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    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

    Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars?

    The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies has just released a new monograph that presents an alternative view of the character of warfare in the 21st Century. This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.

    Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face “Hybrid Wars” that are a combination of traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.

    Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Research Fellow Frank Hoffman, summarizes the background and analysis of the changing character of warfare in our time. Examining the debate over the past decade about the evolution of modern warfare in the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have claimed that we were in the midst of a “Revolution in Warfare.” Hoffman takes this discussion to a new and much more mature level by recognizing that we are entering a time when multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries. These adversaries understand that successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that are designed to fit one’s goals at that particular time—identified as “Hybrid Wars” in Conflict in the 21st Century...

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default More of the Problem

    I know Frank Hoffman very well so I'm going to have to get on to him about this. I suspect it's the price you have to pay when writing for people like "Institutes".

    How is calling a "War", "Hybrid" helpful? The US Army/USMC can't get it's head around COIN v War, or like folks here, see COIN as discrete and distinct, so why say "Hybrid."

    If there is all the discussion about COIN emphasis degrading "good ole" warfighting skills, then Hybrid is really going to cause panic.

    If you are any sort of professional Army you have to deal with any form of armed conflict. It's all finite and well understood. There is no mystery. Why all the agonising?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Adam L's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I know Frank Hoffman very well so I'm going to have to get on to him about this. I suspect it's the price you have to pay when writing for people like "Institutes".

    How is calling a "War", "Hybrid" helpful? The US Army/USMC can't get it's head around COIN v War, or like folks here, see COIN as discrete and distinct, so why say "Hybrid."

    If there is all the discussion about COIN emphasis degrading "good ole" warfighting skills, then Hybrid is really going to cause panic.

    If you are any sort of professional Army you have to deal with any form of armed conflict. It's all finite and well understood. There is no mystery. Why all the agonising?
    Good question! If I may be so bold, I would like to point out that if we spent less time arguing the definitions of all of these terms and deciding whether war is "hybrid" or whatever we might avoid a good 40-70% of this malarkey. What does it matter if a war is "hybrid" or where COIN fits into the big picture. They are all conflicts of one sort or another and that is what is important (as William F Owen pointed out.) This obsession with categorization is inhibiting progress. This is not to say that it is not important for us to have definitions for terms, but we should not put form over substance.

    Adam L

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    I think there is some utility in doing what Frank Hoffman has done - thinking about war is an endeavor to understand it - it gives us a basis to contemplate ideas and consider their implications. I'm not apt to get wrapped up in the term - he could have called it blended, mixed, etc vs. the term he chose - being blended. I think there is an interesting thing at work here though - "3 block war" had a linear feel to it - I never felt that was right, but neither could I come up with something I liked better to explain or discuss to others what was going on. "Hybrid" as a term may be closer to the mark - at least it starts to get at the idea of simultaneity.

    More important is the thinking that goes on with explaining what he's getting at when he uses "hybrid" - the form in this case is just the wrapping for the function - which is to contemplate the nature of the wars we are seeing. While there may not be much new - again generals such as Slim, Wellington, Marion, Grant, Scipio Africanus, etc. have probably had to contend with some of the same types of conditions in their own campaigns and eras (I'd also add that they may have had to contend with some that we no longer have to, and possibly becuse of culture, technology, or other internal and external influences may not have had to contemplate some of those we now face) - however, we still have to do the nug work to consider how those things apply within the context of the conditions we see or anticipate to really appreciate what they mean.

    There is also a question of the audience - not all the folks are going to have a very good frame of reference for understanding military operations - in fact they may never have served at all - however, they may be the ones making the policy choices which lead (or don't lead) to the use of military force to achieve a political objective. Its hard enough to get uniformed personnel to read complex theory or even good history on military affairs - let alone civilians. We sometimes must put things in writing in a manner that creates discussion, but can be digestible for both the professional and non- professional.

    I plan on reading the full body tomorrow - I'm just too tired to do it tonight. What I'll try to do when I read it is what I've learned to do with all thoughts people have put down to be read - figure out what the author is trying to get across, and evaluate if I think he's right or wrong, why I think that, and what does it mean to me.

    I've not met MR. Hoffman, but I've read a few things he's wrote, from what I've seen he's on a similar journey like many of us to better understand war, and benefit both himself, and what he believes in by doing so. We're not always going to come up with the right terms or definitions - and in some cases there might just not be any - the idea might just be too big to box, however, if you are going to have a discussion based largely on content - meaning through the written word - where animate, interactive discussion is hard or impossible - you have to get some kind of term or definition down - no matter how limited it may be - just to move the ball forward.

    I'll comment more tomorrow after I've read it fully - after a good night's sleep.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 02-03-2008 at 04:21 AM.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    - figure out what the author is trying to get across, and evaluate if I think he's right or wrong, why I think that, and what does it mean to me.
    I don't think Frank is wrong, but I think it might not be useful, because he has not couched the idea of "Hybrid" conflict in a reality that can built upon in terms of doctrine.

    EG: You have COIN, Hybrid, and War Fighting.

    These are premised as being separate, discrete activities, that are part of a spectrum. - (Yes I know that makes no sense, yet that is what is conventionally suggested. Hybrid assumes a mix of two or more separate and discrete entities.)

    Why not just suggest that as a professional army, you will have to fight many different types of enemies, with many differing aims and means. All the fundamentals stay the same.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    Its hard enough to get uniformed personnel to read complex theory or even good history on military affairs - let alone civilians. We sometimes must put things in writing in a manner that creates discussion, but can be digestible for both the professional and non- professional.
    Good point, but this must be held to rigour in the same way other professions, such as medicine, or engineering. Because we don't we end up with 4GW, EBO and other clown-like "concepts" all claiming to shiny new better ways of doing stuff.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question A question

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I don't think Frank is wrong, but I think it might not be useful, because he has not couched the idea of "Hybrid" conflict in a reality that can built upon in terms of doctrine.

    EG: You have COIN, Hybrid, and War Fighting.

    These are premised as being separate, discrete activities, that are part of a spectrum. - (Yes I know that makes no sense, yet that is what is conventionally suggested. Hybrid assumes a mix of two or more separate and discrete entities.)

    Why not just suggest that as a professional army, you will have to fight many different types of enemies, with many differing aims and means. All the fundamentals stay the same.



    Good point, but this must be held to rigour in the same way other professions, such as medicine, or engineering. Because we don't we end up with 4GW, EBO and other clown-like "concepts" all claiming to shiny new better ways of doing stuff.
    Does anything think the whole new and shiny sales pitch and different terms all stems from the fact that in western culture we have taken the whole premise of how to get buy-in from superiors too far.

    Almost everyone has those times when they recognize something that has been dealt with before and they learned about it but the only way they can get it across is to figure out a way for their leaders to make the idea their own.

    How do you get change to take place or at least be understood without reshaping, renaming, or repackaging it in one form or another.

    Just thinking about it

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Why not just suggest that as a professional army, you will have to fight many different types of enemies, with many differing aims and means. All the fundamentals stay the same.
    Hi Wilf, I think this is a very important point. It is not different types of wars but different types of enemies. An enemies cultural backround will heavily influence his methods of war but it is the person that is different not the war.

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Countering "Quds" like capabilities

    I was reading the SWJ Blog 5 APR OPED and hit the Kagan and Kagan piece from the Weekly Standard "What Happened in Basra".

    The Kagans' analysis says Iranian Quds were involved in Basra in both a Train, Advise and Assist role, but also to some degree in the fight. Would this fit our definition of a UW (Unconventional Warfare) campaign?

    A few thoughts came up as I read the article:

    1) If Iran has demonstrated a strong UW capability and capacity in the region to achieve its political goals, what are the conditions required for that capability to be effective? What are its limitations? What other ways does Iran use its influence and tools to compliment its UW capabilities? What would a continued use of UW to achieve its policy goals indicate for the region in the short and long term?

    2) Where states like Iraq have some or all of the conditions required for a UW campaign to be effective, what capabilities are required to counter or mitigate those conditions within their borders? I don't want to limit the capabilities or actions to security and intelligence forces as some of the conditions required for a foreign UW campaign to be effective cannot be solely addressed by them.

    3) With regard to our own efforts in Security Force Assistance - from foreign military sales to advising, from Iraq to the region, are we assessing this threat correctly in terms of its short and long term risk to our goals, and by extension the goals of our regional partners & allies (acknowledging that there are different degrees of partnership, cooperation and competing interests)? What are their shortfalls? What tools would be more appropriate for our partners and allies, and are in their long term interest to develop? Arguably Iran has had degrees of success with supporting, assisting, sustaining, training, advising proxies to extend its influence, is their success relevant to larger picture? why? What should we do about it and capabilities like it?

    I really don't want to debate the Kaplans' analysis too much, except where to do so answers some of the questions. I think its also interesting to consider the level of autonomy the Quds have in Iraq, and the question of how much they are allowed to pursue their own interest independent of Iran's broader FP goals.

    I think there are a few other things to think about that are relevant to the questions above. Its worthwhile to consider what other capabilities exist in the region. Iran has some capabilities with regard to conventional forces, para-military & intelligence capabilities oriented looking in, there is the question of Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities, Iran's terrain and demographics play a role, Iran's role with regard to the Caspian area, energy security from an International perspective, etc. I think that when considering UW capabilities like the Quds, or their support of proxies - we need to consider the broader environment that shapes their "ends/ways/means" thinking, or however you wish to frame the way Iran pursues its objectives.


    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 04-05-2008 at 03:35 PM. Reason: Added some context

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    I think when dealing with Iran as a first step it is always useful to remember that Persia is one of the oldest cultures in the world, probably had the first large-scale industry (copper mining), and was already a full-blown empire reaching from the Bosphorus to the Indus when in Europe folks had just freshly figured out how to do iron.


    On topic: Iran has it easy compared to a Western crusader, especially down on the lower Tigris. Same people, same culture, same religion, cross-border family ties, &c. Easy to be the fish here. And then the Iranian secret service has this strong triade of military, economic and religious power. And also they have a mission, it's not a "job" for them. They operate from a commonly agreed strategic basis, which is: get the Western crusaders. So even sympathetic non-members, or those who want to play it safe because they know they and their family will have to deal with the Persians much longer than with the Westerners. Passive support. Very much like with the Mafia.

    The West can't do anything about it, realisticly. But I think the good news is that the Iranian Mafia is forced to keep to their cultural environment and their people, so besides Iranian refugees, expats, agents and a few opportunists in the West the influence will not spread. Btw, those groups are a worthy target of Western secret services.

    I think one of the potentially weak points of the Iranian secretive organisation is the need to invest their substantial capital outside Iran. Probably a lot in the Gulf states and the Far East, but via the usual suspects Swiss and Channel Island trusts also in the West.
    "Potentially weak" I say because the West is not particulary efficient (or keen) to keep grey and black money out of the system, so the political will for a little covert economical warfare is probably slim.

    And regarding your third point: I wouldn't dare to count on any friends and allies in Arabia, regardless who they think should have been successor of the Prophet. Really. We are on their home-turf. And beyond a few suicidal opportunistic Shias I doubt that

    And I'm pretty sure Quds is almost completely autonomous short of open war or something stupid like a dirty bomb somewhere (which is not in their interest - they thrive to a good part because of that underclared proxy-war in Iraq). Like the SS was, or the ISI is. I think as long as Iranian officials can handle it like Mission Impossible "Your mission, should you decide to accept it..." they can do pretty much what they want. Their head-honcho is a voodoo master! As if that old fart knew about operational details!

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    Default Emerging Threats and Hybrid Warfare


    Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, when not closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile, seeks out the best and brightest for their views on the potential threats we may face in the not so distant future – and of course any such search leads to Frank Hoffman.

    Colonel Gurney has, again, kindly – and we, again, greatly appreciate this – granted SWJ permission to post Frank's Hybrid Warfare and Challenges that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

    The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our best aid to interpretation. In particular, that great and timeless illuminator of conflict, chance, and human nature Thucydides—is as relevant and revealing as ever.

    In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.

    The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he intended, a valuable “possession for all time.”

    In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service roles and missions review, and an upcoming defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.

    One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and nonlinear times. However, the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the converging modes of war. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today...

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    WINEP, 10 Feb 09: Countering Transnational Threats: Terrorism, Narco-Trafficking, and WMD Proliferation
    Table of Contents

    Tackling the Terrorist Threat: Progress Made and Future Challenges
    Kenneth Wainstein, Homeland Security Advisor

    The Future of the Middle East
    Thomas Fingar, Chairman of the National Security Council

    Building the Global Counterterrorism Network
    Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense

    Assessing the Fight against al-Qaeda
    Ted Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats

    Confronting the Challenge of Iran: Comprehensive Solutions for a Comprehensive Threat
    Mario Mancuso, Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security

    Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?
    Michael Braun, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default The hype about "Hybrid" Conflict: Glenn vs. Hoffman

    In my opinion this entire argument continues to chase the wrong line of logic. It is not a case of warfare changing. What we are experiencing is a case of the environment in which warfare occurs changing. This may seem a subtle point, but it is essential to the argument.

    The principles of war, just like the principles of insurgency, do not change much. The one thing that in recent years has changed very much is the shift from a bi-polar, Cold War, non-globalized environment to a multi-polar, post-Cold War, Globalized environment.

    This means that static situations are once again actively seeking a new “normal,” as they emerge from Cold War controls; that this is taking place in an environment that is not shaped by the balancing of two super powers; and most historically important, that it is taking place in this globalized environment, that empowers populaces as never before, and also has enabled the rise of non-state organizations like al Qaeda to be able to conduct Unconventional Warfare in a very state-like way to incite insurgency among disparate populaces, and also for quasi-state organizations like Hezbollah to similarly operate in a zone above the level of gang activity and its associated inefficiencies, but also below the level of state activity and its associated responsibilities and vulnerabilities to state power response.

    In short, it is not about a change of warfare, it is about a change of environment.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 03-04-2009 at 01:44 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Bobs World, What about this idea. We are confusing Types of Warfare with Strategy!

    War doesn't change as you point out but Strategies will evolve and adapt as need be based upon the opponent and situation. What we call UW,FID,Insurgency,COIN,4GW, are not types of warfare but Strategies!!

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Words are important.

    When one takes a position that "War has changed," and the pentagon buys into it and begins to restructure itself to fight and think about this new type of war, I believe you risk building the solution to the wrong problem, and thereby putting our nation at risk.

    When one takes a position that "the Environment is changing," and the pentagon buys into that and sets about ensuring that it does not attempt to frame every emerging problem by an obsolete construct, but looks at each problem with fresh eyes, demanding that the intelligence community commits every bit as much of their considerable skill and energy to an understanding of the environment in which an event occurs as they do currently to describing the "threat" that is operating within that environment; you avoid always refighting the last conflict and thereby reduce our nation's risks.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Default Good point, Bob!

    Now all we can do is hope that the right folks are listening....

    I'd also hazard a guess that part of the hype (as has been commented on before in numerous SWC threads) has to do with folks wanting to "make a name for themselves" by "discovering" this new type of war...which doesn't really exist. It's far easier to make something up than it is to do the legwork and go back through things. Most of the patterns we're seeing now have happened before...it's the changes in the environment (cultural, technological, and so on) that have really changed the dynamics.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Default Two parallel threads ...

    I'm continuing this thread over here
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
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    ...but looks at each problem with fresh eyes, demanding that the intelligence community commits every bit as much of their considerable skill and energy to an understanding of the environment in which an event occurs as they do currently to describing the "threat" that is operating within that environment; you avoid always refighting the last conflict and thereby reduce our nation's risks.
    Words are important to us but what about to our enemies today?

    - Role of Civil Affairs (which encompases religious considerations)

    - Role in background of VOICE OF AMERICA? Anyone notice that President Obama has started to use TV side of VOA overseas to make his points about Iran of late? *Pet subject of mine some of you may recall.

    - Role of the Marine Corp in context of the variety of different environments we are up against these days...to include the damned pirates off coast of Africa.

    - Huge role satellite, U-2, and drone intelligence has to be playing 24/7.

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    Default Doug Macgregor on "Hybrid War"

    Colonel (ret) Doug Macgregor sent to me via personal email his thoughts on this discussion on the "hybrid war" concept and gave me permission to post them on the SWJ blog.

    "As most of us know, the IDF went through some considerable internal self-examination in the period after Lebanon. Most of the self-examination centered around the loss of basic competence associated with combined arms operations, but the self-examination ultimately went much further urging the tight integration of maneuver and strike with good intelligence in the context of all future combat operations.

    In addition, the IDF embraced the use of armor, artillery and fuel air explosive in the conduct of urban operations with the object of minimizing the exposure of dismounted IDF troops to enemy fire. While the Hamas enemy may qualify as one of Frank Hoffman's hybrids, the IDF wasted no time in fighting for hearts and minds because the IDF knows there are none to win in the Islamic World.

    In the final analysis, the so-called hybrid enemy that is absolutely not new in any way was crushed not by some scheme of culturally sensitive men with rifles, but by raw, irresistible military power directed with as much precision as possible. Whether there is any strategic payoff for Israel in this operation is another matter. But tactically and operationally, the IDF got it right.

    Again, this too is not a new approach. Lots of hybrid enemies in Russia during WW II and earlier wars that were ultimately dispatched by the various combatants in exactly the same way. But it is good to see the IDF renew our understanding of reality."
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 03-04-2009 at 06:50 PM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, obviously Colonel Macgrogor

    gets it. Fads don't matter. As he points out, WW II was absolutely full of 'hybrid' war. So were some segments in Korea and many segments in Viet Nam -- most, even.

    The only thing Hezbollah brings to the table that is new is a great deal of competence and proof that superior training produces superior results.

    The lesson from the 2006 effort is do not forget the basics or try to fight a war on the cheap and with an incrementalist approach. Hmm. Weren't both those learned earlier, somewhere...

    Now let's see if all the armchair strategists finally tumble...

    Thanks for posting that.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Ken,

    I agree they did not bring some new form of warfare to the fight, but they did come wrapped in a new form of quasi-state status that the policy types haven't figured out how to deal with yet.

    How many times did we hear in the media and see in offical statements about "Hezbollah vs Israel." Why was this not simply Lebannon vs Israel. Give these guys a political sanctuary from the consquences of their actions and they will certainly be smart enough to take full advantage of it.

    We really need to start figuring out when to separate a non-state actor from the state, and when to simply say: "Look, you can't be both part of the state when it suits you, and then a separate militant arm without implicating that same state in your actions when it suits you either. Pick one."

    When non-state or quasi-state engagese a state, they often fare well because the tools of statecraft (DIME) do not work well against them. When a weak state engages a strong state they lose. We allowed a weak state to engage a strong state under the auspices of "Hezbollah," and it created unnecessary. The proverbial self-inflicted headwound for the West.

    We do the same thing with Hamas. They are elected representatives of the Palestinian people, so we are foolish to not fully recognize that fact and make it painfully clear to them that they just voted themselves out of the non-state terrorist business. From here on out they are just another weak state, and any actions on their part against a stronger state will bring full state consequences down on the larger body they now represent.

    We make this harder than it needs to be, and concepts like "Hybrid Warfare" don't help. The real issue are these evolving political statuses associated with Globalization, not some new form of warfare. In my thread, this is what I refer to when I speak of the "Environment."
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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