Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Tukhachevskii]

a.)
The distinction I am attempting to make is that a useful description of warfare should account for what is attempting to be done, and how, versus purely technical description of the environment. Perhaps not usefully and perhaps I should think it through a bit more!

Thanks for that, although I have an inkling (no more perhaps) that the onus of responsibility for ignorance lies entirely with me. I think, in a nutshell, the distinction I was tryingto make was between politics and war as its continuation. Hence ‘who and where’ approximates to the political requirements as set down by a political authority/government (i.e., “Grand Strategy”/foreign policy) whereas ‘ways and means’ refers to the strategic goals thus defined (i.e., how to effectuate the desired suasion/destruction of a given enemy). For example, Bush’s National Security Strategy of 2002 defined the “who and where” which the military sought to bring about by deciding how (‘ways and means’). (At least this is what I was taught at Uni; perhaps therein lies the rub).

This is what I think I was getting at; in that defining the ‘who and where’ as non-traditional/conventional (whatever) threats NSS served simply to steer the military on the path toward new ‘ways and means’ of engaging with “new” target sets (who and where). Hence the drivers of the obsession with RMA/NCW/EBO was not so much a military (ways and means) issue but a political one (‘who and where’). OTOH, is this essentially a question of doctrine (i.e, Theoria vs. Phronesis)? By that I mean is it a case that the theoretical (doctrinal) ‘ways and means’ of, say, NCW was really about institutional ‘pork barrel’ politics and the military trying to protect its interests as opposed to the practical ‘ways and means’ of getting the job done with the tools in hand which didn’t require new doctrine just the innovative use of existing systems (rather than the innovative justification of existing systems and the acquisition of even more exotic ones)?

When ‘who and where’ was defined as regime A or state B the ‘ways and means’ of bringing about national goals could be comfortably framed in a ‘conventional’ mindset. Once political authorities became obsessed with the idea that the 11th September 2001 was the harbinger of a new kind of warfare then the military followed suite with trying to reinvent the wheel of ‘ways and means’ by trying to adopt a ‘non-conventional mindset’ to what was essentially still a practical military issue of destroying a given enemy. Of course, if by ‘ways and means’ you mean that the goal of the military is to ‘find, fix, and kill’ the enemy by whatever means necessary/available then we are in ‘violent agreement’. I do believe that I have now confused myself (!).

Nonetheless, as I stated before I think the issue is not just one of semantics (of us deploying similar language to say different things) but rather of concepts which are mutually exclusive in their use because they mean different things (thus we are using different languages, or more properly, vocabularies). Hence my civilian take on things vs. your (experienced) military take on things; IMO this is also the problem between policymaking and strategy which is a circle yet to be squared (‘Bohemian Corporals’ present a different problem altogether).

That’s why SWJ/B/C is a great medium through which civilians like myself can greater acquaint themselves with what war is actually about rather than what the theory says it is. For me that means reading more threads before I dare to write what I think I want to say without actually knowing what it is I am thinking (case in point). Anyway, thanks for the constructive feedback, very much appreciated.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...100804018.html

N. Korea Swiftly Expanding Its Special Forces
Commandos Trained in Terror Tactics In Effort to Maintain Military Threat

IMO this article supports the importance of understanding the implications behind the concept of hybrid warfare, even if you think is is unneeded. Our foes are also learning organizations, and based on their observations of our techniques and tactics and Iraq, they are adapting to present a more complex threat, which in their assessment will neutralize some of our technological advantages. N. Korea potentially presents a large conventional threat, unconventional weapons, a large special operations capability to support their deep fight in S. Korea (and abroad), and now apparently a robust special operations/insurgent like capability to fight our forces in North Korea in the event we ever go to blows again.

By expanding what was already the world's largest special operations force, the North appears to be adding commando teeth to what, in essence, is a defensive military strategy. The cash-strapped government of Kim Jong Il, which struggles to maintain and buy fuel for its aging tanks and armor, has concluded it cannot win a conventional war, according to U.S. and South Korean military officials.

The havoc-raising potential of North Korea's special forces has grown as their numbers have increased and their training has shifted to terrorist tactics developed by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to Gen. Walter Sharp, commander of U.S. forces in Korea.

North Korea has also begun to question the utility of the tanks and armor it can afford at the front, after seeing the ease with which U.S. precision weapons shredded Saddam Hussein's armored forces in Iraq, according to a South Korean Defense Ministry report

.

"The North Koreans made a decision based on the resources they have," said Kwon Young-hae, a former director of South Korea's National Intelligence Service. "The best way for them to counterbalance the South's technological advantage is with special forces. When Kim Jong Il gives pep talks to these troops, he says, 'You are individually, one by one, like nuclear weapons.' "

[William F. Owen]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...100804018.html

N. Korea Swiftly Expanding Its Special Forces
Commandos Trained in Terror Tactics In Effort to Maintain Military Threat

IMO this article supports the importance of understanding the implications behind the concept of hybrid warfare, even if you think is is unneeded.

OK, but NOTHING here is new. It's a re-stating of a 30-year-old fact bar the part that the NK are now less than convinced about their efficacy of their armour. Wow? Who saw that coming. This is someone playing with facts to fit the problem.

Wait for the next announcement that the Chinese are doing the same thing, and then the Russians. This really is the mountain of "So what."

Hyrbrid is a forcing mechanism, which relies on a basic falsehood, and massive gullibility on the part of the user.

[Bill Moore]

Wilf, we had this debate, and it is the war is war debate, or do we need terms like irregular and hybrid? Unfortunately, our Army and apparently the Israeli Army (2006) didn't respond well to these types of threats (and I agree they're old), so maybe articulating them will ensure we train for them. That is my underlying point for all of this. Once the full spectrum of threats are properly addressed in our training and education, then we can go back to the war is war statement and there will be no need for terms like irregular and hybrid.

[UrsaMaior]

OK, but NOTHING here is new. It's a re-stating of a 30-year-old fact bar the part that the NK are now less than convinced about their efficacy of their armour. Wow? Who saw that coming. This is someone playing with facts to fit the problem.

Wait for the next announcement that the Chinese are doing the same thing, and then the Russians. This really is the mountain of "So what."

Hyrbrid is a forcing mechanism, which relies on a basic falsehood, and massive gullibility on the part of the user.

Wilf
While being conservative in military matters is not only needed but also required, you cannot stop the wheel of time by simply closing you eyes. NK needs deterrence. They cannot do it with their missiles, with their nukes so they resort to IW. BTW IW was also the Yugoslav way of home defense having a territorial army which was to resort to guerilla war in case of an foreign (NATO/WP) attack. You are right that these methods are not new (kinda like you have to kill your enemy to stop it being a threat), but the system and the circumstances have significantly changed. Noone in the foreseeable future will have the industrial hinterland to match the US conventional strength (CVBGs, air regiments). So they HAVE to resort to IW. In turn in which NATO and other western forces have so to say mixed record. See China's White paper from 1996. You can find it in globalsecurity.org
And on the top of that there is the media which unlike the other state powers is neither controlled, nor limited by borders. A classic case for that is the demand by the USMC in Fallujah march 2004 to remove the Al-Jazeera reporters from the town as part of the ceasefire agreement.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf
While being conservative in military matters is not only needed but also required, you cannot stop the wheel of time by simply closing you eyes. NK needs deterrence. They cannot do it with their missiles, with their nukes so they resort to IW.

OK, but when has this ever not been blindingly obvious? It is very raison d'etre of Irregular Forces.

No one in the foreseeable future will have the industrial hinterland to match the US conventional strength (CVBGs, air regiments). So they HAVE to resort to IW. In turn in which NATO and other western forces have so to say mixed record. See China's White paper from 1996. You can find it in globalsecurity.org

Again obvious - and it also side steps the very debatable idea that the US and NATO are competent against any regular military force that are not complete clowns. You do not need much in the way of military capability, intelligently employed to challenge NATO.
IMO, there is no IW. Only irregular Forces. How is an ambush, a suicide bomber or an IED something "irregular"?

And on the top of that there is the media which unlike the other state powers is neither controlled, nor limited by borders. A classic case for that is the demand by the USMC in Fallujah march 2004 to remove the Al-Jazeera reporters from the town as part of the ceasefire agreement.

Modern War flows from modern politics. Nothing changes. All media is political, and therefore actors in the conflict. This has never not been the case, as long as media has existed.

[Bob's World]

Sounds to me like they are recognizing the need for greater defensive capability that is effective in the current environment, or rather a great "counter-occupation" capability; and less of an armor heavy offensive capability.

That's a good thing, as we have no need to invade and occupy this country, nor do the South Koreans, or the Chinese. If they were investing heavily in offensive capabilities, then I would worry.

But for those who do spend time thinking about things like "how would I invade N. Korea" do me a favor and go tell your boss its time for a major overhaul of the plan, as the phase you've been basically blowing off is now the most difficult and critical phase of the operation.

[UrsaMaior]

OK, but when has this ever not been blindingly obvious? It is very raison d'etre of Irregular Forces.

Obvious? I had to repeat them, since you seem to forget about them. Besides I have always thought that SF are part of the armed forces, not part of MAD.

Again obvious - and it also side steps the very debatable idea that the US and NATO are competent against any regular military force that are not complete clowns.

Obvious? Even if we accept your presumptions given the current examples of other high-tech forces' ""competency"" like IDF 2006 or Russian Army 2008, the sheer amount of NATO's RMA gadgets and their trained crews will prevail in a HIC. According to you NATO troops do their job badly but I am positive the others are even worse. What about that White Paper? You seem to forget about it too. Probably there is a be a newer version of it for sure, which would be more interesting.

You do not need much in the way of military capability, intelligently employed to challenge NATO.

Could you please elaborate?

IMO, there is no IW. Only irregular Forces. How is an ambush, a suicide bomber or an IED something "irregular"?

What was irregular about spanish partidos? Or hussars in the 17-18th century? That they were not regular. Please do not get into semantics.

Modern War flows from modern politics. Nothing changes. All media is political, and therefore actors in the conflict. This has never not been the case, as long as media has existed.

So Clausewitz is right?
I agree with you that politics and war are as ancient as the first tribe or whatever. But these interlinked concepts change over the time. Like it or not. And the current armed forces are still organised, trained and equipped 80% for HIC, while in reality there is only 10-15% maximum chance for that. Yes even if the esteemed Colin S Gray and you say that things have remained the same, they are not. In the 'complacency kills' forum there is a video of ieaqi youngsters blowing up a bradley. I bet it was fueling the whole iraqi resistence's morale for a week or so. When was such small deed not Zaitsev's or Wittmann's heroic deeds capable of achieving such a feat?
Accept it or not the warning signals are here. It is up to us whether we recognize them. I do not dare to compare myself to them, yet De Gaulle and Liddell-Hart met deaf ears. Surprisingly, Guderian and Tuhachevski were listened to.

[William F. Owen]

Obvious? I had to repeat them, since you seem to forget about them. Besides I have always thought that SF are part of the armed forces, not part of MAD.

Sorry, I don't understand the question.

Obvious? Even if we accept your presumptions given the current examples of other high-tech forces' ""competency"" like IDF 2006 or Russian Army 2008, the sheer amount of NATO's RMA gadgets and their trained crews will prevail in a HIC. According to you NATO troops do their job badly but I am positive the others are even worse. What about that White Paper? You seem to forget about it too. Probably there is a be a newer version of it for sure, which would be more interesting.

It's not a presumption. It's not an issue of competency per se. It's an issue of evidence. When has NATO or the US fought a true peer competitor, since 1945? North Koreans, Chinese and Vietnamese? Iraqis?
90% of the IDF's problem in 2006 was an complete lack of preparation to fight a force the had vast amounts of knowledge about.

Could you please elaborate?

Imagine 5,000 "Irregulars" or even "Regulars" with, 1,000 RPGs/PKMs, 200 ATGMS, 200 MANPADS, and 6,000 122mm rockets, dug in across 10km frontage and depth, of hilly broken and close terrain. They don't even have to be that good, to cause all Armies a very major head ache.
This is obvious. It is not insightful.

Please do not get into semantics.

So don't get into the fact that words have meaning? Doesn't that really limit useful discussion? Simple question. What is Irregular Warfare, if not Warfare conducted by Irregulars? SF are not Irregulars and they do not - much as they like to say it - conduct irregular warfare, unless working with Irregulars.

So Clausewitz is right?

Concur

I agree with you that politics and war are as ancient as the first tribe or whatever. But these interlinked concepts change over the time.

Really? When? Sure they have evolved in terms of how they are practised, but not in terms of why.

Like it or not. And the current armed forces are still organised, trained and equipped 80% for HIC, while in reality there is only 10-15% maximum chance for that.

What were the % chances of 911? HIC is not a meaningful description. A Force trained to fight other regular forces, SHOULD be able to fight irregulars. A force that is trained and equipped to only fight irregular forces, is severely in danger from a competent (or even semi-competent) force.

Yes even if the esteemed Colin S Gray and you say that things have remained the same, they are not.

Humbled to be put in the same league as Colin Gray (who has invited me to speak at Reading at the end of the month!) but neither of us say things have remained the same. "We" keep having to point out that things folks say are "new" usually are not. We are not against innovation. We are against an ignorance of military history and lazy thinking in Strategic studies.

In the 'complacency kills' forum there is a video of ieaqi youngsters blowing up a bradley. I bet it was fueling the whole iraqi resistence's morale for a week or so. When was such small deed not Zaitsev's or Wittmann's heroic deeds capable of achieving such a feat?

Wittman's attack, stalled a Division, IIRC. Did the video kill anyone or alter any military action? IF not, it's irrelevant. Video of irrelevant action is irrelevant. Would Wittman's attack have been more tactically effective if filmed? I think not.

Accept it or not the warning signals are here. It is up to us whether we recognize them. I do not dare to compare myself to them, yet De Gaulle and Liddell-Hart met deaf ears. Surprisingly, Guderian and Tuhachevski were listened to.

Hybrid does not constitute a "warning" to anyone other than the catastrophically stupid. Will the wars of future see a mix of regular and irregular forces? Sure. All Wars do! That is not insightful.

...and Liddell-Hart predicted nothing, and gave rise to a whole raft of idiotic military thought. He engaged in fraud and ruthless self promotion to re-write his contribution to history. We would have been better off without him!

[Tukhachevskii]

[URL="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/08/AR2009100804018.html"]
N. Korea Swiftly Expanding Its Special Forces
Commandos Trained in Terror Tactics In Effort to Maintain Military Threat

IMO this article supports the importance of understanding the implications behind the concept of hybrid warfare, even if you think is is unneeded. Our foes are also learning organizations, and based on their observations of our techniques and tactics and Iraq, they are adapting to present a more complex threat, which in their assessment will neutralize some of our technological advantages.

Forgive me for replying to the above post with a recycled variant of something I posted at the kings of war website but I thought the comments appropriate;

I have to say that making ‘world historical’ generalisations about the nature of future war is like an exercise in divination. I am not personally convinced by the ‘hybrid wars’ or ‘fourth generation warfare’ spiel. If one understands the historical trajectory of North Korean state formation once quickly comes to the conclusion that the most natural thing for a guerrilla regime to o is emphasis its guerrilla forces. This is not a new development. North Korea’s guerrilla or special forces units have been a feature of its armed forces since at least the sixties. Let’s not forget the tunnel incidents of the 60s and seventies and the famous raid (that date escapes me at present) where NK commandos attempted to assassinate President Park. The DPRK was utilising and emphasising its guerilla ops decades before the "Hybrid Fad" too off. While Simpkin, Westmorland and others were busy developing "Assault Breaker, Deep Battle, Air Land Battle" etc, the North Koreans had already realised conventional war between them and the US/SKorean armed forces would be suicidal. Defence industrial concerns, internal stability, sabre-rattling foreign policy (the need to appear fierce even if brittle) and the corporate interests of the Army (and its role in the regime) necessitated a huge conventional build-up.

Furthermore, one should be cognisant of the geopolitical realities of the region. North Korea is not Syria, or Israel or Russia. It really only borders one ‘hostile’ state and the foreign forces of the U.S. Furthermore, the six-party talks, the ballistic missile project and its nuclear weapons programme (whatever its status) bolsters North Korea’s security situation despite what it might appear. The North is diplomatically adept at brinkmanship as a style of diplomacy. But, and here the real issue, is North Korea’s ‘defence transformation’ (tongue in cheek) really about military strategy or regime survival? I think that latter. What I mean by this statement is that employing 1.2 million troops in conventional formations equipped with large numbers of domestically produced armoured vehicles when more than 70% of your domestic oil supply comes via China is not cost effective. Given the draughts and the famines in the 1990s which decimated the available manpower reserves which could be conscripted into the armed forces doesn’t it make more sense to demobilise them and re-divert them into civilian sectors of the economy?

On the other hand it also serves to cut down the influence of the armed forces, especially the geriatric general staff (the old school), who might be a threat to any change in leadership. After all, when Kim Jong-il came to power the first thing he did was rein in the KWP hardliners (hence Kwang Jang Yop’s departure to the South) and it makes sense to prune the hardliners from the military who may object to Kim’s son (whichever one takes the reins). Reducing the military’s power base by diverting forces away from the regular army, and thus into the jurisdiction of the now suitably aligned KWP, makes sense from the perspective of regime survival.

So what this rather rambling post is trying to say is that there’s always more going on than purely a case of ‘international socialisation into the norms of military modernity’ or “hybrid warfare” etc. Our opponents have more on their minds that participating in doctrinal/ideological/philosophical debates which have really rather more to do with intra-service rivalry (a la pork barrel politics- anyone remember Colin Powell’s adumbration of a two theatre warfighting capability as well as international “policing” after the Cold War?) than it has to do with an objective state of affairs. My (recycled) two pence worth.