UK military problems & policies

[Bill Moore]

David,

All good points, and I think I can argue we already failed strategically when we failed to find WMD, and changed the balance of power in the region in a way that favored both Iran and sunni extremists. The current approach may have been well intended, but the underlying assumption or hope that Iraq would step up politically and militarily hasn't happened.

Can we recover from failure? England did during WWII, as have others throughout history. My question for you is should the West fight IS regardless based on the threat the pose to us?

[davidbfpo]

[davidbfpo]

Bill asked me:

My question for you is should the West fight IS regardless based on the threat the(y) pose to us?

From my armchair faraway Bill my response is political not military.

I am unconvinced that we, the UK, should join this alliance and take military action in Iraq, maybe with Syria being added.

First and foremost we do not understand the region well enough to navigate our way around and achieve the goal of a united, coherent Iraqi state. This weakness is partly historical and reflects the lack of information, let alone intelligence on what is happening now.

This academic piece has value 'With bad intelligence on Islamic State, West is flying in the dark':https://theconversation.com/with-bad...the-dark-32247 This analyst takes a more strategic viewpoint - what can intervention achieve:http://leftfootforward.org/2014/09/5...st-should-ask/ and from ICSR:https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/...ikes-stop-isis

Secondly I am not convinced ISIS poses such a threat to the UK and allied national security now or in the near future, that it demands military action. In the debate here last week a number of MPs referred to the threat to Turkey, which is a very weak argument given Turkey's own stance to date. Yes like all jihadists they hate the 'far enemy'. Have they the motivation and capability to attack us now? It seems to me they are busy enough carving out their emirate and contemplating how to attack Baghdad.

The allied military action taken so far has been criticised in many quarters; reflected in the other SWC thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=21196

I support giving aid to the enemies of ISIS such as the Kurds in both countries, although their objectives are quite limited and they are unlikely to want to attack traditionally Sunni Arab areas. As for the Iraqi state I see little action of consequence.

In Syria it is harder to decide on how to fight ISIS. I would oppose a "deal" with Bashir Assad and his rivals the jihadist-inclined groups. As many have noted a number of those groups may ally themselves with ISIS now. If that happens the non-jihadist groups are doomed. Assad rarely attacks ISIS, as Crowbat reminds us.

Containment of ISIS is achievable:

1) Reduce its newly acquired heavy weapons capability (artillery, tanks etc)
2) Support the Kurdish enclaves in Syria
3) Support rival groups overtly and covertly to attack / resist ISIS
4) Enforce a 'no fly zone' over Syria (build up to this)
5) Weaken its message, finances and flow of personnel

[davidbfpo]

General Nick Carter, the UK's top soldier, spoke on February 17th, on the theme of 'The Future of the British Army: How the Army must change to serve Britain in a Volatile World' and a 24 min podcast is here:http://www.chathamhouse.org/event/fu...volatile-world

The UK continues to see itself as the USA's leading ally and as readers will know some in the USA have expressed their doubts, both in terms of capability and political will. So there is value in listening to the intention, it is a moot point if it will be funded.

He does rather pack a lot in, in fact the speech sounds almost hurried. Following 'Chatham House Rules' the Q&A are not available. It is interesting that the venue is Chatham House, aka Royal Insititute for International Affairs, not RUSI or IISS.

There is a main thread 'UK military: problems & policies' into which this may be merged:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4819

[Red Rat]

The new doctrine of "Integrated Action" will be of considerable interest to the COIN community. It is influenced heavily (from what I can see) from Emile Simpson's book "War From The Ground Up" and to my mind seems to be most suitable for stability operations. I will be curious to see how the operational use the doctrine as the character of conflict assumed by the doctrine demands a whole of government response, and a response that is both swift and agile. To date Whitehall has proved quite incapable of this.

As for the UK's position with the US. The UK remains the only ally who can put a division in the field with the Americans and is technically more integrated than the other "Five Eyes" partners. On the political front the relationship seems firm, although Scottish Independence (they haven't gone away and the politics remains fevered and volatile north of the border, with increasing sectarian undertones) or continued strategic myopia by the UK Government (further defence cuts and absence from Europe) would undoubtedly relegate us.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Red Rat in part:

The UK remains the only ally who can put a division in the field with the Americans and is technically more integrated than the other "Five Eyes" partners.

Chatting with a "lurker" with military expertise they remarked the current emphasis on the UK contributing at divisional level meant the one UK division that can be deployed MUST be when an overwhelmingly national interest is at stake. Plus there isno follow-on division.

Secondly I do wonder if NATO decides it must have forces deployed forward in Eastern Europe, Poland notably, will the UK actually totally exit from Germany? Rotating from established bases in Germany is far better than other options.

[Red Rat]

I would be surprised if there were not steps to address the lack of a follow-on division. Certainly the troops are there in number, although not currently in configuration. What would be needed would be a deployable divisional HQ (I don't see why HQ 1 (UK) Division or HQ Force Troops Command could not meet this requirement). More difficult would be sufficient enablers (logistics, CIS, aviation, artillery etc).

A division would operate as part of a corps construct,which could only be fielded by either the US or NATO. One would hope that in both cases national interests would be both aligned and significant. Your lurker is correct in that as the UK's military strength dwindles, commitment of smaller elements constitute greter effort and greater risk. Much like the 20th century Home Fleet much of the strategic value remains in being a "force in being", would the UK really risk the tactical defeat in detail of 3 (UK) Division or the loss of HMS Queen Elizabeth?

I am slightly nonplussed by the UK focus on operating at the divisional level. It seems at variance with the general thrust of what passes for UK defence strategy.

I cannot see the UK not withdrawing completely from Germany, that train appears to have left the station.

[davidbfpo]

General Odierno has publicly voiced his concern over future working with the UK, an issue that Westminster-Whitehall would prefer not be asked, as it undermines the 'Special Relationship'.

I would be lying to you if I did not say that I am very concerned about the GDP investment in the UK. In the past we would have a British army division working alongside an American division. Now it might be a British brigade inside an American division, or even a British battalion inside an American brigade. We have to adjust our programme to make sure we are all able to see that we can still work together.....(He described Britain's role as a key US ally as) about having a partner that has very close values and the same goals as we do. As we look at threats around the world, these are global issues and we need to have multinational solutions. They are concerning to everyone. We all need to be able to invest and work together to solve these problems.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31688929

The BBC cites the original story elsewhere:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-general.html?

There are several issues here, notably UK military capability as it shrinks and how much is spent on defence (2% GDP being an agreed NATO level).



Avid SWC readers will know UK military reform and the politics are debated in the main thread 'UK military problems & policies', with 85k views and 200 posts:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4819

For at least two years now I have encountered mutterings about the UK's declining capability and perceived lack of political (and public) will to remain the US's willing partner. It is the irony of following the US into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as an ally, that the US military first began to ask were we a capable and willing partner. Diplomacy aside I do wonder if American politicians have asked such questions.

I expect if UK (and NATO) defence spending dips below 2% of GDP that the criticism of Europe relying on the USA for it's defence to become louder.

[davidbfpo]

I missed PM David Cameron's response. Rather oddly amidst a wider article, ah well here it is!

Britain is still:

a very strong partner for the US

Economy of effort there!

From the article:

But that is a long way short of saying he will commit to maintaining defence spending at 2% of GDP

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2...fence-spending

Then I found a longer story, apparently given in Colchester as part of election campaign (the town is the ome of an army brigade) and apart from the laudatory list of projects is this:

And as for working with the Americans, I know because I spend time with President Obama and others, how much they appreciate the fact that Britain is a very strong and capable partner and able to fight with them, when it's in our national interest, anywhere in the world.

Now I expect a few people would be puzzled at this claim:

You can see that very specifically today in Iraq, where the second largest contributor in terms of air strikes and air patrols is Britain by a very large margin. You have to add up several other countries to get to the scale of what we are doing, second after the Americans.

The RAF have six Tornados in Cyprus, so old it has been widely reported only two are available at one time. As the House of Commons Defence Committee reported last week the UK's on the ground presence in Iraq is three people (I assume that excludes SOF) and for example the Australians have many more. See:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...state-iraq-mps

This report refers to the UK undertaking:

6% of the air strikes against Isis.....British drones used in Iraq and of those flying over Syria – from October, when they were introduced, through to December. Over that period the UK flew 100 armed Reaper missions, launching 38 Hellfire missiles.

Manpower in Iraq (not Kurdistan):

in December, found at that time there were only three UK military personnel outside the Kurdish regions of Iraq compared with 400 Australians, 280 Italians and 300 Spanish.

[Bill Moore]

More on UK's military downsizing and just as important in my view, their reduced funding of BBC.

Video at the following link is Fareed's take:

http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/05...-0524-take.cnn

His article on the same topic in the Washington Post

Okay, that’s a bit unfair. Leaders everywhere, including in the United States, understand that “all politics is local.” But spending a few days recently in Britain, I was struck by just how parochial it has become. After an extraordinary 300-year run, Britain has essentially resigned as a global power.

[Bob's World]

The UK has always possessed a much more realistic appreciation of geo-strategy than the US. I suspect they are also a bit weary of being dragged into an endless string of US-led foreign misadventures defined by our oddly emotional perspective on interests, and our overly "if it's made in the US, the local will like it" approach to foisting ourselves onto others.

As our opponents continue to rise, and our allies and partners continue to distance themselves to avoid being sucked into the messes we either create or are too stiff-necked to avoid, at some point we will begin to step back and reassess what being the US in a globalized, post Cold War world really means. And how to truly "lead" in such an environment.

[davidbfpo]

Two short comments on a newly found website on the UK's defence dilemmas, which are primarily financial and not strategic. The UK government currently is conducting, yet again, a Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR).

There is a longstanding thread on the UK's military problems:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4819

The website being:http://projects21.com/

Which states it is:

PS21 is a non-national, non-ideological, non-partisan organization

The two articles then. The first written by a serving, so anonymous NATO military officer:http://projects21.com/2015/09/08/not...t-this-autumn/

SDSR means:

Britain’s status as a global military power, which is part of the bedrock of its place in the world, is rapidly diminishing. This is not because Britain has chosen to decline—Albion is simply stumbling into irrelevance.

Here are three reasons why:
The British government doesn’t do strategy.

Britain’s huge defence budget has a huge ‘value-for-money’ problem which puts Britain’s military capabilities at risk.

Britain’s leaders remain reluctant to provide significant forces to support globally important missions, putting Britain’s leadership role in NATO at risk.

The second article is shorter and reports a discussion meeting with several ex-officers:http://projects21.com/2015/09/09/ps2...yond-the-sdsr/

[davidbfpo]

The response on this UK defence blog is interesting; the author is scathing, as are some of the comments and some agree:http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/09/not-with-a-bang/

[davidbfpo]

There is no longer a simple distinction between war and peace. We are in a state of permanent engagement in a global competition....all the instruments of national power need constantly to be in play.. to re-imagine the utility of the armed forces beyond the simple construct of fighting wars or preparing for the next one

(Later referring to constraints on the use of force lay in the areas of societal support, parliamentary consent and ever greater legal challenge). Such constraints are particularly significant when the desire to commit to the use of force is in support of operations which some may consider discretionary to the national interest.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34265850

Remarks made in a speech yesterday by General Sir Nicholas Houghton, UK Chief of the Defence Staff.

[Red Rat]

Well they should not be profound. Countries are always in a state of permanent competition, to think otherwise is dangerously nave.

I echo General Houghton's comments on constraints as to the use of force. The trajectory of UK debates and decision making on the use of force are remarkably uninformed in every respect. The rhetoric used is increasingly hyperbolic, it all seems unsustainable without a reset.

[Bill Moore]

In general I agree with the GEN's assertions, and they differ little from LTG Rupert's assertions in his classic "The Utility of Force."

Rupert argues that our militaries, government institutions, and multinational organizations are still largely designed to facilitate industrial era war, not war amongst the people (or what I prefer to call new wars). They also are increasingly less capable of dealing adversarial state actors like Russia that operate in what is now commonly referred to as the gray zone.

A couple of key points from Rupert's book and subsequent presentations I have heard.

During industrial era wars, military force achieved our strategic objectives directly (WWI, WWI), but now the utility of force is to set conditions that enable other elements of power to achieve the decisive result.

Wars now endure because we attempt to achieve the decisive result with military force, when there is no military solution. This points back to the claim (fact IMO) that our governments are not properly structured to fight and win modern war.

Rupert uses the terms confrontation and conflict to provide a useful model. Confrontation is the war, and conflicts are battles within the context of the confrontation. We are still stuck in the win all the battles and lose the war, because we don't how to use force to set conditions for other element of power to achieve the decisive result.

I like Rupert's theory, but one thing I question is our ability to achieve decisive results with economic aid, government assistance, etc. even if the military, the interagency partners, and multinational partners could work together. This reminds me of a clear eyed view of China's civil war presented the book Wars for Asia (1911-1949), where the author pointed out that our State Department vigorously sought a political agreement (power sharing) between the Chinese nationalists and communists. Both Mao and Chiang knew this was a pipe dream, their political systems were not compatible. Someone had to win and someone had to lose. I think we tend to assume that there is political settlement short of total victory for many of these wars, while the opponents laugh at our naivety. In "some" cases we either need to pick a side, or stay out altogether.

[davidbfpo]

The long awaited UK Strategic Defence & Security Review was published yesterday, getting mixed reviews and some plaudits. From my "armchair" there are the curious: two new 'strike' brigades to be formed by 2025 and largely with the same helicopters we have today.

Reviews:

1. Rather long and detailed:http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/1...-does-it-mean/
2. The BBC's Mark Urban:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34901846
3. RUSI's initial short assessment:https://rusi.org/SDSR2015
4. In The Guardian a RUSI SME adds:http://www.theguardian.com/commentis...review-britain
5. The UK Staff College (Kings War Studies outpost) has three responses:http://defenceindepth.co/

Will our allies, principally the USA 'first & foremost' be convinced the UK is a capable and willing ally?

Yes there is a long running thread on UK Defence into which this maybe merged one day, but as many readers are Americans and we so like the 'Special Relationship' I expecta few here will be interested!

[davidbfpo]

The votes have been cast by 397 to 223, so by a large majority the UK is now committed to bombing Syria - targeting Daesh / ISIS. Just what that means is rather unclear for the UK. Our immediate RAF contribution is small, eight Tornados, plus support aircraft and limited reinforcements - flying from Cyprus.

Amongst the deluge of coverage yesterday I found these contributions helpful.

First in a surprisingly good speech in the House of Commons the Shadow (Opposition) foreign secretary Hilary Benn supported air strikes and was applauded - very unusual, if not unique in our parliament:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34991402

Tim Collins of Gulf War speech fame has a comment:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/poli...ue-leader.html

Adam Holloway, a Conservative MP, an ex-soldier and reporter, wrote and citing one passage:

...for the last 15 years I have watched British governments join or create international "coalitions" that have used military force without understanding what drives each conflict on the ground. This ignorance has had disastrous consequences for tens of millions of people in the Middle East and North Africa. So last week, on the plane back from a visit to Iraq and Turkey, I knew that in (the debate) I would have stand up and say that I simply do not know enough about the big plan to fix the broken politics.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ver-again.html

Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, asks how robust are David Cameron's arguments:https://rusi.org/commentary/sound-st...-syria-strikes

My title derives from the 'alliance' against Daesh involving sixty nations, although to be fair very few contribute militarily, with some leaving for the Yemen and hence the UK being one more involved.

[davidbfpo]

Two pre-decision articles found today. One by Tony Blair's former chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, widely credited as a key figure in the Northern Ireland peace talks, who argues and I quote the title & sub-title

Bombing Isis is not enough – we’ll need to talk to them too; To dismiss Islamic State as merely a mad death cult is to deceive ourselves – they are highly rational and shrewd

His last two paragraphs:

I am not arguing that talking is an alternative to fighting. Unless there is military pressure the armed group will never be prepared to talk. But judging by history, fighting is unlikely to provide an answer by itself. If I were an MP I would vote for bombing in Syria as in Iraq. But I would also want to know who is really going to provide the boots on the ground to fight Isis; and be assured of a serious political strategy to address Sunni grievances in Iraq and Syria. If we learn the lessons of the past and combine all these tools – military pressure, addressing grievances and offering a political way out – and do it soon rather than trying everything else first, we may be able to spare a great many lives in the Middle East and in Europe.

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/commentis...tical-solution

Then MG Robert Fry, ex-Royal Marine, asks how moral is this decision? Here is a sample paragraph:

So, taken against this background, let’s return to the likely impact of a marginal increase in one dimension of the military element of the overall campaign to defeat IS. It doesn’t take long to conclude that the cloak of moral certainty the Prime Minister has chosen to wear more closely resembles the emperor’s new clothes.

Finally, again from RUSI, this time by Rafaello Pantucci, asks:

Will bombing ever get rid of Islamic State?

His last paragraph:

The final key point is that the true longer term success of these campaigns can only be secured if an equal soft power campaign is launched to win over the populations in the affected territories. Ultimately a terrorist group will only be removed from an environment if they are unable to have a supportive population to operate within. In all of the aforementioned cases, subsequent to the hard power responses, a concerted effort was made to win over populations and this helped reduce the permissive environment for the group. This is the key to long-term victory over IS—and in the Levant this means making Sunni populations currently living under the group’s thumb feel as though the alternative governments they have on offer are ones that represent them. A bombing campaign will help start to dislodge the group’s mystique and power, but a long-term strategy also needs to win over the population.

Link:http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wo...-islamic-state

[Red Rat]

I am Rip Van Winkle.

I return to the wider world after some time away to discover that the UK has declared war. At least one would think so judging by both the debate in parliament and the media coverage. The UK has not declared war, it has merely extended the geographic parameters of an already extant campaign. The UK has had a national debate over a tactical decision. This does not bode well over the future ability of the UK to apply force in support of national security, let alone national interests.

As for the overall strategy - the military strategy to defeat ISIL seems to be to be in place and working, albeit at a slower pace then most Western governments would like. The military strategy is however occurring in the absence of a broader grand strategic effort for stabilization, and as many have pointed out:
What is needed is not a counter-ISIL narrative but an ISIL competing narrative.