Lines of Operation

[Reid Bessenger]

As Bill Moore posted above, LOO and many other constructs used to visualize, describe and direct actions to achieve an objective can be misused. It seems self-evident that logic is a necessary element in any operational design. If someone can't explain their logic, generally I think we can agree that the design warrants another look. The application of LOO outside maneuver can be valuable, since it can focus discussion on endstate, conditions to contribute to endstate, and DPs that enable or facilitate achieving these conditions. These points should have a defined relationship (logic), though. Like Bill states, if it's power point deep it won't be part of the solution.

[Jones_RE]

Some of the criticisms of lines of operation strike me as misplaced. If, in fact, a military planner can't tell you anything more about the "public opinion" line of operation than "we have one" then there is indeed a problem - that planner clearly does not understand how public opinion affects his forces in a small war. If our hypothetical planner couldn't tell you the real substance behind his air support line of operations in a maneuver battle, we wouldn't be so quick to criticize the planning technique - it would be obvious that the planner wasn't prepared.

These "non traditional" lines of operation and centers of gravity associated with small wars are a hallmark of small wars and not so much a problem with the military theory, in my opinion. The central characteristic of a small war/low intensity conflict/insurgency/stability operation, etc. is that it is not a normal war. Unusual obstacles, goals and operations are the norm. If you could identify the insurgent center of gravity as something so prosaic as a headquarters or main line unit then we'd just be in a really easy maneuver war.

Perhaps it's true that "Lines of Operation" are not a useful tool for analyzing the planning challenges of a small war - however I don't think it's fair to compare the two based on their application by the United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. We run the risk of concluding that wrenches are no good for solving plumbing problems because none of the electricians we called could fix our leaky faucet with one . . . .

[jcustis]

I am bringing this post from the dead instead of open a new one because I need to know (from a USMC perspective hopefully) what the current nomenclature is out there for Lines of Operation in Iraq.

I've recently read a unit AAR about its last rotation, and LOOs are mentioned in loose terms. The overall number of LOOs and area concerned within each LOO are not addressed, so I have no frame of reference (and I'm headed to the unit in question ).

I shouldn't have been surprised, but when I ran a google string on "lines of operation", this SWC thread was the very first hit. Amazing...

[Tom Odom]

I shouldn't have been surprised, but when I ran a google string on "lines of operation", this SWC thread was the very first hit. Amazing...

Yes we are aren't we?

Seriously I believe the term remains the same for us Army types

Best

Tom

[jcustis]

I guess that was a poorly written RFI. I was looking for the various LOOs that are out there. If Army LOOs and Marine Corps' LOOs (that sound silly) are the same, should I refer to the pubs referenced above?

[Surferbeetle]

Jcustis,

FM 3-0 has 26 listings for 'lines of operation'

F 3-24 has 41 listings for 'lines of operation'

FM 3-05-40 has 1 listing for 'lines of operation'

FM 3-05-401 has 2 listings for 'lines of operation'

My copy of JP 3-57 is corrupted, so I can't do a search at the moment, but it's worth rummaging through.

FM 5-0 has 1 listing for 'lines of operation'

FM 6-0 (I have the 03 version looks like I need to update my pubs library) has 0 listings for 'lines of operation'

***TC 25-20 AAR's

Anything you can share on the USMC side would be appreciated

[Presley Cannady]

Just so I'm clear, we're promoting a stencil for use in Powerpoint presentations to a concept?

[PhilR]

Someone with an Army (SAMS?) background can better recount the development of the LOO concept, but it preceded the present conflicts and, I think, has its origins in the complex contingencies of the 1990s. In looking at older briefs and documents, there was a very rigorous and thoughtful way for planners to look at the problem and see if LOOs were necessary, and if so, what the LOOs should be. I think it had to do with complex problems not having single identifiable COGs, but possibly multiple COGs--each requiring actions along a seperate "Logical Line of Operation" (the conceptual equivalent of Jomini's physical line of operation--we dropped the "logical" piece to the title as no one remembers the physical origin and no one wants to associate our current COIN doctrine with a guy named Jomini). The commander had to arrange and coordinate all his actions across the LOOs to achieve his objective.
The Marine Corps never really embraced this doctrine until the early Irregular Warfare pubs--which to me looked largely like expansions of Chiarelli's article on LOOs in Baghdad in Military Review--a seminal piece, to my mind. From having no doctrinal background on LOOs, all of a sudden Marines were identifiying specific LOOs for COIN. Now LOOs pop up everywhere. The Marine Corps has still failed to grapple with them in any of our base doctrinal pub (the MCDPs). I look forward to that happening someday, because I think for LOOs to be useful, they can't be some template that commanders/planners just fill in the blank and start executing. Not every conflict porblem requires LOOs.
In many cases, even in complex scenarios like COIN, I see LOOs used as the equivalent of expanding the warfighting functions (maneuver, fires, logistics, etc.) into the "non-lethal" sphere. This tends to drive units to assign different parts of their forces to the various LOOs and they become almost separate commands at the higher echelons. I thought that the utility of the orginal way of thinking about LOOs was that it forced more synergy--a "kinetic action" was not relegated to a "combat action" LOO, but could affect multiple LOOs (information, enemy destruction, etc.). For the Marine Corps, its well worth looking hard at the LOO (and tell me, what is our 1-2 sentence definition of a generic LOO and what USMC or joint pub we use for it?).

[Spud]

We've gone with five interdependent LOOs as part of our Adaptive Campaigning concept.

Joint Land Combat
Population Protection
Public Information
Population Support
Indigenous Capacity Building

http://www.complex07.org/online-edition/files/426.pdf

While at the moment they're words we are starting to use them in synching our IO effects. Of course the hardest bit has been to teach everyone that information effects occur in each LOO ... not just the Public Information one.