UK military problems & policies

[Fuchs]

Some governments pay too much attention to maintaining relationships and cooperations of nebulous value.

It's as if they knew from an inexplicable source that a certain cooperation makes sense, and don't even bother to think about the "why" or even "if".
The result are expensive policies for the sake of maintaining said cooperation/prestige/relationship.

Germany had and has its strange fixation on keeping NATO and transatlantic cooperation strong, even though the value is probably zero (to cooperate prevents overt rivalry, but the latter doesn't need to happen without said cooperation anyway).
There were also expensive policies done in order to support the bid for a permanent UNSC seat (for which we have little actual use).

Same with the EU; European unification has become an ideology which tolerates no even only small step backwards. Officials rarely discuss the actual utility of additional European cooperation.

The fixation on maintaining big brother's good will is particularly strong in NZ, Australia and the UK. Maybe it's the common language which support this fixation?
Maybe it wouldbe wise to look at more relaxed, non-Anglophone countries and thier alliance policies?

[davidbfpo]

The highly respected British military historian, Hew Strachan, has edited this small volume, thinner as officialdom prevented six serving officers contributions appearing and makes some pithy comments:

Like many armies in the past, the British army struggles to foster effective debate within a hierarchical command chain.....for fear of reputational damage and political controversy....The MoD has got to get real … Differences and debates need to be properly gone over. Otherwise we are none the wiser

If this is what retired officers are writing, as this review puts it I am not surprised controversy results:

An underlying theme in the essays by former generals and senior British staff officers is the almost complete lack of preparedness and failure to provide enough resources, in terms of both money and men, in Iraq. The failures, the authors write, were not learned and were repeated in Afghanistan.

Link to review:http://m.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/2013...als?CMP=twt_gu

Link to publisher's website, where John Nagl comments:http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409437369

Found elsewhere a review by Sir Michael Howard, a historian who in his senior years remains sensible:

This collection must be almost unique in military history. Seldom if ever have senior military commanders discussed so frankly the difficulties they have faced in translating the strategic demands made by their political masters into operational realities. The problems posed by their enemies were minor compared with those presented by corrupt local auxiliaries, remote bureaucratic masters, and civilian colleagues pursuing their own agendas. Our political leaders should study it very carefully before they ever make such demands on our armed forces again.

From:http://ccw.history.ox.ac.uk/2013/05/...n-blairs-wars/

Amazon.com, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/British-Genera...Blair%27s+Wars

Amazon.co.uk: not available yet (ho-hum).

[SJPONeill]

This should be a damn good read but two questions...

Why, oh why will they not let serving officers contribute? This is so short-sighted and having followed a number of senior British officers' public comments over the last 4-5 years, I can not imagine that the blocked contributions to this book could be that damaging to the Blair or the current administration.

Why not release this as a Kindle version as well? The cost of shipping books internationally continues to climb and a large (and growing) proportion of audiences are switching to e-books, including oldies like myself...

[davidbfpo]

I overlooked adding to my post that this week IISS hosted an hour long panel discussion on the book:http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events...-generals-5a6c

Note I have yet to watch this.

[davidbfpo]

SJPONeill asked two questions, I can only offer an explanation for the first:

This should be a damn good read but two questions...

Why, oh why will they not let serving officers contribute? This is so short-sighted and having followed a number of senior British officers' public comments over the last 4-5 years, I can not imagine that the blocked contributions to this book could be that damaging to the Blair or the current administration.

British officialdom is rarely open to public servants, at all levels, contributing on contemporary public issues - I exclude "whistle-blowing". This policy has been reinforced by politicians reluctance to have informed "insider" contributions, which often are contrary to the "spin" the public and media are fed with.

The UK Secretary of Defence, Philip Hammond, made it very clear from taking office that public comments had to be approved and "on message".

What happened to two 'lessons learned' internal unclassified reviews of British military performance provide some insight. The 'Operation Banner' review on Northern Ireland appeared in public via a Republican-leaning group (IIRC it is linked here) and that on Iraq remains an official document - partly I suspect as the Official Iraq Inquiry (known as the Chilcot Report) has yet to be published.

Historians often attest to the value of combing US National Archives for UK documents.

[gute]

The MOD came out with the official release of the UK Army restructuring called Army 2020. Below is a link to the brochure - it's worth a look:

http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/gen...0_brochure.pdf

[davidbfpo]

I will let another speak as to the effectiveness of these changes:

Lord Dannatt, former head of the Army, says 20 per cent defence cuts mean Britain will not be able to fight wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time in future.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...rmy-chief.html

[davidbfpo]

More commentary today, some good, some expected, you decide which they are.

Ex-Para officer, now a Labour MP:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/ju...-cheap-britain

An ex-brigadier, now at IISS:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...ighting-future

More a strategic comment by an academic:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/07/no-...-vital-organs/

Finally try this cartoon:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/car...l-defence-cuts

Apologies my IT skills are not enough to cut & paste this into a post.

[davidbfpo]

The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence has published a report on 'Army 2020', it is pgs long, so I have cited the conclusion only and in part. Paragraph 6:

We remain to be convinced that the Army 2020 plan represents a fully thought-through and tested concept which will allow the Army to counter emerging and uncertain threats and develop a contingent capability to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The MoD needs to justify how the conclusion was reached that the Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves represented the best way of countering these threats.

Link:http://www.publications.parliament.u.../576/57603.htm

Curiously the committee used an unofficial website ARSSE for:

During the course of our inquiry, the Army Rumour Service hosted a web forum to enable us to hear the views of interested parties on the Army 2020 plan which we used to inform our questioning of witnesses. The forum received 494 comments from 171 contributors.

From the final conclusion:

143. Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British Army. It departs significantly from the announcements made in SDSR 2010 and we have considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK's national security. The evidence presented to date has been far from convincing. Our principal concerns are twofold:

· First, the MoD has failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament or the public.

· Second, we remain concerned that the financially driven reduction in the numbers of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel particularly in key supporting capabilities until sufficient additional Reserves are recruited and trained.

144. The Government has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan B.

Link:http://www.publications.parliament.u.../576/57607.htm

[davidbfpo]

The title is taken from testimony by Lord Hennessey, a journalist-cum-historian, who with two others gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence on:

a strategic inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review.

Not an exciting matter for the great British public and I expect many others. Within the testimony are many gems on how the UK does and doesn't do defence policy:http://www.publications.parliament.u...i/uc109001.htm

Here is one passage, Quinlan's law (named after a MoD civil servant of note):

A theorem: In matters of military contingency, the expected, precisely because it is expected, is not to be expected. Rationale: What we expect, we plan and provide for; what we plan and provide for, we thereby deter; what we deter does not happen. What does happen is what we did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not expect it.

Another witness, an academic strategist, Professor Julian Lindley-French, who is British and currently based in The Netherlands, has some enlightening remarks, especially on alliance matters. His blog is:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/

In one post the Professor is straight-talking:

The Royal Navy’s motto is; if you want peace, prepare for war. Thankfully, Britain today does not have to prepare for war. However, in a world full of friction if Britain is to help prevent conflict injurious to its national interests it must think and act strategically. Therefore, SDSR 2015 must finally look beyond Afghanistan and not simply re-fight it better. Indeed, the switch from so-called campaigning to contingency operations will make the 2015 review as close to a grand strategic year zero as Britain has known for a century. It is an opportunity to be seized not squandered.

Link:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...-of-spear.html

No wonder Whitehall-Westminster prefer to make grand statements, but as our American allies know capability is needed with will. Just whether the UK has a strategy today is a moot point, plenty of policy or is it called retrenchment?

Hat tip to 'Red Rat' for the pointer to the testimony.

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" responded:

The conclusion that it is about retrenchment is true. We have been spending beyond our means in defence. The most important part of our Critical National Infrastructure now is our economy. Once that recovers, our priorities will change again. Strategy is the ability to adapt and recalibrate our ways as much as it is an expression of will and capability.

[Red Rat]

Although not exactly 'small wars' the testimony does give a seldom seen and very candid insight into both UK Whitehall machinations (think Pentagon 'E-ring') and some of the dynamics of NATO and defence spending. I would be interested in an informed US perspective as to how familiar this is to the far side of 'the pond' and whether our machinations are much like theirs, I suspect that our Whitehall Warriors are much like Pentagon Warriors.

The document is worth a read in its entirety, there are plenty of gems and it is very witty in places

[Red Rat]

While "a lurker" may well be correct, history shows that priorities do not change in favour of defence and security unless there is a clear and present danger.

The problem is that modern equipment has such a long lead time that there is a complete mis-match between equipment build timelines and the political decision making timelines. Unlike the UK's build to war in 1938 where equipment could come off the production line that year (aircraft, tanks) and the subsequent year (ships), any capital platforms would take years to complete.

[mirhond]

The latest entry from abovesaid blog: Wednesday, 14 May 2014

GLOBSEC: The Road to Bratislava
...
History is only senseless and cruel if the politics and strategy that make history are driven by short-term prescriptions in which the easy politics of the moment trumps strategy and security. In standing up to Greater Russia it is time for all Europeans as Europe to stand tall and resist the precedents of macho power Moscow is seeking to re-establish in Europe. Fail and it will not simply be the poor people of Ukraine who suffer the consequences. The very idea of ‘Europe’ will have been demonstrated a hollow, empty lie – a good-time gamble unable and unwilling to stand up for the very values and interests it claims as its heritage.

It reminds me the lamentations of one European author from 16th cent. about the moral superiority and military prowess of Ottoman Turks, while Europeans are divided, depressed and apathetic. Where is Europe and where is Ottoman Empire now?

[SWJ Blog]

Gates: British Military Cuts Limit Scope for US Partnership

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Philip Hammond, the UK Defence Secretary, has warned short conflicts are the only way to win over 'war weary' public, at the Munich Security Conference.

Within his reported speech are some very odd phrases and words which hardly endear him to the listening public, probably some fellow MPs too. In particular that:

..in Syria that we are creating a new hotbed of international terrorism....public opinion in Western countries is not yet persuaded that military intervention will be justified or in their own self interest.

No, Mr Hammond, 'we' are not creating this hotbed, nor have you persuaded me that military intervention - which was over CW use by the regime - not international terrorism was justified and practical.

There is a climate of skepticism about engagement in failed or failing countries, a fear of getting entrapped in longer term, deeper forms of engagement....Increasingly we need to present intervention as time limited and with strictly defined ambitions. We are at a point in the public opinion cycle in the UK where there is a war weariness after ten years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is definitely a fear, quite irrational in some cases, that any engagement anywhere will somehow lead to an uncontrollable commitment to large numbers of troops, a large amount of resources and a long term intervention.

We are finding not always as persuasive as we would like it to be...It is very clear to those of us looking in horror at this emerging situation in Syria that we are creating a new hotbed of international terrorism, a new base from which international terrorism will operate that will probably rival any of those we have seen in the last decade or so.

We are allowing this to happen and yet public opinion in Western countries is not yet persuaded that military intervention will be justified or in their own self interest.

It will be a long time before anyone forgets the mistakes of Iraq. Dismantling a security infrastructure when there is nothing to put in its place is clearly a mistake and short term compromises are inevitable if we are going to maintain something of a secure environment.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...Secretary.html

The strategy of external Western intervention appears alive and well in the UK Ministry of Defence.

[Red Rat]

War weariness? I simply don't see it. The so called war has not touched society in any significant way.

What I do see is a great deal of public cynicism about the use of military force after two significant campaigns which do not appear to have resulted in any tangible benefit to the country.

Not war weary, the British public is cynical.

[Firn]

War weariness? I simply don't see it. The so called war has not touched society in any significant way.

What I do see is a great deal of public cynicism about the use of military force after two significant campaigns which do not appear to have resulted in any tangible benefit to the country.

Not war weary, the British public is cynical.

I think your arguments have considerable merit, certainly more then the ones made by Mr. Hammond.

[Steve Blair]

Yet in the language of politics his wording does make a twisted sense. Saying the public is "war-weary" implies that they might otherwise be behind the policy were they not "fatigued" in some way. Admitting that they're cynical might reflect badly on the political decisions that led to that cynicism.

Far better to make it sound like the public is loyal but weary rather than disenchanted and distrustful of political decisions. IMO, anyhow.

[davidbfpo]

Ex-SAS commanders are not known for taking a high profile on current events, so this article deserves reading. It does refer to the UK decision to become involved last week. It is a moot point whether it also applies to the USA and others outside the region.

The title 'Get the politics right, then the plan for the military might work' and sub-titled 'Bombing IS jihadists provides a 'sugar rush', but the Government has been silent on what it knows is needed'.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/...k-9759924.html

Here is one key paragraph:

But to those of us that know Iraq, terrorists and extremism, and have fought organisations such as Isis within that country, Afghanistan and elsewhere, the situation does not look as positive, or the plan as robust, as that presented on Friday in Parliament. Projected by the theatre of Parliament, the deployment of six RAF bombers has taken on a military and political significance out of all proportion to their real military value. They provide us and our leaders, desperate to do something, with a military sugar rush, to be followed inevitably in six months’ time with the “war-downer” reality that things are not going as we wish them to, and that the long-term costs of our involvement are escalating, in ways that will need to be explained, or hidden, during a general election.

Then shorter passages:

Bombing that is not geared to an Iraqi political purpose will only create propaganda opportunities for Isis, as it seeks to legitimise its hold over western Iraq.....Bombing alone will not break the will of Isis to hold its ground in Iraq, and it must be joined on the ground by the Iraqi military if it is to be decisive. What, then, of this essential task?.....Bombing and killing Isis and Iraqis without a political solution for the Iraqi Sunni is to risk strategic failure – to risk making the Iraqi Sunni see Baghdad as oppressors and not liberators. Bombing without an effective Iraqi army is to risk operational stalemate on the ground and a fixing of the front lines, both of which appear to define the course that we have set ourselves.

Personally I am deeply pessimistic from the comfort of my armchair about the UK resuming a military role in Iraq, for our national interests bar one which I will end with later. Secondly the Iraqi state shows no sign of changing and as Joel Wing reports on the main Iraq-Syria thread the state armed forces remain, well a mess. I fear we have done what ISIS wanted, as western powers return to the region with just bombs.

What is the UK national interest bar one? Joining in a coalition which the USA has advocated, so once again we stand beside you.