Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Gian P Gentile]

Colonel (ret) Doug Macgregor sent to me via personal email his thoughts on this discussion on the "hybrid war" concept and gave me permission to post them on the SWJ blog.

"As most of us know, the IDF went through some considerable internal self-examination in the period after Lebanon. Most of the self-examination centered around the loss of basic competence associated with combined arms operations, but the self-examination ultimately went much further urging the tight integration of maneuver and strike with good intelligence in the context of all future combat operations.

In addition, the IDF embraced the use of armor, artillery and fuel air explosive in the conduct of urban operations with the object of minimizing the exposure of dismounted IDF troops to enemy fire. While the Hamas enemy may qualify as one of Frank Hoffman's hybrids, the IDF wasted no time in fighting for hearts and minds because the IDF knows there are none to win in the Islamic World.

In the final analysis, the so-called hybrid enemy that is absolutely not new in any way was crushed not by some scheme of culturally sensitive men with rifles, but by raw, irresistible military power directed with as much precision as possible. Whether there is any strategic payoff for Israel in this operation is another matter. But tactically and operationally, the IDF got it right.

Again, this too is not a new approach. Lots of hybrid enemies in Russia during WW II and earlier wars that were ultimately dispatched by the various combatants in exactly the same way. But it is good to see the IDF renew our understanding of reality."

[Ken White]

gets it. Fads don't matter. As he points out, WW II was absolutely full of 'hybrid' war. So were some segments in Korea and many segments in Viet Nam -- most, even.

The only thing Hezbollah brings to the table that is new is a great deal of competence and proof that superior training produces superior results.

The lesson from the 2006 effort is do not forget the basics or try to fight a war on the cheap and with an incrementalist approach. Hmm. Weren't both those learned earlier, somewhere...

Now let's see if all the armchair strategists finally tumble...

Thanks for posting that.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

I agree they did not bring some new form of warfare to the fight, but they did come wrapped in a new form of quasi-state status that the policy types haven't figured out how to deal with yet.

How many times did we hear in the media and see in offical statements about "Hezbollah vs Israel." Why was this not simply Lebannon vs Israel. Give these guys a political sanctuary from the consquences of their actions and they will certainly be smart enough to take full advantage of it.

We really need to start figuring out when to separate a non-state actor from the state, and when to simply say: "Look, you can't be both part of the state when it suits you, and then a separate militant arm without implicating that same state in your actions when it suits you either. Pick one."

When non-state or quasi-state engagese a state, they often fare well because the tools of statecraft (DIME) do not work well against them. When a weak state engages a strong state they lose. We allowed a weak state to engage a strong state under the auspices of "Hezbollah," and it created unnecessary. The proverbial self-inflicted headwound for the West.

We do the same thing with Hamas. They are elected representatives of the Palestinian people, so we are foolish to not fully recognize that fact and make it painfully clear to them that they just voted themselves out of the non-state terrorist business. From here on out they are just another weak state, and any actions on their part against a stronger state will bring full state consequences down on the larger body they now represent.

We make this harder than it needs to be, and concepts like "Hybrid Warfare" don't help. The real issue are these evolving political statuses associated with Globalization, not some new form of warfare. In my thread, this is what I refer to when I speak of the "Environment."

[Cavguy]

All,

Jack McCuen is a classical COIN thinker who published Art of Counter Revolutionary War in 1966. He's a particpant on a closed forum I am involved in discussing the same topic. He has been an advocate of the Hybrid war concept. I post the below with his concurrence.

ALL,

Let me repeat my comments I made in a private discussion because I disagree with Russell Glenn's article, "Thought on 'Hybrid' Conflict" for a number of reasons.

First, he largely bases his article on the Israeli Lebanon campaign, which is certainly a prime example of a hybrid war and a clear example of the type of hybrid war we might expect in the future if we choose to intervene in such places as the Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Pakistan -- although I'm not advocating or recommending any such operations. It is also the example which General Mattis, Frank Hoffman and their associates have been using as their example of hybrid war, along with, I suspect, Israel's recent campaign into Gaza. As Frank knows, I'm don't think that this is the best hybrid war example because of its limited context. In fact, Russell Glen uses this limited context as his basic argument that hybrid war's limited context makes it unworthy of use as a separate form of war. Rather, as I've said a number of times in earlier messages, I believe that the Vietnam, Iraqi and Afghanistan Wars are much better and wider context examples of hybrid war and refute Russell's basic argument.

Second, although Russell quotes my definition of hybrid war from my March-April 2008 Military Review Article, "Hybrid Wars," "...a struggle against an armed enemy and ...a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community," which is a very wide definition, in deed, he then ignores it by saying that the term, "hybrid war," is primarily a tactical, rather a strategic one -- using Lebanon with Hezbollah as his prime example, rather than Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. I would have to agree that the Lebanon Campaign with Hezbollah was a rather tactical example; however, the impact of the war and its tactics had very wide strategic implications which were very critical and decisive, involving, not only a new strategy but wide impacts on the home front and international community which played critical roles in the ultimate success or failure of the campaign or war. As I mentioned above and as we have been discussing elsewhere, the conduct of the Vietnam, Iraqi and Afghanistan Wars was very wide and very strategic.

Third, something Russell does not mention is that we badly need the use of the term, "hybrid war," to develop an adequate strategy for these wars we have been, are and are likely to be fighting. Since I wrote my monograph on "The Art of Hybrid War" in 2007, I have been struggling to get the military to develop an effective strategy for the wars we have fought and are fighting in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and in the future. We need to call this new form of war something and get on with developing a strategy which will win them. The word "hybrid war" works well because this new from of war is a "hybrid" combination of symmetric and asymmetric war. Somehow, terms like "irregular war, "complex war" don't, to my mind at least, lend themselves to developing a highly complex, wide ranging strategy for them. As I say in my monograph, I'm not wedded to the term, "hybrid," but we had been call it something quickly and develop a strategy which will start winning them. Thus, for the moment, I'm going with "hybrid war."

Fourth, and finally as I have discussed privately with some of you, the concept of hybrid war offers a possible bridge within the military to heal the "cultural divide" which is separating the "traditionalists," who are strongly advocating the concepts of conventional/symmetric war and the "crusaders" who want to rebuild the military mainly around counterinsurgency/asymmetric war. Frankly, this cultural divide, both silently and openly, is severely hindering the military and civilian community in building the military and civilian components of our government in developing future strategy, reorganizing our military and civilian components, as well as equipping and training them for wars of the future. The concept of hybrid war, being a hybrid combination of these two concepts of war -- the symmetric and asymmetric -- offers a bridge on which both the "traditionalists" and the "crusaders" should be able to agree and operate. Sure, major compromises will have to be made and consolidations, but the fact is that we have to establish a military and civilian establishment which can fight and win any war, on any battlefield, anywhere in the world. That will require dominant symmetric/conventional/nuclear capabilities and asymmetric/irregular/counterinsurgency capabilities.

THAT'S WHY I LIKE THE CONCEPT OF HYBRID WAR.

WARM REGARDS,

JACK

[Ken White]

I agree they did not bring some new form of warfare to the fight, but they did come wrapped in a new form of quasi-state status that the policy types haven't figured out how to deal with yet.

True -- and regrettable, it's not that hard IMO. But that always seems to be the case; that they're behind the power curve. In my view that derives from trying to make too many disparate groups happy, an obvious impossibility...

Penalty of living in a democratic society, I guess.

How many times did we hear in the media and see in offical statements about "Hezbollah vs Israel." Why was this not simply Lebannon vs Israel. Give these guys a political sanctuary from the consquences of their actions and they will certainly be smart enough to take full advantage of it.

As would most groups. Hezbollah just arrived at the conjunction of time and space that gave them the legs to climb from the primordial ooze. My admittedly limited experience with Lebanon leaves me convinced that many there would clobber Hezbollah in an eye blink -- if they could. They were too weak and could not stop its growth at the time; the west did nothing to slow or stop it (nothing new in that -- and I am not advocating force there...) and it grew and grew to the point that it is now powerful enough to threaten the state of Lebanon though they are carefukl not too push that too far (to date...). Hezbollah is not an existential threat to Israel though it is dangerous and pestilential threat. It can, if it wishes be an annoyance to others but that would likely be its death warrant and I think they're smart enough to realize that.

We really need to start figuring out when to separate a non-state actor from the state, and when to simply say: "Look, you can't be both part of the state when it suits you, and then a separate militant arm without implicating that same state in your actions when it suits you either. Pick one."

Philosophically, I agree. Practically, I'm not sure that can be done given the current state of the world.As an aside, it will be interesting to see what the current worldwide economic downturn does to several simmering potential conflicts.

In any event If we try to impose order unilaterally, we'll be adjudged more evil; if we get a coalition to do it; they'll be judged evil -- in all cases, that judgment will be by lesser States who object to power to sort out problems (unless they do it locally or internally, then it's no one else's business). The UN is not going to be effective for the same reason, all the numerous little States will object. Only if the non-state actors do something really egregious will one get any traction -- and most know that and are careful not to cross that line. So. I agree -- but do not know how to accomplish what you suggest. That's because, as you say:

When non-state or quasi-state engagese a state, they often fare well because the tools of statecraft (DIME) do not work well against them. When a weak state engages a strong state they lose. We allowed a weak state to engage a strong state under the auspices of "Hezbollah," and it created unnecessary. The proverbial self-inflicted headwound for the West.

True.

We make this harder than it needs to be, and concepts like "Hybrid Warfare" don't help. The real issue are these evolving political statuses associated with Globalization, not some new form of warfare. In my thread, this is what I refer to when I speak of the "Environment."

Saw that and generally agree with it also. The issue, I think, is how do we 'educate' the already highly educated 'policy professionals' whose academic backgrounds somehow all too frequrntly seem to poorly equip them for dealing with the real world?

[Ken White]

Cav Guy. Read his book a long time ago; agreed with parts and not with others. I do strongly agree with this statement of his you quote:

"the fact is that we have to establish a military and civilian establishment which can fight and win any war, on any battlefield, anywhere in the world. That will require dominant symmetric/conventional/nuclear capabilities and asymmetric/irregular/counterinsurgency capabilities.

Anyone who agrees with me is bound to be thinking correctly...

Or is that I agree with him so I must be thinking correctly...

Either way, he's right.

P.S.

I have no hangup on hybrid war as a term; I just point out that as a practical effort, it's been around for years and thus is not 'new.' McCuen is correct, we have not dealt with it at all well and we need to be able to do that. No radical reforms are necessary, just common sense improvements -- and the civilian policy establishment is a big part of the problem.

[William F. Owen]

I know both Doug MacGregor and Frank Hoffman, extremely well and have immense respect for both men - and I don't give that out lightly

Like most men I respect, I do not agree with all they say, but Doug hits the nail on the head with this one.

The IDF has made close examination of Hoffman's work, but they have very different ideas, that do no equate to "Hybrid". For the IDF Gaza and Lebanon are State v State warfare the civilians to be protected are their own. The fact that the enemy does not posses armoured brigades is utterly irrelevant - as it should be. There is no "new war". War is war and all wars are basically the same.

In my opinion "Hybrid" does serve a purpose if your Army/Services are intellectually incapable of grasping the nuance of the wider problem. It's the same justification as Manoeuvre Warfare.

[Entropy]

I need to read more on hybrid warfare, but at first glance it does not seem all that new. I've been reading Roman (Republic) history lately and it seems to me they would be quite familiar with the concept of "hybrid warfare" if not the terminology.

Col.(ret) Macgregor said above:

In addition, the IDF embraced the use of armor, artillery and fuel air explosive in the conduct of urban operations with the object of minimizing the exposure of dismounted IDF troops to enemy fire. While the Hamas enemy may qualify as one of Frank Hoffman's hybrids, the IDF wasted no time in fighting for hearts and minds because the IDF knows there are none to win in the Islamic World.

He goes on to say that the IDF got it tactically and operationally right in the recent Hamas war. I agree with that to an extent, but Hamas' incompetence and mistakes, and the IDF's limited operational objectives (they didn't go "downtown" to root out hidden Hamas fighters/leadership) were factors as well.

[Rank amateur]

Whether there is any strategic payoff for Israel in this operation is another matter. But tactically and operationally, the IDF got it right.
[/I]

Is like a pilot saying, let's not worry about landings, lets learn from the pilot who does fantastic take offs and level flights.

[Ron Humphrey]

Is like a pilot saying, let's not worry about landings, lets learn from the pilot who does fantastic take offs and level flights.

Or cooking dinner with all the right ingredients and proper equipment but assuming 15 min at 800 will work rather than 60 at 200


The issue that seems to continue to be left out of much of the discussion whenever IDF is involved is the fact that how they "war" is and will always be completely different than how we can "war" because they live their thus your talking about the difference between fighting for survival(them) and changing things for someone else(us).

I've always agreed with WILF that war is war, Just seems like it needs to be stated that theres a big difference between -
Your War and Someone elses battles

[Ken White]

survive, doing things right tactically and operationally are pretty important -- one error can mean disaster.

Which does not at all mean the Israelis did not profit strategically from the effort. Some times just demonstrating capability or will is a very important strategic effort (see Iraq, 2003-2009).

I do agree that the Israelis offer few usable examples for us -- but in this case, there is one minor lesson -- that 'hybrid' war is manageable.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

This is all a mess...

We have Jack McCuen telling us that Hybrid is new and a combination of Symmetric and Asymmetric war - seriously? Who fights a symmetric war? Two boxers, maybe? And Hoffman spreading the term around with wild abandon.

I suggest:

1. It's not new.

2. The term would be useful if it prompted some of the dinosaurs / oil tankers (insert your own metaphor) to change course and if it galvanises the community - it isn't - it's being seized upon as a means to settle old scores (especially between the services...EBO anyone?), make reputations, but generally it is divisive.

3. We're trying to walk before we can run...I still haven't seen a decent Irregular Warfare definition...I think that we need to get our house into order before we start developing new terms for old problems.

I notice that the Israelis are pushing Hybrid real hard. Hezbollah's victory was a red herring - as this forum has stated, the Israelis got caught with their pants down. Ill prepared, not trained, and poorly equipped.

And the Hamas thing...Israel lost (didn't win) against Hezbollah, so it loses its deterrence... best thing to do is to find someone real quick and give them a good hiding, just so the neighbourhood knows you're still in business.

I think Hybrid's popularity stems from the fact that it is a useful fig leaf to cover someone's screw-up.

LP

[Ron Humphrey]

This is all a mess...

We have Jack McCuen telling us that Hybrid is new and a combination of Symmetric and Asymmetric war - seriously? Who fights a symmetric war? Two boxers, maybe? And Hoffman spreading the term around with wild abandon.

I suggest:

1. It's not new.

2. The term would be useful if it prompted some of the dinosaurs / oil tankers (insert your own metaphor) to change course and if it galvanises the community - it isn't - it's being seized upon as a means to settle old scores (especially between the services...EBO anyone?), make reputations, but generally it is divisive.

3. We're trying to walk before we can run...I still haven't seen a decent Irregular Warfare definition...I think that we need to get our house into order before we start developing new terms for old problems.

I notice that the Israelis are pushing Hybrid real hard. Hezbollah's victory was a red herring - as this forum has stated, the Israelis got caught with their pants down. Ill prepared, not trained, and poorly equipped.

And the Hamas thing...Israel lost (didn't win) against Hezbollah, so it loses its deterrence... best thing to do is to find someone real quick and give them a good hiding, just so the neighbourhood knows you're still in business.

I think Hybrid's popularity stems from the fact that it is a useful fig leaf to cover someone's screw-up.

LP

it is unfortunately our mess because for all intensive purposes it does seem to drive where we go.

As for Hezbollah, Hamas, or other's should it really be considered indicatory in the least of what a different player involved in the same conflict should expect?

Do you suppose were it the ally's entering that there wouldn't be a massive difference in how they would fight. Or even if the Lebanese army where to go at it with them, are you sure it wouldn't be something more akin to Iraq or the Phillipine's, Farc, or (fill in the blank) I'm sure you get the point.

Or how about if we had decided to have a go at Russia during the Georgian incursion last year. What might that have looked like? Anywho long way of saying I for one am still waiting on the definition of "regular" (war, warfare, battle, conflict, negotiation, barter, trade, etc) anything having to do with one party gaining or losing something to or from another.


As to your concern with irregular warfare
How's this for definition.

Any conflict that occurs with the intent of achieving a given endstate, yet which is enacted through actions, teachings, or politics which do not conform to universally accepted norms for warfare.

No good? Oh well had to try.
Funny thing is seem's to me that once your able to accurately describe something in such a manner as to be encompassing of all actions to be found within it; it wouldn't be quite so irregular anymore

In this particular case I don;t see a problem with the definition being used now. Perhaps the more important issue is how it is used and by whom toward what ends?

[slapout9]

I don't think we need anymore new words in the war vocabulary as many have pointed out, however I bet this catches on. Our economy is a hybrid economy, part planned and part free market (supposedly anyway) this term was popular when I studied economies a long time ago but it fell out of fashion and the term now is "mixed economy". However it is about to make a comeback and bet Hybrid Warfare will come with it....we will see.

[William F. Owen]

I notice that the Israelis are pushing Hybrid real hard. Hezbollah's victory was a red herring - as this forum has stated, the Israelis got caught with their pants down. Ill prepared, not trained, and poorly equipped.

Not true. As I stated in a previous post on this thread, the IDF is not enamoured with "Hybrid". I was at the IDF's Staff Collage, the day after Hoffman, so I am pretty well aware of their reaction and reservations. I don't know who you think here is pushing it, but they are not on my radar.

In 2006 the IDF knew more about Hezbollah than any other organisation on the planet. The operational problems that did occur (and they did) had little or nothing to do with not understanding how Hezbollah worked.

What the IDF are concerned with is something a bit more nuanced than "Hybrid," and they've been talking about it for the last 10 years

[JMA]

Colonel (ret) Doug Macgregor sent to me via personal email his thoughts on this discussion on the "hybrid war" concept and gave me permission to post them on the SWJ blog.

[snip]

In addition, the IDF embraced the use of armor, artillery and fuel air explosive in the conduct of urban operations with the object of minimizing the exposure of dismounted IDF troops to enemy fire. While the Hamas enemy may qualify as one of Frank Hoffman's hybrids, the IDF wasted no time in fighting for hearts and minds because the IDF knows there are none to win in the Islamic World.

[snip]

That Israel knows where their are "hearts and minds" to win and where not is relevant to Afghanistan where a careful analysis of what is possible and what is not in this regard and where.