Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Bill Moore]

If anyone wants to tell me Ms Flournoy is correct in her assertions and reasoning, I would be fascinated as to the actual evidence or train of thought.

Wilf, the hybrid concept is not new, but some of the potential threats are new (that is simply due to an ever changing geopolitical environment and new technology available, which is simply a continuation of history), so the character of war has changed. I'm trying to discern exactly what you disagree with Ms Flournoy on? The list of threats or the hybrid war concept?

Bob's World

, I agree with most of your points, but the majority of Cold War conflict was so called irregular warfare, where one side attempted to win over a select population using armed conflict in Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Angola, Greece, Italy, Turkey, etc. Fortunately for us the communist system was bankrupt, so even if we weren't that good at counterinsurgency, we still won that particular round. I think an argument could be made that this war is still ongoing, based on the apparent surge in Maoist insurgency activity throughout many parts of the world. The difference is we don't have near competitor nuclear superpowers fighting a largely overt proxy war. Proxy wars are kind of like computer games, the guys pushing the buttons don't get dirty.

From this particular vantage point complex adaptive means having the abilities and skills to use not just gray matter by itself but to augment it with math/computers/electronics in order to rapidly exert influence out of proportion to what we were given by the creator (the whole basic tool using primate thing).

Steve, not to reopen an old debate on our opposing views of EBO, but complex adaptive systems is not about tools, it is about human behavior and the ability for humans to learn and adapt. In simple grunt terms (my language) the enemy has a vote, because they will adapt to our response and we will adapt to theirs, thus conflict co-evolution. I strongly disagree with your assertion that a tool will allow us to simplify war into a math equation. Tools may help, but I tend to trust a "good" commander's inutition much more than a tool.

Wilf makes the point that none of these concepts are new is correct (that is only half true, our descripton of something as old as mankind is new), but again I would argue not useful. 90% of our failures in so irregular warfare are due to leadership failures to understand the nature of the problem and respond correctly. 90% of the successes are due to leadership successes. The other 10% is random or luck. You would think fixing the leadership issue would be relatively easy, but it isn't due to our deeply embedded culture for conventional warfare, thus whether new or not, the concepts of IW and hybrid warfare are useful forcing mechanisms. I suspect you'll disagree, but I don't know how you can argue the point that we didn't do very well initially fighting this type of war, and I'm not sure how the argument that war is war (even though its true) is helpful is fixing our underlying problems. Please explain your positon?

I think the main issue for our general purpose forces creating an awareness of the holistic nature of war through education and training. In addition to fixing our professional education and culture, we need to direct more funding towards Special Operations, security force assistance, and so called asymmetric capabilities such as cyber, missile defense, space dominance, etc.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, the hybrid concept is not new, but some of the potential threats are new (that is simply due to an ever changing geopolitical environment and new technology available, which is simply a continuation of history), so the character of war has changed. I'm trying to discern exactly what you disagree with Ms Flournoy on? The list of threats or the hybrid war concept?

If she had started her testimony with the words "Business as usual to anyone with a brain," I'd agree with her.

I don't agree with a Hybrid War concept. It falls between being an invented problem, and naming something we don't need to name. It's a another poorly defined feature of contemporary military thought.

What threats are we seeing that are so new? No weapon the enemy is using in Iraq or A'Stan is less than 30 years old or more in terms of actual employment. What emerging regional powers (that we don't know about)

Sea Mines? Anti-ship missiles? Broad Band Jamming? Passive Radar? Sarin? VX? What about all these are so surprising or even "new technology?"

If US Armed Forces are being pulled in two very different directions then someone needs to be sacked for stupidity for letting that happen.

[Ken White]

I don't agree with a Hybrid War concept. It falls between being an invented problem, and naming something we don't need to name. It's a another poorly defined feature of contemporary military thought.

My take also...

If US Armed Forces are being pulled in two very different directions then someone needs to be sacked for stupidity for letting that happen.

1. I think that US tactical and operational thinking has been so severely constrained by our fetish with 'metrics' and providing 'systems' thinking that we see anything out of OUR now constrained definition of ordinary as something new when in fact it is not; thus our perception -- or rather, that of some (fortunately not all) of our 'strategic thinkers' -- is easly skewed.

2. Add to that the US governmental system that says Person C get elected to replace Person B. Person C must appoint People who will publicly refute every trick, technique, policy or statement of Person B -- just. as Person B and his or her folks did yo Person A.

... a. Until, of course, they find out there was a very good reason for their predecessor's policies and quietly reinstitute them...

... b. In any event, new appointees will parrot new things just cause they're different. This usually consists, in DoD, of listening to the buzz amongst the troops and emphasizing something that predecessor civilians did not. Such mention will not necessarily be either in context or involve common sense. This is an obvious problem made worse by 1. above.

3. This governmental process also requires 'new' thinking every four to eight years. Sometimes, that appears, usually it's just the old wine with a new set of buzzwords.

[Bill Moore]

What threats are we seeing that are so new? No weapon the enemy is using in Iraq or A'Stan is less than 30 years old or more in terms of actual employment. What emerging regional powers (that we don't know about)

Wilf

The fact that the resistance in Afghanistan is a near peer competitor with the world's most modern military is a somewhat disturbing thought when you really think about it. Recently a senior officer suggested that our network centric warfare model (all seeing, all knowing, sensor-shooter technology stuff) is deeply flawed and that we need to revisit the principle of mass. Our high speed sensors and shooters are not getting the job done. What we need is more Soldiers walking the turf so we can control the populace and defeat the enemy. While I don't want to throw the baby out with the bath water I tend to agree that our experiment with network warfare worked well fighting an inept enemy like Saddam, but it hasn't worked so well since then.

Agree or not, the network centric form of warfare is how we fight. It is how we're equipped and trained to fight. It is enabled by satellites, computers, software, etc., and of course all these are increasingly vulnerable to attack through asymmetric means (counter-technology?). What happens to our ability to fight if our satellites are disabled? What happens if a virus shuts down our internet system supporting the fight? We'll have no common operational picture, navigation will be impacted, intelligence will be significantly hampered, sensor to shooter capability will be serious effected, etc. It will take precious time to shift back to paper maps, FAX machines, HF radio, etc. There are several things that are new; one of them is that our dependence on information technology has made us more vulnerable, because these systems are vulnerable to attacks using counter-technology.

What else is new? The fact that a kid in the Philippines can design, then employ a computer virus that causes millions, if not billions, of dollars of damage worldwide is somewhat new. 30 years ago a kid couldn't do that. If you believe the recent hype about our electric power grid being vulnerable to a computer attack from afar, that is also relatively new. We still haven't grasped the significance of global networking tools for enabling hostile global networks to coordinate their activities. We’re not the only ones who have a network. The World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle a few years back should have been a wake up call. The rapid proliferation of knowledge on line ranging from how to fire a weapon, organize a demonstration, make a bomb, sabotage a bull dozer, etc. with video and text support is all somewhat new.

I get your point, but if we opt to live in the past and continue on as though nothing is new, I think we assume exceptional risk. I don’t like cute labels either, and I don’t get her point about being pulled in two directions, but I still think there is some merit to the discussion.

[William F. Owen]

What else is new? The fact that a kid in the Philippines can design, then employ a computer virus that causes millions, if not billions, of dollars of damage worldwide is somewhat new. 30 years ago a kid couldn't do that. If you believe the recent hype about our electric power grid being vulnerable to a computer attack from afar, that is also relatively new. We still haven't grasped the significance of global networking tools for enabling hostile global networks to coordinate their activities. We’re not the only ones who have a network. The World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle a few years back should have been a wake up call. The rapid proliferation of knowledge on line ranging from how to fire a weapon, organize a demonstration, make a bomb, sabotage a bull dozer, etc. with video and text support is all somewhat new.

Bill,

Sure, we are living in the information age. I fully admit that. It also has massive benefits for our side as well. There are now training and equipment opportunities that we could only dream back in the day. If some punk 18-year-old anti-WTO type can get it, then we need to sack folks who can't. It's obvious, and it's not hard. If there is any platoon commander in the US or UK who could not plan the 911 attacks we need to sack him as well.

However, my point is that the likes Flournoy and many, many others, is that they are saying "The dog ate my homework."
Anyone who is telling us that our enemy has technologies, is stating the obvious, and often has to overstate the threat to get the reaction they want.
Anyone saying war is now more complex is grossly unaware of military history.

The current defence debate is silliness on an industrial scale. I am not a luddite or yearning for the cold war. This is the easiest military environment we have faced since 1914. We need to realise that, and stop panicking about complexity, hybrids and networks.

[Bill Moore]

Anyone who is telling us that our enemy has technologies, is stating the obvious, and often has to overstate the threat to get the reaction they want.

Anyone saying war is now more complex is grossly unaware of military history.

Wilf

Concur that our current conflicts are simple relative to our previous fights, but they are not simple.

My question for you remains, how do we improve our military's ability to effectively wage this type of conflict without a forcing mechanism (IW in this case)? If we simply accept that war is war, how will that drive us to make needed changes in our doctrine and training?

[William F. Owen]

Concur that our current conflicts are simple relative to our previous fights, but they are not simple.

ALL Wars/conflicts of any form or type are complex. I concur. The complexity varies, but they are never, ever simple! This is precisely my point.

My question for you remains, how do we improve our military's ability to effectively wage this type of conflict without a forcing mechanism (IW in this case)? If we simply accept that war is war, how will that drive us to make needed changes in our doctrine and training?

OK, excellent question and sorry not to have addressed before.

First, we need to reject or limit the use of forcing mechanisms, unless we openly state we are using them, and clearly articulate why and how we are using them. I don't like them, because they are inherently dishonest and talk down to soldiers - the very worst examples being 4GW and Manoeuvre Warfare. Hybrid War also seems to be a forcing mechanism.

Second, you need to write a "Year Zero" description of war and with that a description of what military does in it. - and you don't need to write all of it, because Clausewitz has done most of that for us.

Thirdly, and using the "Year Zero" model, we need to recover military thought from the nose dive it has been in for the last 10-15 years. The quality of military writing and especially that which is getting published in professional journals is at an all time low. Serious rigourous reviews of most of this work is lacking. We could start naming names here on SWC, but I suspect there is no appetite for it, especially among those who are serving, and I completely understand this.

Some of the US Military, and some of the UK, have a very skewed view of military history, thus it was understandable yet negligent in the extreme that US Army had no COIN expertise - there simply was no excuse, given that military history lays out all the fundamentals in stark detail. I strongly suggest that addressing the teaching and education of military history, as to inform practical knowledge would address this. It would also mean FM3-24 could be about 200 pages shorter than it is.

I would strongly suggest reading this by Colin S. Gray. It is brilliant and says everything better than I ever could

[Surferbeetle]

Wilf,

Enjoyed the Gray link, he is well written and presents some points to reflect upon:

The domain of uncertainty can be distressingly large, however. If you are not blessed, or cursed, with a dominant enemy, the path of prudence is to cover all major possibilities as well as possible, without becoming overcommitted to one particular category of danger. The temptation is to assert that flexibility and adaptability are not policies, certainly not strategies. Nonetheless, they are often the basis for defense planning when the time, place, and identity of enemies are unknown, or at least uncertain.

This is the easiest military environment we have faced since 1914. We need to realise that, and stop panicking about complexity, hybrids and networks.

I have had the good fortune to spend some time on several trips at the WWI battlefield in Asiago, Italy. As I wandered through the tunnels and trenches and across that battlefield I too gained a deep appreciation of what our brother soldiers endured in WWI, however I was not in the least impressed by the constrained/channeled/narrow/bungled thinking that led to trench warfare and its variants.

Rather than panic many, myself included, welcome the thinking and philosophy behind complexity, hybrids and networks. It seems to me that detractors of the various descriptive terms of warfare limit constrain themselves and and in so doing limit their ability to respond on the battlefield. This both contradicts the dictum 'A good commander maximizes his options' and seems contradict what Professor/Soldier Gray is presenting in his paper.

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

As I wandered through the tunnels and trenches and across that battlefield I too gained a deep appreciation of what our brother soldiers endured in WWI, however I was not in the least impressed by the constrained/channeled/narrow/bungled thinking that led to trench warfare and its variants.

I think that very much depends if you feel Trench Warfare was avoidable. Personally, I do not think it was. The problems it presented were vast and mostly unforeseen. Should they have been foreseen? Well that's another question.

Rather than panic many, myself included, welcome the thinking and philosophy behind complexity, hybrids and networks. It seems to me that detractors of the various descriptive terms of warfare limit constrain themselves and and in so doing limit their ability to respond on the battlefield. This both contradicts the dictum 'A good commander maximizes his options' and seems contradict what Professor/Soldier Gray is presenting in his paper.

For me, these descriptions are "Ahistorical". _ they are not rooted in military history or even operational analysis. They are fortune telling, or speculation.

There is no threat, physical battlefield condition, or circumstance, now or emerging, that requires any form of novel response. Currently there is very little new in land warfare and even less in COIN. Technology is creeping forward, but it rewards us as much as our enemies.

For me, I just can't see what it is that the users of all this new language find so hard to understand.
How does calling something "Hybrid" help? The VC, Khmer Rouge, Northern Front, PLO and most forces in 1990's Balkans, were all "Hybrids." How is this insightful? How does it help?
Why not "Guerillas" or even "Irregulars" - words that worked for over 100 years!!

[Surferbeetle]

Bill,

Appreciate the response. You and I are 'active learners' and have learned in both the classroom and field that Humans are more important than hardware. We both know that all that running around on a battlefield with an equation on piece of paper is going to do is get somebody killed, instead it takes men and women who are willing to physically do what must be done. My point is this does not mean that hardware/and the math behind it should be ignored, and I will try to provide some relevant examples which show that math has and continues to help to create the conditions for success on the battlefield.

Steve, not to reopen an old debate on our opposing views of EBO, but complex adaptive systems is not about tools, it is about human behavior and the ability for humans to learn and adapt. In simple grunt terms (my language) the enemy has a vote, because they will adapt to our response and we will adapt to theirs, thus conflict co-evolution. I strongly disagree with your assertion that a tool will allow us to simplify war into a math equation. Tools may help, but I tend to trust a "good" commander's intuition much more than a tool.

I suspect that you too remember learning about John Henry way back when. Look where we are today with respect to earthmoving equipment. How about crossbows versus our 'old' standby the M-16 musket IMHO you and I stand at a similar point in history with respect to the evolution of some more aspects of warfare from art into a math based science. The computer and the internet have had huge roles in our and our enemies TTPs in this particular event and the genie will not be heading back into the bottle any time soon.

Wilf makes the point that none of these concepts are new is correct (that is only half true, our descripton of something as old as mankind is new), but again I would argue not useful. 90% of our failures in so irregular warfare are due to leadership failures to understand the nature of the problem and respond correctly. 90% of the successes are due to leadership successes. The other 10% is random or luck. You would think fixing the leadership issue would be relatively easy, but it isn't due to our deeply embedded culture for conventional warfare, thus whether new or not, the concepts of IW and hybrid warfare are useful forcing mechanisms. I suspect you'll disagree, but I don't know how you can argue the point that we didn't do very well initially fighting this type of war, and I'm not sure how the argument that war is war (even though its true) is helpful is fixing our underlying problems. Please explain your position?

Using the following definitions:

• War: struggle over life and death

• Warfare: the act of waging war or methods used for waging war

Unconventionally during the invasion of Afghanistan and conventionally during the invasion of Iraq we did very, very well. As you mentioned however, the enemy has a vote and has adapted to our style of warfare. My point is that we need to continue to adapt our methods of warfare as well and a conventional, non-asymmetric, math-free/light response will not answer the mail. Our combat trained/tested leadership at all levels NCO/WO/Officer is the glue that holds it all together; in spite of the cold war bureaucracy which works to hold us back in some important respects.

I think the main issue for our general purpose forces creating an awareness of the holistic nature of war through education and training. In addition to fixing our professional education and culture, we need to direct more funding towards Special Operations, security force assistance, and so called asymmetric capabilities such as cyber, missile defense, space dominance, etc.

I agree with you on this point, and as usual here at SWJ our path takes us right back to the importance of relevant training...

Steve