How do We Train to Match our Actions to Our Narrative?

[Eden]

Some honest questions from a guy who thinks you are on to something, but still doesn't quite get it.

1. I often hear it said that the enemy's narrative is 'better' than ours, that he is whipping us in the information war. Is that true, or is that just one of those truisms that people have come to accept? How is that measured? Who establishes and monitors the metrics? Or are we just using that as an excuse for our failures? My experience in Afghanistan is that Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's narratives were largely rejected by the natives. Suicide bombers and random violence were counter-productive within Afghanistan, though they may have played well elsewhere.

2. Is it possible to approach a place like Afghanistan with a single narrative? Can we develop a common narrative that is acceptable both to the Afghans, to our international partners, and the Great American Public? And our soldiers, by the way? Can we even develop a single narrative that is acceptable to the layered, nuanced, complex culture of Afghanistan? Again, my experience is that the indigenous peoples are not stupid. They understand our agenda; it's just that many segments reject while others are suspicious of our ability to sustain it.

3. If the answers to the above are no, do we strive to create alternate narratives tailored to different audiences? How do we wall these narratives off from each other so they don't leak to other audiences? Or do we just ignore certain audiences and accept the fact that they will reject our messages? Someone used an example about how WWII's narrative was simpler. True. Does that imply that diametrically opposed narratives can only be resolved through brute force, and that the 'softer' tools of information war are sometimes useless?

[marct]

Hi Eden,

Some honest questions from a guy who thinks you are on to something, but still doesn't quite get it.

1. I often hear it said that the enemy's narrative is 'better' than ours, that he is whipping us in the information war. Is that true, or is that just one of those truisms that people have come to accept? How is that measured? Who establishes and monitors the metrics? Or are we just using that as an excuse for our failures? My experience in Afghanistan is that Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's narratives were largely rejected by the natives. Suicide bombers and random violence were counter-productive within Afghanistan, though they may have played well elsewhere.

Metrics are a tough one - we do have the techniques for getting them, but I have grave doubts about their validity in a war zone.

2. Is it possible to approach a place like Afghanistan with a single narrative? Can we develop a common narrative that is acceptable both to the Afghans, to our international partners, and the Great American Public? And our soldiers, by the way? Can we even develop a single narrative that is acceptable to the layered, nuanced, complex culture of Afghanistan? Again, my experience is that the indigenous peoples are not stupid. They understand our agenda; it's just that many segments reject while others are suspicious of our ability to sustain it.

In short, that would be a limited "yes" to all. Basically, you need to develop and deploy a grand narrative (see above). This was done in Afghanistan originally, but was pretty much displaced by the time of the 2003 Loya Jirga to a social narrative from the US. A really bad mistake that is slowly being fixed by co-creating a social narrative for Afghanistan.

The best option, in my opinion, is to assume that you will have to co-create a specific social narrative within a larger grand narrative. It's not really possible to go into an area with a pre-cut, one-size fits all narrative and assume it will work (well, you could but you would then have to be labelled as a Darwin Award winner due to shear stupidity).

3. If the answers to the above are no, do we strive to create alternate narratives tailored to different audiences? How do we wall these narratives off from each other so they don't leak to other audiences? Or do we just ignore certain audiences and accept the fact that they will reject our messages? Someone used an example about how WWII's narrative was simpler. True. Does that imply that diametrically opposed narratives can only be resolved through brute force, and that the 'softer' tools of information war are sometimes useless?

The short answer is that you can't wall off one audience from another and any attempts to do so will fail miserably. This isn't to say that your narrative won't change over time; of course it will. As to whether or not diametrically opposed narratives can only be resolved by force, I would have to say that force is one option for their resolution, but not the only one. In some cases, it is possible to create a shared narrative that will contain the resolution of the two - not simple mind you, but possible.

Marc

[Spud]

2. Is it possible to approach a place like Afghanistan with a single narrative? Can we develop a common narrative that is acceptable both to the Afghans, to our international partners, and the Great American Public? And our soldiers, by the way? Can we even develop a single narrative that is acceptable to the layered, nuanced, complex culture of Afghanistan? Again, my experience is that the indigenous peoples are not stupid. They understand our agenda; it's just that many segments reject while others are suspicious of our ability to sustain it.

NATO/ISAF has one (and it’s not bad either if excessively wordy). The real issue in a place like Afghanistan is getting a fractured (in the nicest possible sense) coalition to use that narrative from the political-strategic through to the tactical.

The current strat-political game of one upmanship over who's pulling more weight and which countries are truly fighting is completely drowning out the narrative and significantly impacting on the information battlespace. There is no single report in AFG media or the worldwide media that doesn't highlight the differences (perceived or otherwise) in national approaches to the op.

Call me a simple former section commander but if we all signed up to ISAF and ISAF wants to promote a certain narrative shouldn't every contributing nation align to it? We're in no way different to anyone else ... in fact our new Government has been leading the drive down this route just to highlight its differences with the previous administration (and score a few points along the way).

Of course if we can't get that strat narrative sorted, all of the real information issues then fall out. Case in point what do we call our adversary in AFG? "OMF" (mum and dad have no idea what that means), "ACM", "Taliban" (several countries including the AFG Government want to open political negotiations with the people representing the Taliban movement so by putting everyone in the same boat we're potentially impacting on this LOO) "Taliban extremists", "Insurgents" "Nutbugs in a Pakhul with an RPG"... it goes on ... if you check the media releases for the current 32-odd nations in ISAF there's about 15 different descriptors for who we're actually fighting. In reality that should be simple to fix but then what to do with the counter-narc problem?

[Eden]

Call me a simple former section commander but if we all signed up to ISAF and ISAF wants to promote a certain narrative shouldn't every contributing nation align to it? We're in no way different to anyone else ... in fact our new Government has been leading the drive down this route just to highlight its differences with the previous administration (and score a few points along the way).

Any narrative that all members signed up to would not be a useful document. Just as our enemies, our friends are motivated by different agendas, some of them hidden.

You have the serious players, the countries that believe the war in Afghanistan must be fought in order to eliminate the region as a useful sanctuary/training base/recruiting pool for international terrorists.

You have the team players, countries that believe NATO must be supported and be successful in order to achieve the larger goals of international order and security.

You have the aspirant players, those who participate because they believe this is the best way to earn NATO membership, US dollars, and/or domestic support for their militaries.

Then there are the wannabes, states that believe they have to provide support if they want to be taken seriously as international middle-weights.

Some countries fall into one or more categories. Overlay this welter of motivations with domestic political considerations, varying degrees of aversion to casualties, and legitimately different approaches to warfighting/stability operations, and you can see that constructing something like a coherent 'Why we Fight' narrative is doomed to failure.

[marct]

Call me a simple former section commander but if we all signed up to ISAF and ISAF wants to promote a certain narrative shouldn't every contributing nation align to it? We're in no way different to anyone else ... in fact our new Government has been leading the drive down this route just to highlight its differences with the previous administration (and score a few points along the way).

Any narrative that all members signed up to would not be a useful document. Just as our enemies, our friends are motivated by different agendas, some of them hidden.

And, just to add another case in point, not accepting the proffered narrative (actually the grounds and warrants establishing the jus ad bellum) is the reason why Canada isn't in Iraq.

Just a comment, though... It is possible to establish core symbols - "principles" if you will - that are mutually acceptable and allow each nation (or group) to produce their own narratives around that core cluster.

[Rank amateur]

you can see that constructing something like a coherent 'Why we Fight' narrative is doomed to failure.

I have to disagree. "What happened on Sept 11 is wrong and we want all the help we can get fighting it," was working: international banking restrictions, police around the world making arrests etc. It took a core value that almost all people agree with - massacring innocent civilians is wrong - and allowed them to adopt it to the own identities. (Canada can help by... The UK can help by... Egypt may understand the frustration but ...)

Fewer people signed up to "Saddam is part of the problem." Leaving aside the issue of whether that change was right or wrong, it is possible to have a broad consensus. (Even the Germans agree now that we were on the right side in WWII.)

Most people believe in the right to self defense. It's very hard to convince the world that we need to start a war, much easier to convince them that they should help us finish it.

[Steve Blair]

I have to disagree. "What happened on Sept 11 is wrong and we want all the help we can get fighting it," was working: international banking restrictions, police around the world making arrests etc. It took a core value that almost all people agree with - massacring innocent civilians is wrong - and allowed them to adopt it to the own identities. (Canada can help by... The UK can help by... Egypt may understand the frustration but ...)

The Sept 11 narrative worked to a degree, in certain areas....but it's certainly not a unified narrative with 100% buy-in. Even in our own country it didn't get 100% buy-in. It's easy to dismiss the conspiracy folks and assorted wing-nuts, but they are an audience. Also, I'm not sure that the narrative was necessarily adopted by other countries in the sense that I think you mean...

My take on narratives is somewhat different, since I come from a history and not anthropology or sociology background. I tend to see how the narratives shift over time, and how the perspective of a particular period gives them a different view on events than a current writer might have. I also tend to agree with Marc that the informal ("darker" to use his term) narrative is much more powerful as it's based on more primal considerations (and often passed on by someone the listener 'knows' or 'respects').

[marct]

One of the things that bugs me is the actual term "Narrative". Academically, it comes out of discursive textual analysis and that is a different source point from where most of the original Anthropology work came from (which was oral cultures). The term, as it's used in a lot of academic circles, points towards the idea hat you can treat anything as a "text"; an assertion that contains a germ of truth, but so does he idea that you can use an axe to build anything (you can, but it's not the most efficient tool).

My take on narratives is somewhat different, since I come from a history and not anthropology or sociology background. I tend to see how the narratives shift over time, and how the perspective of a particular period gives them a different view on events than a current writer might have.

That's one of the main problems I have with treating anything and everything "as text" (although, it does allow for some great humour ). What is missing is the sense of constant negotiation and construction-reconstruction which appears in oral cultures. And, lest someone point out that neither we nor AQ are oral cultures, think about the increasing dominance of rapid person-to-person communications technologies.

I also tend to agree with Marc that the informal ("darker" to use his term) narrative is much more powerful as it's based on more primal considerations (and often passed on by someone the listener 'knows' or 'respects').

Really this just stems from the communications bandwidth as we get closer and closer to simulating face to face communications. As the simulation of f2f increases, we can convey more and more emotional connotations; in effect partially conditioning the audience. In this sense, what we see in he press, what is passed over cell phone trees, what shows up in YouTube, Blogs, etc. is a more immediate (and emotional) part of an ongoing multilogue that produces a constantly shifting narrative that, with time, starts to get "hardened" around generally agreed upon "evens", "facts" and "logics" - a hardening of interpretation if you will.

Once the topic becomes less immediately important to people, the ongoing discussions recede from general discussions and held by a smaller and smaller number of people - we now have "historical narratives", or "myths", that a part of the background of the culture. These, in turn, are subject to renegotiation and reinterpretation by that small number of people (historians ).

[Rank amateur]

informal ("darker" to use his term) narrative is much more powerful as it's based on more primal considerations (and often passed on by someone the listener 'knows' or 'respects').

I agree. I think it's very reasonable to assume that when you aim a kinetic weapon at someone you will get a primal "fight or flight" reaction. I think many of the problems in Iraq can be traced - at least in part - to the fact that our strategy depends on a different, more cooperative primal response.

[Ron Humphrey]

I agree. I think it's very reasonable to assume that when you aim a kinetic weapon at someone you will get a primal "fight or flight" reaction. I think many of the problems in Iraq can be traced - at least in part - to the fact that our strategy depends on a different, more cooperative primal response.

Would you be able to expand on that? (Within the realm of open source, of course)