Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Rob Thornton]

Slap - I don't know, to me we're both talking about a 3 legged stool - we're just looking at it from a slightly different angle Best, Rob

[Ken White]

you've got it pegged...

[Ken White]

Folks are always changing the rules and in discussions, there are always "well, if..." things thrown in. None of those things you posit happened to get to this point:

"...and you have a good set of conditions to better understanding the difficulty in considering cause and effect."

This did happen:

...In the end, it may not matter - the NYGs went home the winner - The Giants not only had a plan, but had the where-withall to take advantage of the conditions as they emerged.

With the last clause being by far the most important part of all that. Way far (plans have a tendency not to survive the first contact as they say)...

I suspect that you comparing me to a dead Prussian is geriatric abuse. I'll have to consult my Attorney on that...

[Rob Thornton]

nice one - plus a good swing at the dangers of interpretive history and the difficulty of est. causal relationships. Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Slap - I wanted to think about the comparrison a bit more.

Ends, Ways and Means has its greatest value at the policy and strategy end (and to a lesser degree the operational) - not because it "should" be so, but because it "is" so. This has as much to do with the influence of domestic politics and resources as it does with considering providing long term direction that works through changes in conditions METT-TC writ strategic), and remain part of our more enduring strategic culture. Resources - how they are derived, allocated, play a hefty role in determining how military power will be employed to achieve some objective or end. Applying ends, ways and means at the tactical level can lead to inertia - either unable to put a body in motion to rest, or unable to put a body at rest into motion - depends on what your trying to accomplish.

Method, Motive, Opportunity I think has its greatest value at the tactical and to a lesser degree the operational, I think. This is where the first hints of opportunity often show up, where quick action(s) can be leveraged best, and where if you are willing to see things as they are; what you see can be the closest to what is - its why we try not to second guess our field commanders and leaders from afar (time, space, and immediate interests). Applying Method, Motive, Opportunity at the strategic level could wind up keeping us in the short term with regard to pursuing our own interests - it may also distance the relationship between policy and war - one that is contentious enough as it is.

I do think they are pretty much the same three legged stool, but depending on the way you're using it, it might look different.

I apologize if I've short-sheeted the concept, but words have meaning, and often mean different things to different people. What I think is most important is the discussion that is built around the terms toward a better understanding of the subject.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Greycap,

Thinking about the Super Bowl example: the two teams knew well what victory is all about in relative term. Are we sure that opponents in hybrid war share the same idea of victory ?

What is that "first question" you should ask yourself before embarking upon war? - "What is the nature of the war I am embarking upon?" I think that means not only asking what it means to you, and how you will wage it, but what are the stakes of the outcome for your enemie(s) and how might they wage it. What are the possible outcomes for yourself and the enmy and how will that effect other things. The concept of the "Golden Bridge" - or allowing some option to the enemy other then win or die (could be political death) - what does it mean to him? What does it mean to you?

Makes you wonder - seems like the only folks that did not get the word that the Pats were going to win were the NYG. Someody said something last night about Green Bay being a better FB team - but the NYGs wanted it more. Will with a big "W" can make up for an awful lot.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

I better get a lawyer before the city of Berkley tries to limit my free speech like they did the Marines - come to think of it, I should contact the ACLU - where is that damned card anyway - wait a second they are advocating for Berkley

[William F. Owen]

We are suffering from a particularly parochial view of conflict.

In Sierra Leone, you had, from an equipment and training point of view, two or groups of insurgents, locked in a long a bloody war, with well equipped SA Mercenaries or UK forces turning up every now and then. It was just as complex than Iraq or Afghanistan. War, Insurgency or Hybrid War?

The nature of the conflict is defined by who is fighting and how they fight. That's it! Why do we seek to make it all way more complicated?

I think WM may be right when he suggests that Hybrid Wars may be a good bumper sticker to nab the USMC more of the budget.

[slapout9]

Slap - I wanted to think about the comparison a bit more.

Ends, Ways and Means has its greatest value at the policy and strategy end (and to a lesser degree the operational) - not because it "should" be so, but because it "is" so. This has as much to do with the influence of domestic politics and resources as it does with considering providing long term direction that works through changes in conditions METT-TC writ strategic), and remain part of our more enduring strategic culture. Resources - how they are derived, allocated, play a hefty role in determining how military power will be employed to achieve some objective or end. Applying ends, ways and means at the tactical level can lead to inertia - either unable to put a body in motion to rest, or unable to put a body at rest into motion - depends on what your trying to accomplish.

Method, Motive, Opportunity I think has its greatest value at the tactical and to a lesser degree the operational, I think. This is where the first hints of opportunity often show up, where quick action(s) can be leveraged best, and where if you are willing to see things as they are; what you see can be the closest to what is - its why we try not to second guess our field commanders and leaders from afar (time, space, and immediate interests). Applying Method, Motive, Opportunity at the strategic level could wind up keeping us in the short term with regard to pursuing our own interests - it may also distance the relationship between policy and war - one that is contentious enough as it is.

I do think they are pretty much the same three legged stool, but depending on the way you're using it, it might look different.

I apologize if I've short-sheeted the concept, but words have meaning, and often mean different things to different people. What I think is most important is the discussion that is built around the terms toward a better understanding of the subject.

Best, Rob

Darn Rob, you almost had me convinced.... but I think Motive ,Method and opportunity can be applied to any level but it is greatest at the Grand Strategic level heres why. Motive is the simple Why should we go to War... Why did we invade Afghanistan ? Because AQ attacked us...Why do we want to get AQ because that's where UBL is...and why do we want to get UBL...becuase he is the leader of AQ that attacked our people and destroyed our property. The motive to attack is uniting and sustaining. Now apply the same reasoning to Iraq?? Saddam never attacked us, he didn't have any WMD, he didn't like Iran. See how understanding Motive leads to Strategic clarity and unity and if you get it wrong how it can backfire against you? I don't think Ends has that kind of clarity to it. That has been George's biggest problem he cannot define a good motive for attacking Iraq but the American people have and do support attacks against AQ and UBL because we have a good motive to do so.

Speaking of three legged stools did you here the one about the three legged RedNeck?

Also speaking of dead Prussians in the front of Galula's book on COIN theory (capter one I think) he makes a great statment where he says Reveolutionary War changes Big C's "War is policy carried out by other means" to "War is the Policy of a certain party inside a country to be carried out by EVERY means".!!! Sounds like Hybrid War to me. Later

[Graycap]

Thinking about the Super Bowl example: the two teams knew well what victory is all about in relative term. Are we sure that opponents in hybrid war share the same idea of victory ?

Only a doubt.

Now back in lurking position...

Graycap