Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Rob Thornton]

I was reading the SWJ Blog 5 APR OPED and hit the Kagan and Kagan piece from the Weekly Standard "What Happened in Basra".

The Kagans' analysis says Iranian Quds were involved in Basra in both a Train, Advise and Assist role, but also to some degree in the fight. Would this fit our definition of a UW (Unconventional Warfare) campaign?

A few thoughts came up as I read the article:

1) If Iran has demonstrated a strong UW capability and capacity in the region to achieve its political goals, what are the conditions required for that capability to be effective? What are its limitations? What other ways does Iran use its influence and tools to compliment its UW capabilities? What would a continued use of UW to achieve its policy goals indicate for the region in the short and long term?

2) Where states like Iraq have some or all of the conditions required for a UW campaign to be effective, what capabilities are required to counter or mitigate those conditions within their borders? I don't want to limit the capabilities or actions to security and intelligence forces as some of the conditions required for a foreign UW campaign to be effective cannot be solely addressed by them.

3) With regard to our own efforts in Security Force Assistance - from foreign military sales to advising, from Iraq to the region, are we assessing this threat correctly in terms of its short and long term risk to our goals, and by extension the goals of our regional partners & allies (acknowledging that there are different degrees of partnership, cooperation and competing interests)? What are their shortfalls? What tools would be more appropriate for our partners and allies, and are in their long term interest to develop? Arguably Iran has had degrees of success with supporting, assisting, sustaining, training, advising proxies to extend its influence, is their success relevant to larger picture? why? What should we do about it and capabilities like it?

I really don't want to debate the Kaplans' analysis too much, except where to do so answers some of the questions. I think its also interesting to consider the level of autonomy the Quds have in Iraq, and the question of how much they are allowed to pursue their own interest independent of Iran's broader FP goals.

I think there are a few other things to think about that are relevant to the questions above. Its worthwhile to consider what other capabilities exist in the region. Iran has some capabilities with regard to conventional forces, para-military & intelligence capabilities oriented looking in, there is the question of Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities, Iran's terrain and demographics play a role, Iran's role with regard to the Caspian area, energy security from an International perspective, etc. I think that when considering UW capabilities like the Quds, or their support of proxies - we need to consider the broader environment that shapes their "ends/ways/means" thinking, or however you wish to frame the way Iran pursues its objectives.


Best, Rob

[Distiller]

I think when dealing with Iran as a first step it is always useful to remember that Persia is one of the oldest cultures in the world, probably had the first large-scale industry (copper mining), and was already a full-blown empire reaching from the Bosphorus to the Indus when in Europe folks had just freshly figured out how to do iron.


On topic: Iran has it easy compared to a Western crusader, especially down on the lower Tigris. Same people, same culture, same religion, cross-border family ties, &c. Easy to be the fish here. And then the Iranian secret service has this strong triade of military, economic and religious power. And also they have a mission, it's not a "job" for them. They operate from a commonly agreed strategic basis, which is: get the Western crusaders. So even sympathetic non-members, or those who want to play it safe because they know they and their family will have to deal with the Persians much longer than with the Westerners. Passive support. Very much like with the Mafia.

The West can't do anything about it, realisticly. But I think the good news is that the Iranian Mafia is forced to keep to their cultural environment and their people, so besides Iranian refugees, expats, agents and a few opportunists in the West the influence will not spread. Btw, those groups are a worthy target of Western secret services.

I think one of the potentially weak points of the Iranian secretive organisation is the need to invest their substantial capital outside Iran. Probably a lot in the Gulf states and the Far East, but via the usual suspects Swiss and Channel Island trusts also in the West.
"Potentially weak" I say because the West is not particulary efficient (or keen) to keep grey and black money out of the system, so the political will for a little covert economical warfare is probably slim.

And regarding your third point: I wouldn't dare to count on any friends and allies in Arabia, regardless who they think should have been successor of the Prophet. Really. We are on their home-turf. And beyond a few suicidal opportunistic Shias I doubt that

And I'm pretty sure Quds is almost completely autonomous short of open war or something stupid like a dirty bomb somewhere (which is not in their interest - they thrive to a good part because of that underclared proxy-war in Iraq). Like the SS was, or the ISI is. I think as long as Iranian officials can handle it like Mission Impossible "Your mission, should you decide to accept it..." they can do pretty much what they want. Their head-honcho is a voodoo master! As if that old fart knew about operational details!