Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Cavguy]

All,

Jack McCuen is a classical COIN thinker who published Art of Counter Revolutionary War in 1966. He's a particpant on a closed forum I am involved in discussing the same topic. He has been an advocate of the Hybrid war concept. I post the below with his concurrence.

ALL,

Let me repeat my comments I made in a private discussion because I disagree with Russell Glenn's article, "Thought on 'Hybrid' Conflict" for a number of reasons.

First, he largely bases his article on the Israeli Lebanon campaign, which is certainly a prime example of a hybrid war and a clear example of the type of hybrid war we might expect in the future if we choose to intervene in such places as the Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Pakistan -- although I'm not advocating or recommending any such operations. It is also the example which General Mattis, Frank Hoffman and their associates have been using as their example of hybrid war, along with, I suspect, Israel's recent campaign into Gaza. As Frank knows, I'm don't think that this is the best hybrid war example because of its limited context. In fact, Russell Glen uses this limited context as his basic argument that hybrid war's limited context makes it unworthy of use as a separate form of war. Rather, as I've said a number of times in earlier messages, I believe that the Vietnam, Iraqi and Afghanistan Wars are much better and wider context examples of hybrid war and refute Russell's basic argument.

Second, although Russell quotes my definition of hybrid war from my March-April 2008 Military Review Article, "Hybrid Wars," "...a struggle against an armed enemy and ...a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community," which is a very wide definition, in deed, he then ignores it by saying that the term, "hybrid war," is primarily a tactical, rather a strategic one -- using Lebanon with Hezbollah as his prime example, rather than Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. I would have to agree that the Lebanon Campaign with Hezbollah was a rather tactical example; however, the impact of the war and its tactics had very wide strategic implications which were very critical and decisive, involving, not only a new strategy but wide impacts on the home front and international community which played critical roles in the ultimate success or failure of the campaign or war. As I mentioned above and as we have been discussing elsewhere, the conduct of the Vietnam, Iraqi and Afghanistan Wars was very wide and very strategic.

Third, something Russell does not mention is that we badly need the use of the term, "hybrid war," to develop an adequate strategy for these wars we have been, are and are likely to be fighting. Since I wrote my monograph on "The Art of Hybrid War" in 2007, I have been struggling to get the military to develop an effective strategy for the wars we have fought and are fighting in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and in the future. We need to call this new form of war something and get on with developing a strategy which will win them. The word "hybrid war" works well because this new from of war is a "hybrid" combination of symmetric and asymmetric war. Somehow, terms like "irregular war, "complex war" don't, to my mind at least, lend themselves to developing a highly complex, wide ranging strategy for them. As I say in my monograph, I'm not wedded to the term, "hybrid," but we had been call it something quickly and develop a strategy which will start winning them. Thus, for the moment, I'm going with "hybrid war."

Fourth, and finally as I have discussed privately with some of you, the concept of hybrid war offers a possible bridge within the military to heal the "cultural divide" which is separating the "traditionalists," who are strongly advocating the concepts of conventional/symmetric war and the "crusaders" who want to rebuild the military mainly around counterinsurgency/asymmetric war. Frankly, this cultural divide, both silently and openly, is severely hindering the military and civilian community in building the military and civilian components of our government in developing future strategy, reorganizing our military and civilian components, as well as equipping and training them for wars of the future. The concept of hybrid war, being a hybrid combination of these two concepts of war -- the symmetric and asymmetric -- offers a bridge on which both the "traditionalists" and the "crusaders" should be able to agree and operate. Sure, major compromises will have to be made and consolidations, but the fact is that we have to establish a military and civilian establishment which can fight and win any war, on any battlefield, anywhere in the world. That will require dominant symmetric/conventional/nuclear capabilities and asymmetric/irregular/counterinsurgency capabilities.

THAT'S WHY I LIKE THE CONCEPT OF HYBRID WAR.

WARM REGARDS,

JACK

[Ken White]

I agree they did not bring some new form of warfare to the fight, but they did come wrapped in a new form of quasi-state status that the policy types haven't figured out how to deal with yet.

True -- and regrettable, it's not that hard IMO. But that always seems to be the case; that they're behind the power curve. In my view that derives from trying to make too many disparate groups happy, an obvious impossibility...

Penalty of living in a democratic society, I guess.

How many times did we hear in the media and see in offical statements about "Hezbollah vs Israel." Why was this not simply Lebannon vs Israel. Give these guys a political sanctuary from the consquences of their actions and they will certainly be smart enough to take full advantage of it.

As would most groups. Hezbollah just arrived at the conjunction of time and space that gave them the legs to climb from the primordial ooze. My admittedly limited experience with Lebanon leaves me convinced that many there would clobber Hezbollah in an eye blink -- if they could. They were too weak and could not stop its growth at the time; the west did nothing to slow or stop it (nothing new in that -- and I am not advocating force there...) and it grew and grew to the point that it is now powerful enough to threaten the state of Lebanon though they are carefukl not too push that too far (to date...). Hezbollah is not an existential threat to Israel though it is dangerous and pestilential threat. It can, if it wishes be an annoyance to others but that would likely be its death warrant and I think they're smart enough to realize that.

We really need to start figuring out when to separate a non-state actor from the state, and when to simply say: "Look, you can't be both part of the state when it suits you, and then a separate militant arm without implicating that same state in your actions when it suits you either. Pick one."

Philosophically, I agree. Practically, I'm not sure that can be done given the current state of the world.As an aside, it will be interesting to see what the current worldwide economic downturn does to several simmering potential conflicts.

In any event If we try to impose order unilaterally, we'll be adjudged more evil; if we get a coalition to do it; they'll be judged evil -- in all cases, that judgment will be by lesser States who object to power to sort out problems (unless they do it locally or internally, then it's no one else's business). The UN is not going to be effective for the same reason, all the numerous little States will object. Only if the non-state actors do something really egregious will one get any traction -- and most know that and are careful not to cross that line. So. I agree -- but do not know how to accomplish what you suggest. That's because, as you say:

When non-state or quasi-state engagese a state, they often fare well because the tools of statecraft (DIME) do not work well against them. When a weak state engages a strong state they lose. We allowed a weak state to engage a strong state under the auspices of "Hezbollah," and it created unnecessary. The proverbial self-inflicted headwound for the West.

True.

We make this harder than it needs to be, and concepts like "Hybrid Warfare" don't help. The real issue are these evolving political statuses associated with Globalization, not some new form of warfare. In my thread, this is what I refer to when I speak of the "Environment."

Saw that and generally agree with it also. The issue, I think, is how do we 'educate' the already highly educated 'policy professionals' whose academic backgrounds somehow all too frequrntly seem to poorly equip them for dealing with the real world?

[Ken White]

Cav Guy. Read his book a long time ago; agreed with parts and not with others. I do strongly agree with this statement of his you quote:

"the fact is that we have to establish a military and civilian establishment which can fight and win any war, on any battlefield, anywhere in the world. That will require dominant symmetric/conventional/nuclear capabilities and asymmetric/irregular/counterinsurgency capabilities.

Anyone who agrees with me is bound to be thinking correctly...

Or is that I agree with him so I must be thinking correctly...

Either way, he's right.

P.S.

I have no hangup on hybrid war as a term; I just point out that as a practical effort, it's been around for years and thus is not 'new.' McCuen is correct, we have not dealt with it at all well and we need to be able to do that. No radical reforms are necessary, just common sense improvements -- and the civilian policy establishment is a big part of the problem.

[Rank amateur]

Whether there is any strategic payoff for Israel in this operation is another matter. But tactically and operationally, the IDF got it right.
[/I]

Is like a pilot saying, let's not worry about landings, lets learn from the pilot who does fantastic take offs and level flights.

[Ron Humphrey]

Is like a pilot saying, let's not worry about landings, lets learn from the pilot who does fantastic take offs and level flights.

Or cooking dinner with all the right ingredients and proper equipment but assuming 15 min at 800 will work rather than 60 at 200


The issue that seems to continue to be left out of much of the discussion whenever IDF is involved is the fact that how they "war" is and will always be completely different than how we can "war" because they live their thus your talking about the difference between fighting for survival(them) and changing things for someone else(us).

I've always agreed with WILF that war is war, Just seems like it needs to be stated that theres a big difference between -
Your War and Someone elses battles

[Ken White]

survive, doing things right tactically and operationally are pretty important -- one error can mean disaster.

Which does not at all mean the Israelis did not profit strategically from the effort. Some times just demonstrating capability or will is a very important strategic effort (see Iraq, 2003-2009).

I do agree that the Israelis offer few usable examples for us -- but in this case, there is one minor lesson -- that 'hybrid' war is manageable.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

This is all a mess...

We have Jack McCuen telling us that Hybrid is new and a combination of Symmetric and Asymmetric war - seriously? Who fights a symmetric war? Two boxers, maybe? And Hoffman spreading the term around with wild abandon.

I suggest:

1. It's not new.

2. The term would be useful if it prompted some of the dinosaurs / oil tankers (insert your own metaphor) to change course and if it galvanises the community - it isn't - it's being seized upon as a means to settle old scores (especially between the services...EBO anyone?), make reputations, but generally it is divisive.

3. We're trying to walk before we can run...I still haven't seen a decent Irregular Warfare definition...I think that we need to get our house into order before we start developing new terms for old problems.

I notice that the Israelis are pushing Hybrid real hard. Hezbollah's victory was a red herring - as this forum has stated, the Israelis got caught with their pants down. Ill prepared, not trained, and poorly equipped.

And the Hamas thing...Israel lost (didn't win) against Hezbollah, so it loses its deterrence... best thing to do is to find someone real quick and give them a good hiding, just so the neighbourhood knows you're still in business.

I think Hybrid's popularity stems from the fact that it is a useful fig leaf to cover someone's screw-up.

LP

[JMA]

Colonel (ret) Doug Macgregor sent to me via personal email his thoughts on this discussion on the "hybrid war" concept and gave me permission to post them on the SWJ blog.

[snip]

In addition, the IDF embraced the use of armor, artillery and fuel air explosive in the conduct of urban operations with the object of minimizing the exposure of dismounted IDF troops to enemy fire. While the Hamas enemy may qualify as one of Frank Hoffman's hybrids, the IDF wasted no time in fighting for hearts and minds because the IDF knows there are none to win in the Islamic World.

[snip]

That Israel knows where their are "hearts and minds" to win and where not is relevant to Afghanistan where a careful analysis of what is possible and what is not in this regard and where.

[William F. Owen]

If you want to be concerned about the future of the US Armed Forces, see here

Apparently,

Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, said America's conventional dominance gives incentive to its enemies to use asymmetric means to undermine U.S. strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

“Preparing for this operating environment will pull the Army, and the military writ large, in two very different directions,” she told the roughly 200-person audience at the Army Leader Forum at the Pentagon.

On the one hand, the United States must be ready for irregular warfare, in which combatants blend in with civilian populations and conduct roadside-bomb attacks, suicide bombings and similar tactics, she said.

“Those of you who served in Iraq and Afghanistan know firsthand how challenging it is to operate effectively in such an environment,” she said.

Meanwhile, she said, the United States must remain prepared to deal with high-end threats, though these are much more likely to be asymmetric in character. Illustrating this concept, Flournoy described a scenario in which rising regional powers and rogue states use highly sophisticated technologies to deny U.S. access to critical regions and to thwart its operations.

These tactics range from anti-satellite capabilities, anti-air capabilities and anti-ship weapons to weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks.

Further complicating the battle landscape is the prospect of sophisticated nonstate actors using high-end capabilities such as weapons of mass destruction or guided rockets or munitions, as in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon during its 2006 war with Israel.

If anyone wants to tell me Ms Flournoy is correct in her assertions and reasoning, I would be fascinated as to the actual evidence or train of thought.

[Spud]

C'mon WILF at least you've got a policy ... even if it just sitting on the fence.

Our latest effort contradicts itself paragraph by paragraph. See Greg Sheridan for the best 1000 words written on a 140-page 'blancmange.'

You guys are only wondering about where to apportion money. We're still trying to figure out what we have a Defence Force for.

[Bob's World]

We're still pressing full steam ahead trying to make a Cold War strategy work in a rapidly changing environment.

Many military commentors and analysts who also take the correctness of that obsolete strategy look at the resultant friction to it and our challenges in dealing with the misdiagnosed threats as being "hybrid" or "irregular."

The fact is, of course, that the nature of man, and the nature of warfare does not change much. If your policies lead to conflict, those who you are in conflict with will seek their best advantantage to resolve the conflict in their favor. This is all quite regular, as it is also quite regular to apply a savvy mix of approaches to that same end. It has always been so.

Fact is that there is a lot of bad advice being offered at very high levels, not the least of which is because those at very high levels are almost universally very skilled, successful Cold Warriors.

But as Secretary Gates essentially said in his oft quoted (and a guiding document for the currently ongoing QDR) Foreign Affairs article: Thank God for Radical Special Forces Colonels. I resemble that remark.

There is no panacea in either "Hybrid" or "Irregular Warfare."

The key is to understand that the current is only irregular if one takes the positon that the Cold War was "Regular." Hardly. But that great anomally lasted so long in current memory that it is how we measure the world. Time for a new ruler to measure with.

Populaces held static in their governance by Cold War controls are in "movement" once again, those still held static by outside controls attempting to sustain an obsolete status quo are resisting those controls. We need to recognize this, and not be the obstacle to change.

Irregular Warfare, in my opinion, is best looked at not as a form or warfare, but rather as a clumsy description of this globalized, post Cold War world that we live in today. The tools of globalization are doing many very new things:

1. The speed and availability of information don't change the principles of Insurgency, but they do render obsolete many of the tactics. Become more principle based when studying why tactics that worked historically worked, and modify accordingly for today.

2. Islam is reforming. Understand the inner conflict in the middle east. This religious aspect to their quest for self-determination and our efforts to sustain a status quo all make for a very volatile mix.

3. Non-state actors can now act in very state-like ways. AQN wages UW. This is a new thing and it confuses our approach. It also creates new forms of "sanctuary" that we need to sort through.

[William F. Owen]

We're still pressing full steam ahead trying to make a Cold War strategy work in a rapidly changing environment.

Many military commentors and analysts who also take the correctness of that obsolete strategy look at the resultant friction to it and our challenges in dealing with the misdiagnosed threats as being "hybrid" or "irregular."

Well Bob, what worries me is that everyone wants to believe that it is all changing when it is not.

• Al Qieda is NOT A NEW TYPE of enemy. They are a very old one.
• War is not becoming more complex.
• The challenges of today are not "greater than the cold war" - just different

The problem is the folks inventing the problems, which forgives stupidity, and allow solutions of choice, rather than solutions of need.

All this "complex adaptive" stuff is rubbish. If want complex adaptation, look at 1914-18! Far worse than anything the world could throw at us today.

All that is needed is adjustment, not revolution, and re-building.

[goesh]

Just a civilian's opinion but the Conventional will always assure good order and discipline and the flow of goods and services in a timely manner - the rank and file will be marching forever and day. Naval and Air compoments of our national defense aren't being pulled apart, not even with my reach of imagination. With 300+ years of Indian warfare under our belt for starters, the Asymetrical hardly invokes confusion and disarray in the Army. I do see a lot of turf wars having been fueled by AQ and other assorted insurgents/jihadists but it is quite a reach to even speculate that it has caused systemic dysfunction or can cause it.

[Surferbeetle]

All this "complex adaptive" stuff is rubbish. If want complex adaptation, look at 1914-18! Far worse than anything the world could throw at us today.

All that is needed is adjustment, not revolution, and re-building.

Wilf,

Napoleonic warfare and trench warfare are static datapoints in the flowing history of human warfare.

I hope that where we can agree is that in most fights one picks up whatever is available/at hand: stone, stick, common electronics & explosives, computer, radio/tv/cell phone, a highly engineered rifle, reconstruction policies and uses them over a continuum of violence (which is not just limited to physical violence) in order to have one's way.

From this particular vantage point complex adaptive means having the abilities and skills to use not just gray matter by itself but to augment it with math/computers/electronics in order to rapidly exert influence out of proportion to what we were given by the creator (the whole basic tool using primate thing).

Since these tools are widely available to everybody who is skipping around on our worldwide battlefield, and as per the usual battlefield rules it's adapt or die out there, the choice is clear...

Regards,

Steve

[RedRaven]

First off, I'm not really sure where to put this. If its in the wrong forum please move this. Thanks.

The question I have is this: Many smart people are saying that in the future America's enemies will use "hybrid warfare." Is there anyone thinking/writing about how America could use "hybrid warfare" against it's enemies? (our equivalent of Unrestricted Warfare)

Is it a matter of sending SF behind enemy lines, or is it something much different? Morally would America fight a "hybrid war?" Is it it possible to use "hybrid war" as a defensive strategy? etc etc

Just something I'm thinking about...

[William F. Owen]

I think what these people are talking about is Hybrid warfare against "Hybrid Threats,"

Much I as I know, respect and like Frank Hoffman, I think the concept is a very bad idea, and like "Complex" and "Assymetric" it's an invented problem. Hezbollah is clearly not a "Hyrbrid" threat. Why say that they are?
Moreover

• It adds a dimension that adds complexity and thus confusion for no useful purpose.
• It's a-historical. We didn't need to talk about them in the past. Why now?
• It risks talking down to US soldiers. - and in my opinion does.
• It is evidence free. Once the evidence is tested, you have to ask "so what"
• It buys into all the old "post modern" myths, like "wars amongst the people." and 4GW. These ideas are merely opinions and similarly lacking in evidence.

Why do it? None of the world class military historians that I know, are hand-wringing over "Hybrid."

Put it this way. Talking about "Hyrbid" allows you to stop thinking, in the same way that telling a child that wall clocks have tiny men inside them making them work.

[Bob's World]

Concur with WILF.

I've challenged several very savy proponents of this concept to explain it to me, and none have been able to penetrate my thick head significantly enough to show me not only how war is more "hybrid" now then it has been throughout the annals of time; nor how considering it as such helps in any way in shaping more effective strategies, plans or operations for the modern era.

I stand by my position that the one thing that is truly new under the sun is the speed and availability of information. This has several extremely important primary, secondary, etc, etc, effects that have a tremendous impact on the TACTICs of warfare (much like the invention of gunpowder, rifled muskets, machineguns, tanks, etc), but so far as I can tell has no impact on the underlying fundamental principals either state-based or populace-based warfare.

I caution against chasing fads and "easy-button" solutions to solve problems you don't understand, and suggest instead that one simply 'eats their spinach,' and do the research and analysis to understand such conflicts in general and how they have been addressed historically, and then start chewing on the implications of this new information age and how it has changed the playing field.

At the end of the day, perceptions of poor governance create the conditions that make a popualce ripe for insurgency; such populaces are then susceptible to dynamic leaders with an idological message to act out; and if a party outside of that populace and its governance has foolishly imposed itself in such a way as to produce a perception of being either the source or sustainer of the "poor governance," they will become a target of the uprising as well.

1.Avoid perceptions of legitimacy
2.Understand and address "poor governance" (not effective governance), and
3.Secure the populace and implement reasonable measures to bring the rebelling segment of the populace into line.

In otherwords, when you start off an operation by overthrowing an existing government and creating a new one, you have created a legitimacy hurdle that will be EXTREMELY difficult to clear (particularly if you don't appreciate how important that is). Likewise, as you have broken the government going in, it will be extremely ineffective. To try to make it effective exacerbates the legitimacy issue. Focus on what the populace thinks is important (goodness) and get the hell out. Let the new government work toward greater effectiveness, it may be slow and not to our standards, but it will increase their legitimacy.

None of this has anything to do with "hybrids" or "4Gs;" it is timeless, but is taking place in this new information environment.

[slapout9]

Listen to the President explain it. Ignore the video stuff just listen to the speech.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WSGw...eature=related

[Courtney Massengale]

I do think we need some new terminology to help define how warfare has evolved over the past 25 years. To my reckoning, the last real academic application that went into defining conflict that was separating “total war” from “limited war” after the Korean Armistice (of course, this wasn’t anything new – just a reinvigoration to describe the times). Most of the other terms spun out there that William Owen is talking about are derivatives of that transition.

Like Bob mentioned, things have sped up and been pushed down considerably. Its nothing new, but it has changed a lot of how we approach, plan, fight and determine the outcome of conflict. While it may be nothing new in the grand scheme, it does show a shift from how things were done from the previous iteration which in and of itself is worth study.

I don’t necessarily think that “hybrid war” is the right answer, but it does encourage me that people are putting thought into it and recognizing that we can’t continue to use the same definitions to address a different set of phenomena that have come to dominate modern conflict.

[SWJ Blog]

Irregular Adversaries and Hybrid Threats

Entry Excerpt:

Irregular Adversaries and Hybrid Threats - 2011 unclassified handbook by US Joint Forces Command's Joint Irregular Warfare Center and posted at Public Intelligence.



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