You all seem to take the name for “hybrid war” quite seriously, but there has been little discussion about the purpose of such a label. I believe that using the term “hybrid war” can be instructive for someone actually confronted with it. We naturally try to compartmentalize complex information to simplify it, which undoubtedly results in us excluding relevant information. A term like “hybrid” forces the individual to recognize the fusion of what could easily be compartmentalized into “conventional” or “regular” and “asymmetric” or “irregular war.” Is there a difference between irregular and hybrid war? As I see it there is. Imagine if we had to fight the conventional Iraqi forces of OIF 1 and the irregular forces of OIF II at the same time? We certainly would not have been prepared for it, we may not be prepared for it now. In hybrid war the opponent can force us to deploy conventional forces by offering a “regular” target as well as the need for force protection against their “conventional” capability. This may be a Hezbollah rocket battery or regiment of Viet Cong Regulars. With such threats on the battlefield, you can’t simply rely on the formations and tactics required for successful COIN, nor would many commanders resist the temptation to not pursue these "regular targets" at the expense of controlling the population. These situations are challenging because forces must simultaneously be prepared to deal with these two unique and separate threats. When these forces are working in concert it is certainly a challenge modern armies have not prepared for. I would posit that although nothing in war may be “new,” a new understanding (or a review of old understanding) of “hybrid war” is warranted. With only a superficial understanding of Vietnamese “People’s War Doctrine” I can see that their use of conventional forces for achieving limited objectives forces their opponent to maintain a costly conventional force presence that simultaneously undermines their success in the Vietnamese main effort which is control of the people. They used to great affect against us during the Vietnam War while we simultaneously attempted conventional and COIN strategies that were not always fused or mutually supporting. There is the space that exists for a new understanding of this not new dynamic. If a new name helps us to recognize that this fusion exists, then “Hybrid War” is as good a word as any, and it has certainly helped me. When I think of “Hybrid War” I do not consider 4GW or modern capabilities, I only think about an enemy that fights simultaneously on two small but unconnected spectrums. The result is a requirement to have two different capabilities to meet these two threats. The kicker is that each of our capabilities is at best suboptimal and at worse actually detrimental to countering the enemy’s threat that that our capability doesn’t mirror (our conventional Forces are not good for COIN and our COIN forces are not optimal for conventional combat). When both of the enemy’s forces occupy close space on the battlefield, its can become a wicked problem. Add non-state actors, organized crime and all the rest and you’ve got an old problem that may deserve a new label.