Dr. Schadlow (another Cornellian - we're everywhere) makes a bit of a disingenuous play with her examples. While technically true, they greatly oversimplify things and don't really do her idea justice.
For example, the World War II reference, of Eisenhower and Marshall, is not a great example of the Army ditching its cultural proclivity for politics and business as usual. Marshall was kept on as Chief of Staff only at FDR's insistence, over the grousing of many within the Army who wanted the post (or some like MacArthur who hated Marshall and being subordinate to him). Likewise, the only reason Eisenhower wasn't replaced at SHAEF before Overlord was because of FDR's personal intervention. Everyone thought the command would (and should) go to Marshall.
That said, I actually do endorse her idea, although that's easy for me to say Stateside, rather than actually having to be there for a doubled 15-month tour. There is the consideration, however, of having units train and prepare under one command and then having them replaced when they arrive in theater - or would you simply keep Gen. Petraeus and Odierno and let the division commanders (who in country become MNF-North, South, etc. regional commanders, right?) stay?
My guess is that the shifts of Petraeus and other officers are rooted in an effort by the services to keep things "business as usual," in terms of keeping the GO rotations going so that all get their time in the sun, which is odd when in many other ways - procurement, doctrine, etc. - they're making every effort to show how extraordinary the situation is.
Obviously, as Dr. Schadlow argues, and my critiques notwithstanding, that is a major mistake.
Finally, I kind of bristle at the suggestion that a Democratic administration might somehow punish Gen. Petraeus (or any other officers or personnel) by not promoting him to additional commands because of their anti-war attitudes. Obviously such an act would be truly disgusting, but I can't imagine it occurring.
Matt
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