I found little enough to object to in Hoffman's characterization of Hybrid War. You can argue the history or dispute his use of Hamas as a model of the new hybrid army, but in general I think most of us - mastering our inbred distaste for new buzzwords - would agree he has generally got it right. Where Hoffman fails, as most military pundits do, is in the implications he draws from this supposed tectonic shift in the nature of warfare.

Hybrid warriors are extremely difficult to defeat; on the other hand, they rarely win. Hoffman and others confuse tactical excellence with operational or strategic coherence. Because they are handy with the rocket, the bomb, or the ambush, we assume they must be able to use their street-corner triumphs to achieve their desired ends. But this is unclear to me. I don't see how Al-Qaida in Iraq or the successors to the Taliban are 'winning', except in the most negative sense of not losing. If we are driven from Iraq with our tail between our legs, who exactly has 'won' there, and what is their prize? Does anyone think that our various hybrid foes bent on establishing the universal cailphate have the slightest chance of reaching their goal?

What this portends is endless violence, without ultimate victory or defeat, a new Hundred Year's War. Oh, there might be the occasional Agincourt, but mostly it means pointless conflict decided in the end more by geography and demographics than by military excellence.

Now, just because I don't like it, that doesn't mean it won't happen. What it does imply is the continuing 'de-professionalization of violence'. Whenever warfare is endemic, civil and military roles inevitably merge, the rules of civilized behavior change, and the innocent bystander becomes more and more the target of 'military' operations. Except the whole concept of innocent bystander becomes obsolete. This is why medieval warfare was mostly a matter of plunder, induced famine, assassination, rapine, raids, and ambuscade, with the odd stand-up fight thrown in every other decade or so. Who's to say that the American public, after ten or twenty or fifty years, might not decide to use similar tactics against someone who can't be defeated any other way?

So, instead of proposing that we reorganize the infantry battalion, or include more cultural training at Leavenworth, or incorporate human terrain teams with combat units, or foster greater inter-agency cooperation, if we truly want to get ahead of the bow-wave of future warfare, let's do the following: eliminate civilian control of the military (or, alternately, make politicians generals without all the fuss of military training; after all, our opponents do it, apparently with great success); transform the combatant commands into commercial-for-profit enterprises; subject all government employees to the UCMJ; and eliminate all distinctions between 'contractors' and 'soldiers'.

Mostly, I want all the deep thinkers to either stop shying away from the implications of what they are forecasting, or spare the rest of us their repackaged revolutions.

Whew...I feel better.