Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think you are looking at the problem wrong. It is not warfare that has change. It has not. The principals still hold true.

I think the political environment has changed. It is the spread of ideas that encourage individual actors to take a more active role in the fight.

It began to change around the 1700's with the reintroduction of democracy and has been changing ever since. Just look at Napoleon's problems in Spain and his inability to quell the grass roots revolt with conventional forces.

War is a political tool and I believe it has to be viewed in the context of the political environment, not independent of it. War now can be more decentralized, existing directly in the minds of the population. No longer dependent on a king, lord, or state to justify and finance it can exist free of state control bending directly to the will or whim of the people or some fraction of them based on whatever ideal they are espousing.

Then again, I could be totally wrong.

[William F. Owen]

That's the exact same attitude that conventional wisdom held when tanks, paratroopers and the concept of deep battle were first dreamed up. None of them were particulary popular with those who didn't get the "so what".

Sorry, but that's just not true. All were popular and their utility recognised. In the UK, lack of money, and service politics prevented them developing at the rate they did in Germany or Russia - and Russia had purges. If you read the professional journals of the time, - and I have - you'll see the Brits talking about the bones of Deep Battle in 1917!

You’re also ignoring the fact that there is some value in this writing. Even if that value is William Owen getting so fed up with the COIN snake oil that he writes an article proving them wrong that becomes the prism through which all early 21st century warfare is analyzed.

I certainly never ignore the value of good writing, or the contribution of those with valid and useful experience. It is how this thing is done. I am fed up with the new and mostly silly words.
To whit, you asked,

Many smart people are saying that in the future America's enemies will use "hybrid warfare." Is there anyone thinking/writing about how America could use "hybrid warfare" against it's enemies?

So your question is basically would the US fight it's enemies in the same way that the Viet Cong, The PLO, Hezbollah, Hamas or the LTTE guerillas fought? There were/are Guerilla and Irregular Forces. If that's your question, why use the word "Hybrid?" Why do any of us use this word?

Also disagree about the internet not being a battlefield (especially since it was designed as way of circumventing physical battlefields), but that’s a different thread.

If you can physically kill in cyberspace, then it is a battlefield, and if you are telling me that IP based data comms have military application, then I agree, but the Internet is not a battlefield, unless folks die. Words matter. In military writing "Battle Field" has a precise meaning. Please do not invent new ones for it.

[Icepack6]

A couple of thoughts:

1. I often think we spend to much time trying to "bin" understanding(s) of warfare beyond Clauswitz and SunTzu. As an aviator, I am fond of and a practitioner of "compartmentalization," but find it has little utility in understanding warfare, and trying to understand the difference between "hybrid warfare" as compare to fighting regulars/irregulars in any other scenario.

2. Despite the dated language of the Small Wars Manual, I find little in FM 3-24 that wasn't covered, in some measure, in 1940. Does that not mean we shouldn't discuss possible future concepts? No, but I strain all that I read/hear through the "classics" and find little substance other than "back to the future" rehashing of the obvious--only with new terms and frames of reference.

3. A primary dicutum first introduced to me as a young lieutenant learning air combat is: Success in any kind of contest, be it air combat or the Super Bowl, is defined when opportunity meets preparation. Visualizing the battlespace, understanding possible branches and sequels, and being prepared for the unforseen as it relates to all factors of METT-TLS has done us well over history.

[William F. Owen]

1. I often think we spend to much time trying to "bin" understanding(s) of warfare beyond Clauswitz and SunTzu.

Some may and I may appear to be one of them, but I am not. There is much excellent military writing post 1831. However, what the US fixates on is "explicit forms and observations" like Manoeuvre Warfare, 4GW or EBO, most of which is unfit for purpose.

2. Despite the dated language of the Small Wars Manual, I find little in FM 3-24 that wasn't covered, in some measure, in 1940. Does that not mean we shouldn't discuss possible future concepts?

FM3-24 has created a whole new set of problems, that the SWM cleverly avoided, and the problem may well be FM3 and not the FM3-24. It probably should probably never have been written.

Be very careful of future concepts, because almost all attempt to predict the future or warfare, and that is nearly impossible and military technology is far more limited than we commonly suppose. The best people to discuss the future of warfare with are good, operationally knowledgeable military historians.

[Steve Blair]

Why the US knew so little about COIN, given the vast amount that was written is a very good question.

Simple. Because such knowledge wasn't valued by the institution as a whole (and by that I refer mainly to "Big Army" and the AF). The history behind this statement is deep, going all the way back to the earliest days of the Army. Hopefully at least some of the hard lessons will be retained this time....

And I agree that the term "irregular warfare" is as good as any, and possibly more useful than "hybrid" (are we going to be arming a fleet of Priuses now?).

[Courtney Massengale]

Apologies for getting this a bit out of order, and with all due respect, but this:

To whit, you asked,

Many smart people are saying that in the future America's enemies will use "hybrid warfare." Is there anyone thinking/writing about how America could use "hybrid warfare" against it's enemies?

So your question is basically would the US fight it's enemies in the same way that the Viet Cong, The PLO, Hezbollah, Hamas or the LTTE guerillas fought? There were/are Guerilla and Irregular Forces. If that's your question, why use the word "Hybrid?" Why do any of us use this word?p

Makes me want to run with this more than I probably should.

Those were not my words; the original poster was a Council Member named RedRaven who asked that question. I’m not sure how much of your last response is predicated on the erroneous believe that two different posters were the same and thus my comments about military writing are directly implying what was said in the original post about “hybrid warfare”.

So with that grain of salt...

If you read the professional journals of the time, - and I have - you'll see the Brits talking about the bones of Deep Battle in 1917!

I don't dispute that the bones of deep warfare (or tanks, paratroopers, etc) were out there and in writing, but you have no idea how they were received. What's to say that those published "bones" weren't dismissed just as you are dismissing contemporary writings?

If anything, that the Soviets - not the Brits - get most of the credit for advancing deep battle and putting it into practice by the late 20s should speak volumes.

If you can physically kill in cyberspace, then it is a battlefield, and if you are telling me that IP based data comms have military application, then I agree, but the Internet is not a battlefield, unless folks die. Words matter. In military writing "Battle Field" has a precise meaning. Please do not invent new ones for it.

In that there isn’t an operation definition for “battlefield” (only Area of Operation and Area of Interest), I sought out the military writing precise meaning that you alluded to. Everything I ran came across defined a battlefield as a place where a battle took place. So the real question is how do you define battle? None of the ones I found include “folks die” as a component of a battle. The one definition that I was referenced to repeatedly is from Trevor Dupuy - “a conceptual component in the hierarchy of combat in warfare between two or more armed forces, wherein each group will seek to defeat the others within the scope of a military campaign, and are well defined in duration, area and force commitment”.

Using that definition, the internet would qualify. Obviously you have to make an argument for it, but it’s in there. While the argument for making “folks die” over the internet is a thin string, the ability to defeat an enemy over the internet could be defined in real terms.

[slapout9]

to all factors of METT-TLS has done us well over history.

Icepack,I know what METT-TC is but am not familiar with METT-TLS??

[Icepack6]

Slapout9-

METT-T has gone through a few revisions over the years, snce I first learned it in the early 70s. The -TLS means Time-Logistics-Space (space, as in "area available"). Every couple of years, somebody tries to reinvent stuff that has worked through the years. Cheers!

[RedRaven]

Yes, sort of...

So your question is basically would the US fight it's enemies in the same way that the Viet Cong, The PLO, Hezbollah, Hamas or the LTTE guerillas fought? There were/are Guerilla and Irregular Forces. If that's your question, why use the word "Hybrid?" Why do any of us use this word?

To explain myself I first need to explain why I used the word "hybrid warfare."

To me "hybrid warfare" is just a way of describing the TACTICAL EVOLUTION of Guerilla and Irregular warfare, and our response to those evolutions. For example: many IED emplacers now film their attacks and put it up on the internet for all too see. IEDs are an old tactic (we used to call them "mines" or "booby traps") and even filming your attacks is an old tactic. But, distributing that footage TO THE ENTIRE WORLD to be used simultaneously as a:

- Recruitment tool
- A training tool
- Morale Booster
- A tactic to apply international pressure to the U.S
- A tactic to apply internal pressure to the U.S

That is something new.

However you are correct, what we call this evolution is truly not important. As long as we realize that guerilla/irregular/hybrid warfare is in fact evolving.

I think the above discussion (in the thread) let me answer my own question by more clearly defining "hybrid warfare" for me:

I don't think the U.S can us "hybrid warfare" (read: irregular) unless it is against an enemy which matches us in capability, and in the case of such enemies we would be better of using conventional warfare, with maybe some irregular tactics mixed in.

On the other hand as long as we continue to move along and institutionalize such things as IO, MiTT and other counterinsurgency doctrine we will do better in future "hybrid wars." (read: irregular wars) when countries that cannot compete with us conventionally choose to use those tactics againest us or our intrests.

I now realize that all of this seems to come to full circle to "Nagl v. Gentile," but since I am still learning this definitely helps me to conceptualize the issues...

[Bob's World]

Simple. Because such knowledge wasn't valued by the institution as a whole (and by that I refer mainly to "Big Army" and the AF). The history behind this statement is deep, going all the way back to the earliest days of the Army. Hopefully at least some of the hard lessons will be retained this time....

And I agree that the term "irregular warfare" is as good as any, and possibly more useful than "hybrid" (are we going to be arming a fleet of Priuses now?).

Just because the Brits gained a great deal of experience in suppressing colonial uprisings, in no means makes them experts at true "COIN." Similarly, just because the US has gone to the school of hard knocks on "Post-regime change FID," does not make us experts on COIN either.

I was in a conversation with some Flags a few weeks ago and one of them says: "The Brits are no longer the experts on COIN." The other retorts "and they never were!" Both laugh.

Well, my take is that neither of us are, as we both base our COIN expertise on our experience gained from being unwelcome guests in other people's countries.

None of this has anything to do with Hybrid warfare of course, but then again, there is no such thing as hybrid warfare (or more accurately, all warfare is "hybrid" so to add the word adds nothing), so no harm in getting off topic to poke the COIN "experts" a little...

[William F. Owen]

But, distributing that footage TO THE ENTIRE WORLD to be used simultaneously as a:

- Recruitment tool
- A training tool
- Morale Booster
- A tactic to apply international pressure to the U.S
- A tactic to apply internal pressure to the U.S

That is something new.

So what you are saying is that there is a political dimension to all forms of warfare.

However you are correct, what we call this evolution is truly not important. As long as we realize that guerilla/irregular/hybrid warfare is in fact evolving.

OK, but we always did realise it. We are extremely good at realising it. There is no debate and it is not an area we lack knowledge in. Using the word Hybrid adds nothing

I think the above discussion (in the thread) let me answer my own question by more clearly defining "hybrid warfare" for me:

I would merely offer, you cannot have a hybrid war. War is war. There may be differing styles of "warfare," but there always have been. Guerilla and Irregular Forces are not, and never have been limited to Guerrilla or Irregular Warfare.

[William F. Owen]

Just because the Brits gained a great deal of experience in suppressing colonial uprisings, in no means makes them experts at true "COIN." Similarly, just because the US has gone to the school of hard knocks on "Post-regime change FID," does not make us experts on COIN either.

Agreed, but it does mean that when the Brits make observations about COIN, they come with a great deal more informed judgement than from other armies.

I was in a conversation with some Flags a few weeks ago and one of them says: "The Brits are no longer the experts on COIN." The other retorts "and they never were!" Both laugh.

Maybe a valid opinion, but there is a flip side to that coin.. The British Army has always treat COIN/Security Operations as something it just does, as well as combat operations. You have to do both. It's not an argument.
In popular vernacular, "It's who we be. It's how we roll."

The US, in sharp contrast has arrived at it's current confused position, in spite of its understanding, to whit I would submit that things like FM3-24 are more symptomatic of the problem, rather than the solution.

It would be a mistake to assume that welcome and hard won operational success in Iraq is actually a product of the things people want to believe in. It might be, but I think Afghanistan may test that thesis.

[Bill Moore]

I would strongly suggest reading this by Colin S. Gray. It is brilliant and says everything better than I ever could

posted by WILF

Wilf, first thanks for the link to the great article by Collin Gray, I also read one of his books "Another Bloody Century", and find myself a fan, but I still feel he is missing something. However, what he gets and what he attempts to get others to understand is probably much more important than what he may be missing.

His point about the future being unknowable is beyond refute, and as we discussed in another forum the abnormaly bellicose behavior demonstrated by North Korea reminds us that war can come at any time and our enemy to a large extent will define its character. It is a lot more comfortable to think about COIN than a large rocket barrage into a modern country (S. Korea) followed by an attempted land invasion. Gray reminds us that the challenge is to cope with uncertainty, not try to diminish it.

Gray struck gold when he pointed out a law of war that I think our modernization program tends to ignore. The greater the dependency on a capability, the higher the payoff to an enemy who can lessen its utility, in effect turning our strength into a weakness. This dovetails nicely with a previous comment that I will paraphrase: If we have the luxuary of picking a fight, then think twice about picking a fight where the characteristic of it does not favor our strengths.

Unfortunately (I think) I agree that the process of COIN disengagement has begun, despite the hype to the contrary in the QDR. Donor nations are tired, and we see other threats on the horizon that we may be ignoring at our peril. However, he did add that our study of irregular warfare was worthwhile, because it was an obvious gap in our capabilities, and we won't always get to chose our fights (e.g. Afghanistan).

There is nothing that Gray wrote however that would convince me that our pursuit of excellence in irregular warfare and hybrid warfare (more troublesome, but still has some uses) is off track as long as we keep it in perspective. To the contrary I think his article supports it, we have to prepare for an uncertain future, and on September 11th, 2001 we were not ready to wage the type of war we were about to wage. We just can't afford to let the COIN doctrine to become the new Fulda Gap doctrine where we myopically focused the Army on one problem set.

On the other hand, he made strong arguments on why the West will see conflict with Russia, and the U.S. will see conflict with China eventually. We're hardly in an age now, or even in the immediate future where we will only have to deal with irregular threats. Irregular threats will continue to be a persistant player in current and future conflicts, but they will not be the only threat.

[slapout9]

I find it strange that Colin S. Gray is being quoted considering he says Americas future is to become a total Airpower type organization.

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

In what article or book did he write that? Everything I have seen to date he is cautioning us from becoming over fixated on air power, COIN, etc. and ensure we're well rounded enough to respond to a whole spectrum of threats. I don't think Warden and Gray are like minded, though they may agree on some points. Bill

[slapout9]

Slap,

In what article or book did he write that? Everything I have seen to date he is cautioning us from becoming over fixated on air power, COIN, etc. and ensure we're well rounded enough to respond to a whole spectrum of threats. I don't think Warden and Gray are like minded, though they may agree on some points. Bill

I am looking it up right now. Standby the door.

[slapout9]

Bill, here it is.


http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/...s/GrayARI2.pdf

[Bob's World]

Woah...been away from this thread a while, and come back and see I have a little cleaning up to do!

My comments about "one-eyed man" in no way intended to disparrage Frank Hoffman. More my frustration with how blind our collective policy/security/intelligence community has been to seek out a true understanding of the challenges that face us today. For me the lightbulbs really started going on when I came to a series of revelations:

1. The only thing truly new in the world today is the rate and availability of information. This does not change the nature of warfare, nor does it change our Ends as a nation. It does, however, in very very significant ways render ineffective many of the time proven tactics of COIN, and empower new tactics for Insurgency and UW. Fascinating stuff, but there are no "Easy Button" solutions that are so attractive for some reason with certain communities.

2. That insurgency happens when government fails. A couple of key thoughts to go with this is that that failure is not one of effectiveness, but is subjective, often intangible, often mere perception, and often wholly irrational to that "failed" government; but always always to be assessed from the perspective of the affected populace. Said another way: "Populaces don't fail governments, its governments that fail populaces." This means that any good COIN (or FID) program must be rooted in ensuring that the govenrment knows the problem is their fault and that focus of efforts will be on understanding where the are falling short and addressing those specific issues. Period.

The criticality of Legitimacy. This is probably the number one issue the US needs to grasp and address. GWOT is largely a function of a wide number of populaces, primarily Muslim and in the Middle East, perceiving that the US is a major source of legitimacy of the poor governments ruling over them, and that they cannot effect change through legitimate means at home until the break that source of external legitimacy. This condition was created through our Cold War engagement, and now we must work equally hard to extricate ourselves from that perception without abandoning the nations and populaces (screw the individual leaders, we owe them nothing) who we have built these relationships with.

This list could go on (I've been learning a lot these past several years), but when I say its time to get on board with IW not because we all need to be good corporate men (those who know me are laughing hard at the thought of me ever being that), but that it is happening, and God help us if we let the same guys who designed GWOT design IW! Stop arguing (and back to my hero Gen Grant) either start skinning, or hold a leg for the guy who has the knife!

[William F. Owen]

I find it strange that Colin S. Gray is being quoted considering he says Americas future is to become a total Airpower type organization.

My reading of the document concerned gives a very clear indication of the limitations of air power and how it's advocates have consistently fallen foul of reality.

It's men like Colin Gray that give me hope. I have read very very little he has ever written that I disagree with. He uses the old words!

Guerilla, rebellion, Irregular, small war.....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

is a true appreciation for military history. Take WW II (WW I works too but the US was involved on a smaller scale so it is mostly ignored here). Most politicians see the “big war:” Normandy, the strategic bombing campaign, Hiroshima, etc... Basically the HIC portions only. They totally fail to see the CBI, the Chindits, the Maquis, the Alamo Scouts, Tito's Partisans...

WWI had a similar dynamic, again everyone looks at the Western Front and often miss that dude Lawrence, von Lettow-Vorbeck, Lyautey...

The American Revolution saw Washington and Greene fighting in conventional fashion while Marion, Pickens, and Sumter prosecuted a guerrilla campaign in the South.

I will not bother going into France's Indochina War and our Vietnam War.

Hate to tell them, but this “new paradigm” of “hybrid war” has been around for quite sometime. Seems to stem from the American penchant for wanting to have concise catchy names for things.