Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

...and here we go again...

1. It does, however, in very very significant ways render ineffective many of the time proven tactics of COIN, and empower new tactics for Insurgency and UW.

Do you think those that created the Genocide in Rwanda could have used the internet to create it? ...or was Government Radio a better choice?

2. That insurgency happens when government fails.

If you are telling me that War is the setting forth of politics, and all insurgents seek political end states, the OK, but every government can be said to have failed some element of it's society. - so I can't see where that gets us.

The criticality of Legitimacy. This is probably the number one issue the US needs to grasp and address.

This assume legitimacy is an absolute. Understandings of legitimacy vary very widely, so if you are telling me that "dissatisfaction with elements of US foreign policy is a source of conflict" I'll agree. Does that get us any further?
...and if we want to go down this road, for every position you or anyone else sees as legitimate, I can show you an opposing one, so ...

...war is a setting forth of legitimacy by other means?...

[Bob's World]

Ahh, brother WILF. As you focus more on the military aspect of insurgency and counterinsurgency, you are more, I believe, of the counterinsurgent camp. "Defeat the insurgent and defeat the insurgency."

I have come to the position where those activiities are certainly a critical supporting effort of any good COIN program, but that one must primarily "address the root causes of poor governance to defeat the insurgency."

As you look at the long history of such conflicts everytime the former approach was used it merely suppressed the movement, never solved it.

The much touted tactics applied in Malaysia of "separating the insurgent from the populace," while feasible in that era and that environment simply are not any more. If its just me and a dozen buddies hunkered, cold, wet, miserable, infested with jungle sores, constantly on the run, it is easy for us to simply give up hope and quit. We feel quite alone and ineffective. But when I get a text on my cell from a supporter back in the UK telling me how we are inspiring the movement there and to keep up the good work, or from the capital where a webpage is being managed that brags about our deeds and the worthiness of our cause, or from a similar movement three countries over where they just had a major success, or when I check the balance of my account and see that money is pouring in from supporters around the world...etc. It's just damn hard to break my morale or separate me from the populace.

All the more reason that the COIN force, the government, must be more sophisticated and more holistic these days. Must stop being cavalier and simply blaming the insurgency on the populce (the "let them eat cake" approach) or on some evil outside instigator with his ideology (the "Pied Piper theory of insurgency approach). One must get real. One must take the (ok, 12-step approach). "Hi, my name is (insert name of national leader here), and I have a problem...

Until one does this, they are simply blaming their failures on others and attempting to suppress the evidence of those same failures.

[William F. Owen]

Ahh, brother WILF. As you focus more on the military aspect of insurgency and counterinsurgency, you are more, I believe, of the counterinsurgent camp. "Defeat the insurgent and defeat the insurgency."

Damn straight, and the reason is simple. An Insurgency is armed military force. Therefore it requires armed military force to prevent it gaining it's political objectives by military means.

....but that one must primarily "address the root causes of poor governance to defeat the insurgency."

Wouldn't that be nice, but addressing the causes of poor governance lies in the politics of the country concerned.
You Bob, I assume are only a registered voter in the US. You have no right to interfere in another country's politics, unless so enabled as an instrument of US Foreign Policy, and how that instrument is applied is the subject of party politics, so you don't get a say, unless elected.

As you look at the long history of such conflicts everytime the former approach was used it merely suppressed the movement, never solved it.

...but that depends where and when you stop the clock. Oman, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Mexico, Sri-Lanka... maybe.
When folks blithely say, COIN is 80% political 20% military, it categorically ignores that military action is ALWAYS taken for political ends. To say "there is no purely military solution" is exactly correct - and correct for ALL Wars, not just COIN.
You can trace the German aggression of WW2 to their dissatisfaction with the conclusion of WW1 and the the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour with the US oil embargo on Japan.
Would better "Governance" would have avoided 911, or was it the result of a failed US Foreign Policy? Had said Policy since made Muslims any happier?

[slapout9]

My reading of the document concerned gives a very clear indication of the limitations of air power and how it's advocates have consistently fallen foul of reality.

It's men like Colin Gray that give me hope. I have read very very little he has ever written that I disagree with. He uses the old words!

Guerilla, rebellion, Irregular, small war.....

Wilf, how can you say that? He flat out states that is impossible for the US to be anything but a Hi-Tech power. That is a rather bold statement, but I am sure the Air Force loves it. We agree on one thing, it is an old concept that he is referring to. The Air Force idea of bomb them to oblivion and let the Infantry pick up what is left. He drank the whole pitcher of big blue kool-aid on this one.

I have read everything by Gray that I could find for free(poor policeman) and he always seemed to be as objective as possible, but not in this case, he specifically ignored some of the low-tech and cheap options that Warden has advocated for some time.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, how can you say that? He flat out states that is impossible for the US to be anything but a Hi-Tech power. That is a rather bold statement, but I am sure the Air Force loves it. We agree on one thing, it is an old concept that he is referring to. The Air Force idea of bomb them to oblivion and let the Infantry pick up what is left. He drank the whole pitcher of big blue kool-aid on this one.

I have read everything by Gray that I could find for free(poor policeman) and he always seemed to be as objective as possible, but not in this case, he specifically ignored some of the low-tech and cheap options that Warden has advocated for some time.

OK, now DL'd the document and it turns out to be one other than I thought!
I assumed I head read it... but apparently I have not even seen it before.

I'll be back!

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

I disagree with your interpretation of Gray's paper, which by the way is focused on air power (which he mentioned as a caveat to the readers). He repeatedly states that he doesn't understand the continued debate within the U.S. military over land and air power, since both are essential. His central argument in this paper and others is that the U.S. lacks a strategy to unify all its warfighting tools.

I will argue the debate almost solely arises from a few narrow minded officers in the Air Force like COL (R) Warden, who speak more as a company man, than as a warrior who understands warfighting. Senior U.S. officers in theory are supposed to be joint, not parachocial. They are supposed to demonstrate professional maturity and have the higher interest of their country in mind versus the interests of their service. There may be examples, but I'm aware of any senior Army Officer making arguments against air power? We love fighting under the protection of world's finest air force, but we also realize (as do most Air Force officers) that air power isn't always decisive. Once we commit to go to war it generally requires a full effort of sea, land and air power (plus political, economic, information, etc.). In situations short of war air power has proven very successful, such as

Israel's interdiction of Saddam's nuclear production capability.
U.S. air power strike on Libya in response to their state sponsored terrorism.
Putting pressure on Serbia in regards to withdrawing their forces from Kosovo.

However, I see a parallel with air power and nuclear weapons. We had nuclear weapons primarily for strategic deterrence, but over time our foes learn how to tie our hands and make the nukes politically infeasible (asymmetrical threats). A perfect example was Al Qaeda's attack on 9/11, what could we have nuked to any effect? The same is true with kinetic air power, what could we have bombed that would have any lasting deterrence effect? Air power enabled us to be successful in the first phase of the Afghan war, but without land power (U.S. and Northern Alliance) it wouldn't have achieved much.

I included several excerpts from Gray's paper that gives Air Power its due, but also puts it in context.

Near exclusive focus upon the contributions airpower can make to warfare is a mistake.

The study advises frank recognition of airpower’s situational limitations. Those limitations are less than they used to be, but some remain simply as a consequence of the physical realities of flight with reference to a conflict that must relate, ultimately, to decisions and behavior on land.

technological innovation lies at the heart of the argument for the privileging of airpower in a new American way in warfare. There is nothing wrong with that, as far as it goes. Unfortunately for the integrity of the argument, technology is only one of warfare’s seven contexts.

Plainly, a holistic theory of warfare is lacking today. As a direct consequence, argument about the strategic implications of airpower’s recent transformation or the allegedly enduring necessity for the presence of “the man [our man, naturally; CSG] on the scene with the gun” is conducted
out of context and even, one can assert, out of paradigm

Future warfare must, and will, be joint and perhaps even integrated in well “internetted” character.

The potential value of airpower in future warfare is a spectrum of possibilities, depending upon the contexts or situation.

American airpower is a very great asymmetrical advantage. At least, it is very great if it is properly equipped, trained, provided with suitable concepts of operation—doctrine—and properly employed within a coherent strategy in the service of a prudent overall strategy and national policy.

For reasons that are both pragmatically sensible as well as deeply cultural, one can expect airpower to remain the most favored military agency in the American way of warfare.

It is important for those sincerely convinced of the great advantages conferred by superior airpower not to understate its systemic and situational limitations.

First, because airpower, broadly defined, is and will long remain a prime source of US asymmetrical advantage, it should be exploited to the fullest for all the leverage it can deliver.

[Ken White]

Agree. I don't see the Paper as anything other than a balanced view and a cautionary to folks not to get air power or land power centric...

[slapout9]

Bill, you agree with this? I don't see anything balanced or helpful in this. Where was this non debatable Airpower advatange during 911. It is futile to debate it because he is wrong.

Gray's 3rd conclusion

Third, it is futile to debate the subject of America’s airpower
advantage either strictly from the perspective of rational strategic
analysis or even with heavy-to-dominant reference to interorganizational
politics and influence in Washington. It is a fact that high
technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A hightechnology
society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to
fight, its wars in any other than a technology-led manner. A
technology privileging American approach to combat is of long
standing and is beyond intelligent debate. To seek technology
solutions to military challenges, in many cases whether or not
there are superior or comparable alternatives theoretically available,
is the American style. The reasons for this condition reach
back to Colonial times, certainly through the nineteenth century,
and became legendary among America’s allies and foes in
World War II.

[Ken White]

9/11 point. What does one have to do with the other?

Also, I see you posted his 3d conclusion -- what is wrong with it?

[Bill Moore]

What was he wrong about? I'm not sure what your argument is here, but I'll take a swag at it.

9/11 was the culmination of a lot of factors, but in the end it was a successful attack due to the failure of airport security at Logan Airport. In this situation security forces were asleep at the wheel, and this weakness was exploited.

I wonder if we would have launched a war against "terrorism" if 9/11 didn't happen, but we still continued to suffer a major terrorist attack against one of our embassies or military compounds every 3-5 years? This is the political context that Gray makes reference to.

This goes back to one of our previous debates, are we really at war with terrorism, drugs, and poverty? Can we achieve victory against any of these by waging war? If not, then what are we doing? We were forced (we opted, but we didn't have many options) to fight, but I'm not so sure (in hindsight) that declaring war was the right answer. Since terrorism will "always" be with us, just like illegal drugs, have we entered another war with no end and really no meaning? What is the strategic context of the war against terror?

Generally, terrorism is best dealt with via good security measures, law enforcement in depth (city, county, state, federal, and international) and by the intelligence services (the critical war in the shadows that some in our Congress continue to undermine). In this context air power is a small player, but so is war making land power.

What changed? Obviously the American people demanded a visible answer (a reaction) to 9/11, so we invaded Afghanistan after the Taliban refused to turn over Al Qaeda. That changed the character of the fight from law enforcement and intelligence work to a conventional military operation. That in itself, IMO, was prudent, but instead of just launching a major punitive raid, which was quickly realized wouldn't defeat terrorism, we once again changed the mission, this time to nation building in hopes of pacifying entire populations with democracy and free markets, thus denying that area a future safe haven to terrorism.

Air power was essential for the first part, and as Gray stated Air Power is not restricted to kinetic power. Only our Air Force could have moved our Army to and sustained our Army in a remote land locked country. Only the Air Force had the reach to hammer Taliban and Al Qaeda positions with kinetic power. Air also provided critical intelligence support. So based on our conventional strategy for the first phase of the "war", air power was an essential part of the equation. Special Forces and the Northern Alliance we're not going to defeat the Taliban without air power in a few short weeks. The bombing not only broke the Taliban's and AQ's will, but it stiffened the will of the Northern Alliance which empowered them physically and psychologically to take and hold the ground surrendered by the Taliban.

After the Taliban and AQ broke ranks and ran into Pakistan for safehaven, the character of the war changed into a more unconventional fight, where air power is much less influencial (still critical based on the way we decided to fight the war). Now air power, at least the kinetic application of it may be doing more harm than good, but the intelligence and sustainment aspects of air power are still critical.

Air power will probably never prevent a future terrorist attack, but it may provide a deterrence (especially if it is a state sponsored attack) and a viable counterattack mechanism in some situations. My underlying argument is we can't effectively wage war against terrorism. A lot of folks laughed when the President said we're going to change GWOT to overseas contingency operations, but IMO that makes more sense. Furthermore, we can't define every future threat based on Al Qaeda. If we go to war with North Korea in the future, Al Qaeda will become back page news, and the same is true if Russia attempts to forceably reintegrate certain countries back into its imaginary empire.

[slapout9]

Short answer is this when you lead with technology you lose.

Backround: I was reading a NOVA interview of General Van Riper and he was talking about this very subject. He said we should figure out the concepts for how we will fight the enemy and develop the technologies to support our fighting concepts. And he went on to point out that when you lead with technologies first you will probabaly end up loosing and I think he is correct in that. Hence my objection to Gray's conclusion about leading with technology.


911 was an Air Strike....they had a fighting/attack concept first and then just developed/stole the technology to accomplish it.

Finally this is not an attack on Gray I like his stuff at least what I have read. I don't think this paper was balanced and it was largley inconclusive IMHO.

Now my opinion for what the Air Force concepts should be.

Clear the Skies.....Hold the Skies......Build an Air Bridge to the Objective. Now develop technologies that support that.

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

I'm in total agreement with the first part of your post, and at first glance I agree with the second part about the air bridge.

Your point goes back to the old saying that when you're a hammer everything looks like a nail, and I suspect you're right (though I can't think of any historical parallels except maybe Vietnam) that we tend to design strategy around our technology instead of using technology to support our strategy. Excellent point. Bill

[slapout9]

(though I can't think of any historical parallels except maybe Vietnam) that we tend to design strategy around our technology instead of using technology to support our strategy. Excellent point. Bill

Exactly, I think Vietnam (project agile type stuff) was a tipping point. We used to do it right but lately....I don't know.

Oh and lest I forget did you see in the news awhile back The War On Drugs is officially over per the Obama Administration, don't know if we one but it is over.

[Bill Moore]

I'm siding with Wilf on this one, and will as far to say that Bob's World is wrong, because he believes he has found an absolute truth that is useful to the counterinsurgent. None of these ideas are absolute or overly useful IMO. I would like to see an example applied to Iraq or Afghanistan.

1. The only thing truly new in the world today is the rate and availability of information.

New since when? Yesterday? 20 years ago? 50 years ago? Information availability and choices of where you can get your information are more numerous than ever, and while it is important it is not the only new kid on the block. Depending on when new starts the list of what is new and relevant to warfare could fill a book ranging from advanced satellites, armed UAVs, space based technology, the use of cyberspace to manage complicated industrial and military systems, new forms of armor, faster boats and vehicles, new oil exploitation technologies, nuclear proliferation, the fall of the USSR, a multi-polar world, new ecomonic models, global warming, the formation of Israel as a State, etc.

2. That insurgency happens when government fails.
"Populaces don't fail governments, its governments that fail populaces." This means that any good COIN (or FID) program must be rooted in ensuring that the govenrment knows the problem is their fault and that focus of efforts will be on understanding where the are falling short and addressing those specific issues. Period.

While there are many example during the Cold War where your argument could hold some water, this is hardly an universal truth. Is it the government's fault that some radicals with an ideology that doesn't appeal to the majority want to pursue their ends via insurgency? It is only the government's fault if they don't crush this insurgency. The way you phrased the argument is that the government should just bend over and take it up the back side, and appease the radicals by meeting their needs. Sharia law for everyone, someone shot at our policemen, so I guess that is what you all want, I'm so sorry for failing you.

The criticality of Legitimacy.

This is in the IW definition, but what does it really mean? I interpret it to mean that the people in general freely submit to their government's rule, but the government still must weld some stick (coercion) to keep people in line with accepted norms of behavior such as not driving drunk, not speeding, not robbing banks, not raping, not shooting abortion doctors, etc. If a government does not have the willing consent of "most" of the people, then it must either rule with an iron fist (North Korea, Burma, USSR, Mao's China, etc.) to preserve power, or collapse.

The much touted tactics applied in Malaysia of "separating the insurgent from the populace," while feasible in that era and that environment simply are not any more.

Really? I think it is more appropriate than ever, and failure to understand this is a failure to understand the centers of gravity in this type of conflict. The successes in certain towns in Iraq were the result of separating the insurgent from the populace period. The tactics used in Malaysia may or may not be applicable in most cases, but the "principle" of separating the populace from the insurgent is not simply an idea that cannot be disregarded by any serious military leader. Getting a text message from Florida won't do a lot for my aching stomach or shortage of ammunition.

Must stop being cavalier and simply blaming the insurgency on the populce (the "let them eat cake" approach) or on some evil outside instigator with his ideology (the "Pied Piper theory of insurgency approach).

We had this debate before, and history and current events continue to prove that you're wrong. There may be spontaneous riots, but there are not spontaneous insurgencies. Insurgencies require leaders to mobilize and organize the people. The communists and now the Islamists were and are pro's of using outsiders to provide that leadership to instigate rebellion. Find one example of a successful insurgency that didn't have leadership? By the way, most insurgencies do fail, so that fact my itself undermines your main argument that governments must roll over and play dead and meet the demands of the insurgent.

[reed11b]

Sorry to change tracks, but my concern, partially expressed by Wilf and Ken and Bill Moore, is that the key inovations that make the US better at CT, SFA, FID, IW, small wars, and possibly STABO (still arguing to myself on the legitamacy of the STABO concept) are also the key innovations we need to improve at HIC. Training focused on the small unit level (not, I repeat NOT the individual level), unit structure and training designed to maximize core compentancies and flexability, unit manning and deployment schemes that consider the combat behavior of soldiers, weapon systems prioritized to FIGHT not intimidate, etc etc. Notice I did not say COIN. The US should not even consider the COIN mission unless we are expecting California to revolt. COIN is against the population and that is counter the US world view. When we have tried it in the past it has either been a near term disaster or created negative long term effects.
Key point, what is good for IW is often good for HIC and these are the improvments we need to look for to instititionalize.
Reed

[Bob's World]

Bill,

You're twisting my words to fit your paradigm.

For example, I never said that insurgency does not require leadership, or ideology for that matter. In fact, I believe that both are critical requriements for a successful insurgency. I just believe that so long as they are effective they are fungible. So long as the underlying conditions exist that give rise to insurgency a leader will step up to lead, and he or she will find a message that speaks to the populace. As Chairman Deng said regarding ideology and insurgency, and I agree, "it does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice."

We tend to focus on the surface issues, the acts of terror, the insurgent, the leader, the ideololgy applied. All are important, but none are the cause of the problem.

Take OEF-P. An excellent FID program is being implemented by the US in the southern Philiippines, Philippine security forces grow more competent every day; but it is an effort doomed to failure so long as the Government of the Philippines refuses to address the very real grievances of the Muslim populace of the South. The only true success can come from addressing this enduring grievance. The main effort for the US, if we truly want to deny the use of the Southern Philippines as a sanctuary from which attacks could be launched against America and American interests then we would focus on the main effort: Hard carrots and sticks with the government of the Philippines to get serious about the peace process. But we don't because there are other things we want from the government of the Philippines even more, and out of our fear of losing those things we don't press the governemnt to do what really needs to be done.

The same can be said of our approach with the Saudis.

In both cases we are seen as a source of legitimacy of the government, in that we help preserve them in power in exchange for support of our interests. The people notice; and when the people rise up in insurgency they attack the sources of legitimacy of the government they wish to change. This, more than any other thing, is at the heart of GWOT, and yet we ignore the heart and instead flail at the edges.

We attack leaders.

We attack ideology.

We support despots.

We kill members of the populaces the insurgents come from.

So no, WILF is wrong on this. His approach is the one the destroyed the British Empire; and if we think applying the same approach will not have the same effect on us, we're fooling ourselves.

I don't expect everyone to agree with me. I just want to give them some alternative perspectives to consider.

[Bill Moore]

Bob's World,

On the Philippines I agree wholeheartedly, there is no end game because it appears that the government of the Philippines is not interested in seriously considering a realistic political settlement with the MILF. I recall that many of us who supported the Philippine Army durng the 80's in their fight against the New People's Army agreed if we grew up in a remote area in the Philippines we probably would have been communist insurgents, because the government under Marcos simply didn't care about the people. The NPA rallying cry would have been enticing. The same would probably be true if I grew up in a Moro village in Mindanao. In a way this gets at Reed's point, we don't do COIN, we do FID. We can do great FID, but in the end if the government can't get its COIN right it won't make a difference. What turned the fight around in both El Salvador and the Philippines (against the NPA) was a new President with new ideas, who reached out to the populace. Unfortunately, the NPA arose from the ashes once again because the government has failed to address the needs of the people. We're in agreement up to that point.

Let's go to (Wilf has me hooked on this now) the back to the basics: interests, pride, and fear. In the 80's it was in our interests to maintain use of Clark, Air Force Base and Subic Bay to support our ability to project force throughout the globe, but primarily Asia if the Cold War turned hot. You can argue we sacrified our principles of how a country should be governed by siding with Marcos in exchange for realizing greater strategic interests. Bad FID/COIN, but darn good strategy. He is a bastard, but he's our bastard approach. There are parallels with the fight against Islamic based terrorism in the Southern Philippines. We're scared that the movement will grow and threaten our interests in the region if it isn't beat down, so we over look the bad governance and "try" to focus the problem to defeating the terrorists, which is probably an impossible task, since in this case it is the ineffective governance that permits the terrorists to survive (although it is much tougher now than in previous years, and it is not unthinkable that the military could defeat the ASG, but the ASG is only part of the problem). In fairness, the current Philippine government is much more responsive to the people's needs than Marcos, but it will take years to weed out the corruption that undermines its efforts to reach out to the people effectively.

However, going back to your example of Saudi. The government may be oppressive, and it may be illegitimate, but do you think the Wahabi fundamentalist movement has popular support? Do you think "most" Saudi's would prefer to live under a stricter version of Shari'a law? Do you think it is in our "interests" to allow the Saudi government to fall to the Islamists? I know you have an understanding of global economics, and Saudi still provides the bulk of the fuel that drives the global economy. Again he may be bastard, but he is our bastard. You can say that doesn't work, but it has worked for us and other nations for years. You can't compare the British experience to the American experience. The Brit's colonized their empire generated much hatred and longing for freedom from their rule, while we influenced the countries we needed to influence using our elements of national power DIME.

So your right,

In both cases we are seen as a source of legitimacy of the government, in that we help preserve them in power in exchange for support of our interests.

but this is what nations do. Until we come up with another viable strategy for protecting our interests I suspect this is what we'll continue to do, even if at times it makes us a little sick to our stomach.

We attack leaders.

Do you mean insurgent leaders? Yes we do, and in some cases there are probably better options, we seem to be stuck in a targeting paradigm. We confuse targeting with strategy, instead of using targeting to support strategy.

We attack ideology.

The more you attack it, the more you validate it, I think we learned this, and I think we're just now learning how to address their ideology in a way that is helpful.

We support despots.

When it is useful to our interests. The other option would be to???

We kill members of the populaces the insurgents come from.

Not trying to be cute, but war is hell, and don't forget that the insurgents in many cases also kill and terrorize the populace they come from.


Posted by Reed,

The US should not even consider the COIN mission unless we are expecting California to revolt. COIN is against the population and that is counter the US world view. When we have tried it in the past it has either been a near term disaster or created negative long term effects.
Key point, what is good for IW is often good for HIC and these are the improvments we need to look for to instititionalize.

Do you mean California or Key West, Florida where Jimmy Buffet led an attempted separatist movement? I think the Coast Guard blockaded Key West for a few hours, and when Jimmy realized they wouldn't be able to get any weed or booze he called the rebellion off .

In all seriousness, if we do a regime overthrow (Japan, Germany, Iraq, and Afghanistan) then we're in facto the government, even if we quickly prop up another government and pretend they're in charge. Until their bureaucratic systems mature, and that can take awhile if we're putting in an entirely new form of government, then we're doing COIN. To pretend otherwise is to get on the road to failure. We want to transition to the point where we're doing FID as fast as possible, but fast as possible isn't a few days after their election. Maybe we would have more successful in Iraq and Afghanistan if we slowed the train down and focused on the COIN fight while simultaneously putting considerable effort into building their government and security forces, instead of rushing through the process?

[reed11b]

In all seriousness, if we do a regime overthrow (Japan, Germany, Iraq, and Afghanistan) then we're in facto the government, even if we quickly prop up another government and pretend they're in charge. Until their bureaucratic systems mature, and that can take awhile if we're putting in an entirely new form of government, then we're doing COIN. To pretend otherwise is to get on the road to failure. We want to transition to the point where we're doing FID as fast as possible, but fast as possible isn't a few days after their election. Maybe we would have more successful in Iraq and Afghanistan if we slowed the train down and focused on the COIN fight while simultaneously putting considerable effort into building their government and security forces, instead of rushing through the process?

Good Point, well taken. My argument would be that we need to know how to "win the peace" and that this is more important then being proficient in COIN. In another thread I outlined a long list of original mistakes we made in Iraq that made an insurgency inevitable, and strongly contend that the scope of the insurgency in Iraq was completely avoidable. Are saying that these steps to provide increased security and structure fall under COIN? I have always felt that successfully ending a conflict w/o it turning into a COIN fight was a separate skill base. What are the councils thoughts on this?
Reed

[William F. Owen]

I'm siding with Wilf on this one, and will as far to say that Bob's World is wrong, because he believes he has found an absolute truth that is useful to the counterinsurgent. None of these ideas are absolute or overly useful IMO. I would like to see an example applied to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Thanks for the support, but I fear there is only one seat in my Kamikaze!
My concern is the same. Not all insurgencies are the same, not all insurgents are the same.

This, more than any other thing, is at the heart of GWOT, and yet we ignore the heart and instead flail at the edges.

We attack leaders.

We attack ideology.

We support despots.

We kill members of the populaces the insurgents come from.

Sorry, but idea of the GWOT, is profoundly stupid to begin with - war on an abstract noun, so war without political end state!

Bob, You have to differentiate between Strategy, the military contribution to strategy and then operations/tactics.

Every one of your points pertains to Strategy - that is politics, so the pervue of the elected!
If you want to tell me that US Foreign Policy - that which drives Strategy - is profoundly stupid, I'll not argue that long. That has very little to do with the mechanics (ways and means) of defeating an insurgents or anyone else.

Your assumption seems to imply that all insurgencies have legitimate grievances. They do not. Folks may not have perfect lives, but that does not always legitimise the use of violence to change the political land scape.

So no, WILF is wrong on this. His approach is the one the destroyed the British Empire; and if we think applying the same approach will not have the same effect on us.

Well If I had an approach, then I might see your point, and WW1 led to the policy of dismantling of the British Empire (which is some cases created insurgencies). The successful COIN campaigns largely ensured the coherency of the Commonwealth which followed it.

I don't expect everyone to agree with me. I just want to give them some alternative perspectives to consider.

Alternate away brother! I feel the same way!

[slapout9]

Key point, what is good for IW is often good for HIC and these are the improvments we need to look for to instititionalize.
Reed

Can you expand on that? You are about to convince me. Does anybody care if California revolts...I thought they already had