I guess that was a poorly written RFI. I was looking for the various LOOs that are out there. If Army LOOs and Marine Corps' LOOs (that sound silly) are the same, should I refer to the pubs referenced above?
I guess that was a poorly written RFI. I was looking for the various LOOs that are out there. If Army LOOs and Marine Corps' LOOs (that sound silly) are the same, should I refer to the pubs referenced above?
Jcustis,
FM 3-0 has 26 listings for 'lines of operation'
F 3-24 has 41 listings for 'lines of operation'
FM 3-05-40 has 1 listing for 'lines of operation'
FM 3-05-401 has 2 listings for 'lines of operation'
My copy of JP 3-57 is corrupted, so I can't do a search at the moment, but it's worth rummaging through.
FM 5-0 has 1 listing for 'lines of operation'
FM 6-0 (I have the 03 version looks like I need to update my pubs library) has 0 listings for 'lines of operation'
***TC 25-20 AAR's
Anything you can share on the USMC side would be appreciated
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 03-08-2008 at 01:48 PM.
Sapere Aude
Just so I'm clear, we're promoting a stencil for use in Powerpoint presentations to a concept?
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
Presley, not sure what you are asking. Please rephrase.
Seahorse,
Whilst EBO seems to be dying a slow death, I think logical lines are still going to hang around; albeit, they seem to encourage linear thinking (one-direction causality) and fail to appreciate sufficiently the interactive complexity at hand.
My opinion is that LLOOs are rather arrogant (right word?) attempts toward "social engineering" change in groups/societies/political-economic systems abroad. The idea that US interagency operations and advisory methods can be deterministic in changing complex social systems is highly questionable -- there is no "science" and these LLOOs suggest a false sense of scientific-like causality (and lead to setting expectations that are unfortunately as illusory as a shaman rain dance).
I think the efficacy of a more philosophical approach to complexity (found in the "DESIGN MOVEMENT" led primarily by the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies) may offer some better hope. Yet joint doctrine has not yet insitutionalized these alternatives that (in my opinion) consitute a worldview shift. I wrote on this in SWJ a few weeks ago: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/jou...9-paparone.pdf. I also know there is a group at JFCOM J7 working on a design handbook and that SAMS has published a student text: http://www.cgsc.edu/events/sams/ArtofDesign_v2.pdf.
Last edited by ChrisPaparone; 07-01-2010 at 02:26 PM.
Literally that. It's an arrow (or arrows) through things you intend to do to achieve something, an arrow that invariably pops up in diagrams. Represent it with different stencils and you've got a flowchart. With none at all, you've got a to do list. Draw it on a map you've got your old-school LOO. Use a string and post it notes...well, you get the picture.
Just seems like it's little more than synonym proliferation is all.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
Presley, (this is me, ChrisPaparone talking from my home account)
Ohhhhhhhhhh, Yes, yes indeed! Some writers have called this metaphorical reasoning (Lakoff and Johnson).
Many (if not all) of our military concepts were "displaced" from physical root meanings. For example "leadership" originated from a physical arrangement (e.g., a line with a lead person who is showing the way to others from one point to another). Clausewitz's "schwerpunkt" (center of gravity/focal point) was analogically based in the physics of his time. Over the long haul, we abstract root metaphors (extending and eventually displacing them -- resulting in a "dead metaphor"). Some would argue this is the essence of creativity.
See a piece that was published a while back in MILREV on the subject as it pertains to military lingo: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/..._metaphors.pdf
Are you a believer in (or at least support) this explanation?
Best,
Chris
Last edited by The Pap; 07-02-2010 at 02:37 PM.
Someone with an Army (SAMS?) background can better recount the development of the LOO concept, but it preceded the present conflicts and, I think, has its origins in the complex contingencies of the 1990s. In looking at older briefs and documents, there was a very rigorous and thoughtful way for planners to look at the problem and see if LOOs were necessary, and if so, what the LOOs should be. I think it had to do with complex problems not having single identifiable COGs, but possibly multiple COGs--each requiring actions along a seperate "Logical Line of Operation" (the conceptual equivalent of Jomini's physical line of operation--we dropped the "logical" piece to the title as no one remembers the physical origin and no one wants to associate our current COIN doctrine with a guy named Jomini). The commander had to arrange and coordinate all his actions across the LOOs to achieve his objective.
The Marine Corps never really embraced this doctrine until the early Irregular Warfare pubs--which to me looked largely like expansions of Chiarelli's article on LOOs in Baghdad in Military Review--a seminal piece, to my mind. From having no doctrinal background on LOOs, all of a sudden Marines were identifiying specific LOOs for COIN. Now LOOs pop up everywhere. The Marine Corps has still failed to grapple with them in any of our base doctrinal pub (the MCDPs). I look forward to that happening someday, because I think for LOOs to be useful, they can't be some template that commanders/planners just fill in the blank and start executing. Not every conflict porblem requires LOOs.
In many cases, even in complex scenarios like COIN, I see LOOs used as the equivalent of expanding the warfighting functions (maneuver, fires, logistics, etc.) into the "non-lethal" sphere. This tends to drive units to assign different parts of their forces to the various LOOs and they become almost separate commands at the higher echelons. I thought that the utility of the orginal way of thinking about LOOs was that it forced more synergy--a "kinetic action" was not relegated to a "combat action" LOO, but could affect multiple LOOs (information, enemy destruction, etc.). For the Marine Corps, its well worth looking hard at the LOO (and tell me, what is our 1-2 sentence definition of a generic LOO and what USMC or joint pub we use for it?).
We've gone with five interdependent LOOs as part of our Adaptive Campaigning concept.
Joint Land Combat
Population Protection
Public Information
Population Support
Indigenous Capacity Building
http://www.complex07.org/online-edition/files/426.pdf
While at the moment they're words we are starting to use them in synching our IO effects. Of course the hardest bit has been to teach everyone that information effects occur in each LOO ... not just the Public Information one.
Phil,
Your reference to the Chiarelli article pulled it al together. I found a copy on .pdf and have added it to the queue.
Bookmarks