EBO - or as I refer to it 'Effects Blurred Operations' encapsulates the arguments I believe you are making. I was engaged in the campaign assessment process and found it extremely difficult to define effects within the OPP process that a)could be achieved, b)could be measured effectively, and c) whose assessment could inform the larger strategies. Instead, I saw what I refer to as OPP with an effects based language. No one seemed capable of creating an effects based campaign plan (and NATO had 5 LOOs - Security, Governance, Security Sector Reform, Reconstruction and Development, and finally Coordination).

Typically the OPP failed to produce definable, realizable and measureable end-states, effects, or measures of effectiveness. Almost all the measures were in fact measures of performance, quantifiable measures which did little to advance the mission objectives and nothing to assess strategies and priorities. Secondly, even when adopting qualitative measures, these were typically utilised at higher HQ levels to report on mission achievements and progress rather than sorting out weather we were doing the right things. Finally, the measures utilised had littel to no ownership and therefore no stakeholder had accountability for problmes, errors, missteps etc. It seemed, only successes were applauded and promoted. I even witnessed senior effects planners advocating that where Afghan polling results agreed with their opinions, they were useful, however when they disagreed with perceptions, they could be completely ignored.

Such are my experiences.

Cheers,

David