It may have been said before, but the guy who said it so it clicked with me was Dave Kilcullen at the Quantico pitch he said (paraphrased because it was a few months back) -"We must match our actions to our narrative, not go back and change the narrative to match our actions". This came up again recently at the SWC non-virtual get together with Jack Holt, and later in a conversation with a senior leader.

This goes to the idea that there is an "Information Component" to every operation - lethal or non-lethal. It may be a message we want to send, or it may be a message we did not intend to send - but never the less, there it is. Further the messages that go forward may influence different audiences in different ways, and may even send very different messages beyond the intended audiences. Even something that like how we use media can be considered - ex. when LTG Caldwell put up a blog here - what were the responses around the "Blogosphere"? What messages does that send? What are the messages we receive when we don't see other senior leaders doing likewise? In some cases, even no message at all still sends a message.

At the strategic level it would seem there is more thought of how the use of the elements of national power send messages - the questions would at least seem to be asked. If the Israelis hit a target in Syria that would "appear" to be the beginning of a nuclear effort - then the action would seem to match at least one narrative - "we will take action against any threat to our survival". I say "appear" because I think part of the challenge we have is not only understanding our own narrative, but the narratives of others we inter act with. It may only be that at the strategic level it is sometimes easier to link the narrative and the action when the actions are "in bold" and stand out for a number of reasons.

However, what about the numerous actions that take place at the tactical level? Its harder - its like being at a large party where everyone is discussing things in terms that often sound very similar, however - the use of those terms and the context of those terms my be very different. Occasionally there is a different tone that stands out - and for one reason or another, that is the voice that is heard above others. The understanding by others of what that voice is saying is effected by not only the conversation the individual was having, but by the proximate conversations around between the listener and the voice that stood out.

Often when we discuss a "narrative" at the tactical level, we think of "talking points", things to say to the media, things not to talk about, things not to put on a hand-bill, or on some other media, or things like that - it seems reactive. I don't think we think in terms of all of our actions in terms of matching our narrative -of synchronizing our lethal and non-lethal actions at the tactical level to support a tactical narrative that is nested with an operational and strategic one. We do pursue Objectives & Endstates, Task and Purpose, and CDR's Intent - but I'm not sure these lead to matching our actions to the narrative we'd like to be heard and understood. Instead, I think our actions are often abandoned to interpretation - sort of hanging outside the narrative to be picked up and placed within the context either the listener chooses, or a third party who wishes to use our actions to reinforce their narrative.

I'm not sure its possible to match all our actions with a narrative - war is full of fog, friction and chance - #### happens - targets are going to misidentified, confusion about what a particular event means, or just the very nature of warfare at the tactical level where sooner or later combatants are going to try and kill each other at a time and place that is advantageous to them -and anyone else who gets caught in the middle is often seen as unfortunate, but necessary, or as someone that chose the wrong side - can mean that the narrative gets subsumed for the moment.

However, can we do better at those actions that are planned? At certain levels where we at least appear to control the tempo, can we better match our actions to our narrative? How do we train that at the tactical level (2 stars HQs and below)? How do we train the Commanders and Staffs who generate orders and synchronize resources to consider and integrate the information component of all of our operations - so that where possible our actions, at least more closely match our narrative? How do we identify the narrative - no matter what we decide (or have decided) to call it - and then communicate vertically and horizontally - not only to our forces, but to our enemies, our friends, and the many, many others caught in the middle, but who may have more weight in determining the outcome then any of the former? I’m not trying to repackage something we all know by another name - I am trying to consider something I think we do know as one thing, but maybe have not thought about in ways we may not have considered.

We often say this is a war of ideas, and I think we often have an appreciation for the information component after something happens - which leads us to either explaining our action(s) - could be to take advantage of that action, or it could be to mitigate the damage done by that action(s), but I don't think we give too much thought to considering the effects on the narrative when we plan the action, or before committing the action. Part of this gets back to LTG Caldwell's comment about providing the soldier (used to represent all of those whose actions effect the narrative) the tools and training (and I think we could also include education here) to not only avoid actions which detract from the narrative, but enhance it!

SWC Member Jack Holt said a couple of things Monday night I think we need to acknowledge. First is that the enemy is using his narrative in ways we dn't fully understand and to greater effect then we are, and that if we are going to beat him in this area - which ultimately may prove more important then any other area of the battlefield since it gets to the heart of our Will, and the Will of those we wish to attract and retain, and because in our system our Will effects our Means - which even for us, are not infinite. The second is that the generation of Americans coming into service has an expectation of freedom of speech and the means they pursue it that has been influenced by the technology and cultures we've seen evolve with the improvements in Information technologies. You can't stick you head in the sand and believe its a problem with a solution - its a condition - there is a big difference.

The sad part about the latter is we grow some of the best natural communicators here in the United States - we also grow many of the world's best ideas from our values and culture that are attractive - and attainable - but we don't get them out. We have the means to do so, but lack the understanding of the significance of inaction, and as such allow the unattractive and unattainable messages that come from the darker side of capitalism - Baywatch blondes, rampant materialism on reality T.V. and other shows, etc. While we know that this is only one aspect of who we are, we leave the rest of the world to place what comes over their satellite T.V., through the Internet and across their cell phones to form the context of our narrative.

Often, the first real American that someone in a remote place will encounter will be wearing uniform - how will they interpret their actions within the narrative they have formed about us? Can we provide them a better narrative - our version? To do so means the actions must reinforce it. This is not restricted to non-lethal actions! Sometimes showing up and challenging someone like AQ by killing them or compelling them to move elsewhere is part of the narrative. There is a lethal component to information operations, and there is an information component to lethal operations. The same is true for non-lethal. I think "Full Spectrum" operations must include the Information domain - and being proficient and better then our enemies in this domain will not occur by ignoring it, or by making policies which restrict us from operating in it - all that does is create vacuum and opportunity for the enemy to operate unopposed - much like ceding the areas of population and concentrating of securing the MSRs for our own use - we've seen what happens when we do that.

Best Regards, Rob