with one other post.
UK Army 2020
This may have flown under the radar but I have seen that the British army has adopted a completely different future organisation than that which has been announced previously. Army 2020 remedies a number of problems I have personally had with the Bde based army (notably permanent Div HQ). It also innovates by providing three different organisations inc. a specialised logistics (or force troops) entity. It maintains a "heavy" div for high intensity ops well as keeping the stabilisation ops option with a several Bde div. My main issue is the reduction of armour from 5 reg/Bns under the previous proposal to just three in the current one (I would have thought that the adaptable forces would have at least two independentt Armoured reg/bn). But alas that is not so. I think, personally, that its a much better structure than the previous proposal of five Bdes with a hodge-podge of capabilites and units. The creation of permanet div HQ also facilitates so called stabilisation ops esp. when one considers that in Afghanistan Bdes were largely left to their own divices in theatre with regards COIN ops. Now a permanet Div can help smooth the transition during roulement and allow startegic objectives to be translated into tactial missions without distrupting operations because of redeployments (however, the LACK of a strategy was probably the real problem in Afghanistan).
What do the honourable members of this here council think? Your comments and observations would be much appreciated.
Germany did split its army (and to some degree also its air force) into crisis reaction and other forces. It sucked.
Budget was tight, so crisis reaction forces got adequate personnel and almost adequate material funds, but the rest was neglected and atrophied.
NEVER establish a two-class military under the umbrella of the same GHQ. Separate active and reserve forces, united only at the level of ministry - acceptable. Divided army - not acceptable.
2nd; why bother with a single Div HQ if so many brigades are in the army? The would all be deployed in a big war, so simply call it a Corps HQ and design it as such.
3rd; looks like only three tank battalions for the entire UK army to me - that's approx. 200 Chally2 including driving training tanks and tanks in major repairs etc. That is hardly enough; the UK army would not be capable of mobile warfare against a real, capable army.
4th; helicopters overrated, as usual.
A lot of the detail about how this structure will be resourced and trained is still to appear, in particular how the Reserve element will be integrated.
What is very apparent is that the UK will almost certainly never deploy a division in the field again. Despite UK protestations to the contrary this capability is paper thin - literally.
The structure makes the best of a bad deal. The structures were entirely driven by the requirement to reduce the UK military size due to financial imperatives. That is a reasonable enough course of action, but there was no corresponding change in UK national security ambitions so effectively the structural changes have happened in something of a strategic vacuum. I am also lead to understand that the initial reforms presented by the 'Carter team' which led the process for the army were viewed as too radical and rejected by the government.
When the UK stated it could put a division in the field it struggled to put a brigade. By stating that it will aim to put a Bde in the field I suspect that increasingly even this level will be hollowed out.
The loss of heavy armour is not for me as much of an issue as the lack of RAF capability. The bdes are Armoured Infantry and not Armoured brigades. The role of armour is increasingly seen as enabling decisive infantry ops. This is predicated on the fact that it is regarded as highly unlikely that we will fight a parity or near parity opponent in the near to medium future. But this assumption is based on the assumption that the UK and it's Allies will retain technological dominance resulting in air and PGM dominance. I think this is a dangerous assumption based on both the shift in economic power away from the West and the increasing rate of technological diffusion.
My personal view is that the UK defence review should have reduced the UK army much more significantly in order to maintain viable Air and Maritime capabilities.
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...
The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
Good points all round. Personally I would have liked to see the expansion of the Royal Marines to two bdes with associated naval assets and the army reduced to three large(ish) bdes (each about three inf, one-two tank and two arty bns) but I doubt the regimental ethos and traditions of our armies would permit it (and let's not even get started with the Scots regts!). What really galled me was that the SDSR mentions UK commitments to allies yet our commitments to pacific nations doesnt even get a mention. To boot the SDSR outlines a REDUCTION in royal marine strength by 1,800! Definitely a document written by a committee if ever I saw one.The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...
The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).
British Army 'not ready for urban warfare'
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8548...n-warfare.htmlA critical assessment of the Armys readiness for the next decade of military operations also found that its frontline units lack the right vehicles and precision weapons that will be needed.
The Armys current shortcomings are highlighted in a report drawn up following an eight-month planning and assessment exercise named Agile Warrior.
The exercise was carried out by the Force Development and Training Command, a team of senior officers that attempts to prepare the Army for the operations it is likely to face in the years ahead.
A scrimmage in a Border Station
A canter down some dark defile
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail
http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg
Oh, 2nd half of 90's all over again.
I wonder why quantity isn't the primary concern for such environments because of the short lines of sight and fire.
You'd think someone in Whitehall would have watched The Children of Men.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vQAJ1q4z4A
Last edited by AdamG; 06-06-2011 at 11:39 AM.
A scrimmage in a Border Station
A canter down some dark defile
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail
http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg
One Trick Pony
The British Army is currently a one trick pony. Resources are devoted almost entirely to training for Afghanistan leaving little to devote elsewhere.
Some of the TTPs from Afghanistan will be transferrable and there is still some residual knowledge from Basra (Iraq). However operations in large urban areas will prove challenging on many fronts. Use of PGMs will probably broadly follow Afghanistan TTPs, as will use of ISTAR. We have very limited main battle tank currency currently and developing expertise in use of armoured vehicles in urban environments could stretch our limited training resources.
Already (and rightly) general's efforts are looking ahead to the armed forces post-Afghanistan; structures and capabilities. Fuchs raises a good point in that the UK Army is envisaged as being so small (6 deployable brigades but not 6 at the same time) that the fact that mass has a quality all of its own and is essential for some operational environments appears to have been downplayed.
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
The Future of the British Army
The Future of the British Army
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
How the British Army will Fight
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kedBlURaRaE
These interviews impressed me as being balanced. Those interviewed realize that Afghanistan isn't a template for future conflict, and logically state the requirement for having a full range of military capabilities.
Comments from an armchair
Bill,
I have now watched and listened to the film clip twice. It raises a number of issues succinctly, although some of the footage was odd - the Russians in Kosovo and the IDF. Being an official product, when the MoD prefers to be in hibernation from public comment, it is a shame alternative voices do not feature. The speakers, with one exception, being MoD employees or contractors.
After a recent, speculative press report 'British Army's fleet of Apache helicopters 'could be scrapped' it was almost amusing to hear the remarks on "heavy" assets versus Apaches:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-scrapped.html
What was more valuable was the very careful skirting round the issue of, from various voices:There are dissenting voices that think the shrunken UK military have - now and will clearly do so soon - fallen below the US minimum level for a contribution.an ability to go with them (USA)...making a strategic difference to the USA....an ability to do a task alone..
Reductions in public spending are driving this process, not a change in strategic direction nor a change in public opinion - which gives defence a low priority. I suspect that politically no-one wants to ask, let alone hear either the British professionals or US politicians answer the question is the UK a meaningful ally when it comes to a fight? A fight not for national survival, hard to conceive of today, more likely an intervention with the USA somewhere.
Hypothetically had the UK not pushed others in NATO in 2005 over "making a difference" in Afghanistan; the decision for ISAF to go south, would the USA have done so alone? You can argue that the minimal campaigning by the USA in Afghanistan better suited your national purpose.
davidbfpo
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