Lines of Operation

**Reid Bessenger** · 03-17-2006

I see utility in the LOO construct for planning and assessing operations.

Some citations:

• Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, defines LOOs as the directional orientation of the force in time & space in relation to the enemy.
• JP 3-0 states LOOs attain a three-dimensional aspect and enable commanders to visualize the application of combat power throughout space and time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the force to converge on and defeat adversary centers of gravity (COGs).
• FM 3-0 puts LOOs in context of stability operations & support operations where positional reference to an adversary is less relevant. Commanders visualize the operation along logical lines which link multiple objectives & actions with the logic of purpose – cause & effect.

The identified desired endstate can suggest a set of conditions that, when achieved, combine to bring about the endstate. The degree of contribution in time and total may vary owing to the situation confronted in the operating environment including the interaction of diverse group actions and the cumulative impact on perceptions. The calibrating role of this set of conditions is to focus thinking and discussion in planning, and eventually the execution of operations.

The conditions suggest an objective for an associated line of operation. Decisive points along this LOO are geographic places, specific key events, or enabling systems that allow commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy (JP 3-0 and FM 3-0). These DP are often the focal points of connection between multiple LOO.

I think that when employed, LOO can speed the process of appreciating the situation confronted, and lend efficiency to identifying tasks that contribute to the end state.

I share concerns voiced by others about claims of a "new" answer or solution to situations confronted. This approach can be helpful.

**Bill Moore** · 03-20-2006

I won't argue the point that LOO "can" can be useful, but I will stand on my original criticism that I have seldom seen it used in a constructive matter. Vice grips are useful to turn nuts, but not drive nails, paint, or assorted other uses. LOOs are useful for maneuver, but don't necessarily add anything but confusion to operations that don't involve maneuvering to achieve an objective. I don't know how many times I have seen the following in briefs: Our lines of operation are security, civil affairs and information operations. At first glance you might think that sounds appropriate in a stability operation, but the substance to this part of the brief never follows, it just doesn't come. Obviously you think you missed something, so you have side bar discussions with the briefers so they can explain how they use their lines of operations to achieve their objectives, what the mile stones are along the lines, and how they synergistically contribute to an end state. You'll get a bunch of blank stares, and sometimes you'll get the truth, well the boss wants to see LOOs in the brief, they don't really add any value or mean anything. If we don't get back to hard core, no nonsense commanders, that demand that plans and words mean something we'll be spinning our wheels for years to come.

**GatorLHA2** · 03-20-2006

Just because someone has missused LOO's as a window dressing in a brief does not prove that it is a flawed concept.

In Small Wars, combat operations are not always the primary focus of effort. There are many non-combat types of operations that need to be undertaken to achieve success in unconventional operations. How many and what are the LOO's depend entirely on the existing situation and the conditions that must be met to achive the desired endstate.

LOO's are not new. What is new, is that LOO's in this context does not describle physical maneuver over the landscape, but rather key problems that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion simultaneously rather than sequentially. Furthermore, the lead agency in some of the LOO's will not be the military.

**Reid Bessenger** · 03-20-2006

As Bill Moore posted above, LOO and many other constructs used to visualize, describe and direct actions to achieve an objective can be misused. It seems self-evident that logic is a necessary element in any operational design. If someone can't explain their logic, generally I think we can agree that the design warrants another look. The application of LOO outside maneuver can be valuable, since it can focus discussion on endstate, conditions to contribute to endstate, and DPs that enable or facilitate achieving these conditions. These points should have a defined relationship (logic), though. Like Bill states, if it's power point deep it won't be part of the solution.

**Jones_RE** · 03-21-2006

Some of the criticisms of lines of operation strike me as misplaced. If, in fact, a military planner can't tell you anything more about the "public opinion" line of operation than "we have one" then there is indeed a problem - that planner clearly does not understand how public opinion affects his forces in a small war. If our hypothetical planner couldn't tell you the real substance behind his air support line of operations in a maneuver battle, we wouldn't be so quick to criticize the planning technique - it would be obvious that the planner wasn't prepared.

These "non traditional" lines of operation and centers of gravity associated with small wars are a hallmark of small wars and not so much a problem with the military theory, in my opinion. The central characteristic of a small war/low intensity conflict/insurgency/stability operation, etc. is that it is not a normal war. Unusual obstacles, goals and operations are the norm. If you could identify the insurgent center of gravity as something so prosaic as a headquarters or main line unit then we'd just be in a really easy maneuver war.

Perhaps it's true that "Lines of Operation" are not a useful tool for analyzing the planning challenges of a small war - however I don't think it's fair to compare the two based on their application by the United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. We run the risk of concluding that wrenches are no good for solving plumbing problems because none of the electricians we called could fix our leaky faucet with one . . . .

**jcustis** · 03-07-2008

I am bringing this post from the dead instead of open a new one because I need to know (from a USMC perspective hopefully) what the current nomenclature is out there for Lines of Operation in Iraq.

I've recently read a unit AAR about its last rotation, and LOOs are mentioned in loose terms. The overall number of LOOs and area concerned within each LOO are not addressed, so I have no frame of reference (and I'm headed to the unit in question

).

I shouldn't have been surprised, but when I ran a google string on "lines of operation", this SWC thread was the very first hit. Amazing...