Isn't 'strategy' to do with the context[B[/B] of the issue, rather than its relative merits?

Therefore, a Platoon Commander thinking hard about how to destroy a Dushka firing from a compound is dealing with a fundamentally tactical problem. If he calls in a 2000lb-er on it, and the compound is full of civilians, there will be strategic implications, because Karzai will complain, and ISAF will cede more support/tolerance from the population. But the problem itself is a tactical one.

Whereas if we're trying to secure energy supplies for the next 20 years, this is a strategic issue. The choice between building a nuclear power station, or drilling for more North Sea Oil is perhaps a tactical one - but again both have 'strategic' implications in terms on industrial bases, environmental impact etc.

Therefore the strategic issue of dealing with a global islamist insurgency is clearly a strategic one, especially when mapped onto the risk of WMD proliferation and the increased porousness and vulnerability of an interconnected world.

Somewhere, leaders need to provide the intellectual clarity to lay down clearly how and where we will fight, for what ends, and in so doing identify which issues are reconcilable (ie - we accept scope for dialogue because an insurgent has some legitmate grievance)...and where we say, 'f*** you' - its not happening - the committed irreconcilable - whether thats a nuclear Iran (clock ticking), a nuclear NK (too late!) or AQ.

General Rupert Smith observed at a v good lecture at Kings College London that the UK had not had anythintg that remotely resembled a coherent national strategy, in terms of a vision for the role of the country, international objectives, and a foreign policy to achieve them and nest military efforts. Hard to diagree.