Lines of Operation

[Merv Benson]

Clauswitz point on winning was making the enemy feel defenseless. Of course destruction of the enemy army was one way to achieve that objective. But he also talks about focusing on the enemy's "center of gravity." That may or may not be his army. One of the classic ways this was done in his era was by manuevering forces to get between the enemy and their "lines of communication" i.e. their supply lines and lines of retreat.

One of the reasons why it is important for the US to defeat the insurgency is to make that form of warfare less attractive and less likely to be used against our interest. If the insurgency can be defeated, the enemy will have to resort to political means to achieve its objectives and in doing so he will find it difficult to persuade most people to live under a Taliban type society. There is some recognition of the mistakes of the Taliban in Zawahiri's letter to Zarqawi.

While this insurgency has its true believers, it is doing a very poor job of making the people think they would be better off under their trule. In fact there is substantial evidence that it is alienating the Iraq population and things like the bombing of a Shia holy site is not calculate to endear them to their cause. Zarqawi seeks to persuade through abuse like a sadistic parent.

When this thread started there was an issue of organizing certain events in connection with achieving an objective. While my question about a to do list, may have understated the complexity, it does sound like a situation that used to be addressed by project management software in the early 90's. I have not looked at that type of software in several years but it might be a solution to managing several different events in connection with achieving the objective.

[Bill Moore]

Lines of operation, much like effects based operations, is largely a conceptual means to help military planners structure and explain their thoughts. It can also be used to simply present a smoke and mirrors brief that says absolutely nothing if we don’t put in the appropriate intellectual effort to make it mean something. For example, what is a Civil Affairs (CA) line of operation really mean?

In my opinion a line should represent a path to an objective or a subordinate effect to an objective and depending on the situation there could be numerous lines. A path is perhaps to close a parallel to the original use of LOOs, which was to describe maneuver, but it is useful in that we should be on a line to make progress towards achieving our effect or objective(s). Going back to the CA line of operation (if it is applicable), I think we need to identify markers on the trail, sort of navigation check points that need to be some sort of prioritized order. For example, if your unit is trying to establish security and stability in an AO, you may want your CA line markers to look something like this: 1. provide baseline security 2. Establish emergency services (law, fire, medical) 3. Open the banks. 4. Provide trash pick up 5. Open local businesses 6. Open schools, etc. I put no thought in this, so don’t waste time tearing up my priorities, they are simply meant to illustrate a point on a way we can make a line of operation useful. If you have enough resources you may be able to address several markers on this line simultaneously. Of course you’ll be working along several lines of operation simultaneously such as conduct security operations, build HN security force capacity, establish local government, etc….

It would seem the art is finding a method to ensure these lines have a synergistic effect, or at least are not at odds with one another. Obviously all the markers on the CA line will be tied to some extent to the provide security LOO. Synching the lines is partly intuitive, and partly the process of detailed analysis that takes place in your Effects Targeting Coordination meetings.

Clausewitz was a genius in his time and much of what he wrote still has some relevance, but we cannot afford to take every new (or old) idea we have and then reshape it so it fits within a Clausewitzian construct. We’ll fail to evolve if we do.

[GorTex6]

Forcing a reaction, or over reaction, is a tactic not an objective. It is not what they want, it is one of the means they will use to get what they want.

Harvesting a community to uprise against us is their objective.

Clauswitz point on winning was making the enemy feel defenseless. Of course destruction of the enemy army was one way to achieve that objective. But he also talks about focusing on the enemy's "center of gravity." That may or may not be his army. One of the classic ways this was done in his era was by manuevering forces to get between the enemy and their "lines of communication" i.e. their supply lines and lines of retreat.

How do you physically strike an opponents center of mass when it's their family ties, tribal loyalties, a koranic code, or faith in god? Although not impossible, it is very counterproductive.

Clausewitz was a genius in his time and much of what he wrote still has some relevance, but we cannot afford to take every new (or old) idea we have and then reshape it so it fits within a Clausewitzian construct. We’ll fail to evolve if we do.

Ahmen

[Reid Bessenger]

I see utility in the LOO construct for planning and assessing operations.

Some citations:

• Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, defines LOOs as the directional orientation of the force in time & space in relation to the enemy.
• JP 3-0 states LOOs attain a three-dimensional aspect and enable commanders to visualize the application of combat power throughout space and time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the force to converge on and defeat adversary centers of gravity (COGs).
• FM 3-0 puts LOOs in context of stability operations & support operations where positional reference to an adversary is less relevant. Commanders visualize the operation along logical lines which link multiple objectives & actions with the logic of purpose – cause & effect.

The identified desired endstate can suggest a set of conditions that, when achieved, combine to bring about the endstate. The degree of contribution in time and total may vary owing to the situation confronted in the operating environment including the interaction of diverse group actions and the cumulative impact on perceptions. The calibrating role of this set of conditions is to focus thinking and discussion in planning, and eventually the execution of operations.

The conditions suggest an objective for an associated line of operation. Decisive points along this LOO are geographic places, specific key events, or enabling systems that allow commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy (JP 3-0 and FM 3-0). These DP are often the focal points of connection between multiple LOO.

I think that when employed, LOO can speed the process of appreciating the situation confronted, and lend efficiency to identifying tasks that contribute to the end state.

I share concerns voiced by others about claims of a "new" answer or solution to situations confronted. This approach can be helpful.

[Bill Moore]

I won't argue the point that LOO "can" can be useful, but I will stand on my original criticism that I have seldom seen it used in a constructive matter. Vice grips are useful to turn nuts, but not drive nails, paint, or assorted other uses. LOOs are useful for maneuver, but don't necessarily add anything but confusion to operations that don't involve maneuvering to achieve an objective. I don't know how many times I have seen the following in briefs: Our lines of operation are security, civil affairs and information operations. At first glance you might think that sounds appropriate in a stability operation, but the substance to this part of the brief never follows, it just doesn't come. Obviously you think you missed something, so you have side bar discussions with the briefers so they can explain how they use their lines of operations to achieve their objectives, what the mile stones are along the lines, and how they synergistically contribute to an end state. You'll get a bunch of blank stares, and sometimes you'll get the truth, well the boss wants to see LOOs in the brief, they don't really add any value or mean anything. If we don't get back to hard core, no nonsense commanders, that demand that plans and words mean something we'll be spinning our wheels for years to come.

[GatorLHA2]

Just because someone has missused LOO's as a window dressing in a brief does not prove that it is a flawed concept.

In Small Wars, combat operations are not always the primary focus of effort. There are many non-combat types of operations that need to be undertaken to achieve success in unconventional operations. How many and what are the LOO's depend entirely on the existing situation and the conditions that must be met to achive the desired endstate.

LOO's are not new. What is new, is that LOO's in this context does not describle physical maneuver over the landscape, but rather key problems that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion simultaneously rather than sequentially. Furthermore, the lead agency in some of the LOO's will not be the military.

[Reid Bessenger]

As Bill Moore posted above, LOO and many other constructs used to visualize, describe and direct actions to achieve an objective can be misused. It seems self-evident that logic is a necessary element in any operational design. If someone can't explain their logic, generally I think we can agree that the design warrants another look. The application of LOO outside maneuver can be valuable, since it can focus discussion on endstate, conditions to contribute to endstate, and DPs that enable or facilitate achieving these conditions. These points should have a defined relationship (logic), though. Like Bill states, if it's power point deep it won't be part of the solution.