Originally Posted by Tom Odom
did any thing come of it or did the study get placed on a shelf in CALL or some other office?
Kreker
Kreker
I wrote a study for CALL just 4 years ago that proposed a similar but more extensive use of CGSC to cohort a staff of 4 with mentors and then hand them off to commanders as a cohort staff for no less than 18 months.
Tom
That's great, but
did any thing come of it or did the study get placed on a shelf in CALL or some other office?
Kreker
And is it still available on CALL? I'd be interested in reading your recommendations. Specifically, does the cohort model recommend rotating a new S3 and XO in the same COHORT? How much overlap is recommended between a departing COHORT and the new one? Are major green cycle training events synched with COHORT "RIP/TOA"? Did the model focus on Bn or BDE level or both?did any thing come of it or did the study get placed on a shelf in CALL or some other office?
Kreker
...you get the picture.
"Law cannot limit what physics makes possible." Humanitarian Apsects of Airpower (papers of Frederick L. Anderson, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)
I have this vague recollection that someone
I trust told me that Bn Cdrs and CSMs were now a package deal and went through the pre-command bit together???
'Zat true or am I closer to the big A than I thought?
That Staff packaging would be a tremendous benefit. If it's on the shelf someone should try to resurrect it...
I view this proposal as a mixed blessing. Sure you get a team that one hopes is vetted as functionally capable and able to work together. However what you don't get is the ability of the commander to whom this cadre is assigned to shape the staff to his/her style of command, especially with the 18 month stabilization. And you also don't get the opportunity that many on this board have suggested is a real plus--the ability to identify a fast burning, smarter than the average bear LT/CPT that you can pull up into the staff and make things really happen. Every time I was ever called on to play in an artificially-selected staff group exercise, I found other members of the assigned "team" that I would have preferred to have been left in the locker room, and I suspect that others on the team probably felt the same way about me.
I guess the point I really want to make here is that I see Tom's proposal as a way to sub-optimize, rather than optimize, an organization. Sorry, but I'd rather have the ability to pick and choose my own staff as much as possible from a pool, albeit limited, rather than have someone else hand me a staff that knows the "school solution."
BTW, if Ken is right about the nuptials between a Bn Cdr and the CSM, I wonder who arranges that marriage and whether it is a shotgun wedding. In other words does either party get a say before they are betrothed; can either say the match just won't work?.
I have not been out of the operational side too long- I'm pretty sure that if there is a CSM already there, the CDR then falls in on him. Remember there are relationships not just between a BN CSM and his BN CDR, but also between a BN CSM and the BDE CSM.
My view is that the continuity offered by one or the other already being there can be very beneficial. Much like the relationship between the 1SGand the company or the PSG and the platoon - we officer's are transients in many ways, and the heart and soul of the organization is its NCOs - any legacy that might be carried on, is carried on through them. Officers by the nature of the progression we must go through must leave behind some of the loyalties they had, and turn over the keys e.g. Rifle CO CDR gets sent to be the HHC, or the BN CDR gets moved up to be the BCT DCO. Without our NCO Corps as the unit standard bearer a unit has the permanence of sand caught in the tide.
There could be someting said as well for some degree of continuity in primary staff. Clearly there would be some benefits to linking guys up early and delivering them as a package - but even then I think they'd have to integrate into something - their unity may isolate them from others, and might incur bias as much as it might foster synchronization in the warfighting functions (what we used to call the BOS - battlefield operating systems). Ultimately the CDR must form relationships with each one of his primary staff (or in my oppinion should) as well as with his CO CDRs and Specialty PLs - he must do so to understand their strengths and weaknesses, and in order to develop them - CMD is a people business. It works well for primary staff and subordinate CDRs to develop relationships with each other, withthe BN CDR and with the BN CSM - I spent allot of time with Larry Allen & Art McCann (both fantastic 1-24 CSMs)- and both me as a CO CDR and my company benefitted from it. I spent allot of time discussing what I might pitch to the boss to both the BN S-3 and the BN XO so I could benefit from their experience - I'm not sure I could've done that if I thought (perceived) they were going to have like oppinions. I served as a mentor to JR. Staff officers as a CDR which benefitted not only them, but also the companies as it reminded them that a BN HQs was not a BN, but that a BN was made up of companies, that had platoons and squads, etc.
Developing a good company or a good BN or a good anything depends on the personalities and the relationships those personalities form, they are both horizontal & vertical, formal and casual. They require work & maintenance - and if you are lucky you see them again down the road. The organization you want to go to war with is one that understand who it is - its strengths and weaknesses, and the character of its people. Time (to include lots of good, hard quality training) & personal effort is what that is built on.
Best, Rob
Still available on the web page under special studies as 04-1 Transforming the Staff for the 21st Century. I can't answer specifics here but you can download.
Best
Tom
Pesky FOUO. Good read!
"Law cannot limit what physics makes possible." Humanitarian Apsects of Airpower (papers of Frederick L. Anderson, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)
Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom
I can't answer specifics here but you can download.
Tom
Pesky FOUO. Good read!
I just wanted to address the Army's love of pick up staffs. For once I would like to see a battalion commander start with with a staff that knows the basic WFFs and is trained to work them together as a staff. If that happened staffs might actually become the combat multiplier they are supposed to be. Color me ever hopeful...
Then again there is always the USAF's eternal quest for the ultimate fighter:
:Aerospace Daily & Defense Report
February 14, 2008 (Log in required)
General Says USAF Will Procure 380 F-22s, Despite OSD
Gen. Bruce Carlson, chief of the U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, told a group of reporters Feb. 13 that the Air Force will figure out a way to buy 380 F-22s, despite the fact that the Pentagon has capped the number of aircraft to be procured at 183.
"We think that [183] is the wrong number," Carlson said. Even 380, a number he joked is a "compromise" from the 381 the Air Force originally asked for, still leaves too much room for risk. That risk could even include a future conflict with China, he said. "Most people say in the future there will be a Chinese element to whatever we do," he added.
Tom
This probably isn't a popular opinion...
So do I need to put on some more nomex to defend against the upcoming flames?The F-22A is needed but definitely not as much for small wars... it is needed to make sure wars stay small. No one in the US military is postured to gain/maintain air superiority other than the F-22A and the F-15C (Navy has mostly switched to Aegis for fleet defence)... and the F-15C can't survive the SAMS that China and Russia have and Iran is trying very hard to buy... imagine trying to do OIF or OEF without air superiority... can't be done. The F-22A is a support asset... it is there to support the rest of the US Military by keeping them safe from enemy air. WWII is so far in the past that average folks in the US forget what enemy air can do to us... they only see what our air does to other folks. The Chinese, on the other hand, remember and are working hard to develop capabilities as close to ours as they can get. At some point things get to be a numbers game... even if F-15Cs are close to the F-11/Su-33s capability-wise, look at the number of Flanker regiments the Chinese have... The AF has a huge institutional memory of how we lost air superiority in WW II because of failure to develop specialized fighters- it took almost 3 years to recover from that. We can't afford 3 years in this day and age, especially when it takes 10 yrs to develop a fighter
All the services need more money. Clearly the Army and Marines are currently engaged in a fight, and must be the priority. On the other hand, the history of warfare is replete with folks who built their forces to fight the last war... ideally we should be able to afford high intensity conflict forces as well as COIN/low intensity forces. If you can't afford both then you end up having to make hard choices.
If we lose our superiority to wage high-end war, we open ourselves up to being challenged there... better to continue to deter folks from challenging us on the high end while continuing to improve ourselves on the low end.
I know many folks probably will take my arguements as being a defense of the white-scarf/we need fighters so we can all be fighter pilots mentality. All I can tell you is that the Air Force is trying very hard to support the fight we are in now while still hedging against the future. Most folks in our leadership truly understand that we need to support the Army and Marines in the current fight and that is the priority. We have sent a lot of Air Force folks to help the Army in the AOR, and the whole JTAC/TACP force has been given huge priority. At any rate, the defense budget should not be a zero sum game. OK, probably time for me to hunker down and await the incoming!
No disagreement, Cliff. That is a position I have stated on here as well. Where the rub comes in is dealing with how to balance that and support ongoing operations. MG Dunlap on here lambasts the Army and the Marine Corps for seemingly ignoring airpower in COIN and then tries to make an argument that smart bombs are smarter than a trained infantryman. Any points he gains in offering the argument are destroyed by his own conclusions. Meanwhile MG Comer (ret) as an AF Spec Ops giy really does get at the issues that matter on COIN and irregular warfare. I posted the article above because of what comes across like a knee jerk reaction from a senior AF leader. I understand the AF history in WWII and even before WWII. In this case, the AF general in question comes across like a battleship admiral dismissing Billy Mitchell.If we lose our superiority to wage high-end war, we open ourselves up to being challenged there... better to continue to deter folks from challenging us on the high end while continuing to improve ourselves on the low end.
Best
Tom
No worries, cliff. I'm an old
retired Grunt -- and I'm a firm supporter of both the F22, the F35 (all variants) and a new manned Bomber. I'd also lobby for an A-10 replacement starting development...
The future budgets will be lighter, no doubt and there'll be dumb occurrences but we generally eventually get it about right.
I gotta go find that pony...
I agree...
with you Tom when you say that JDAMs are not a good replacement for well trained folks on the ground!
I guess I was just responding to the F-22 quote more than Maj Gen Dunlap's article with my last post here re the Raptor.
I agree that frequently our airpower advocates appear to go too far in pushing the effects air can have... (includes me sometimes no doubt!).
As for the Dunlap's article, I definitely think that he built his case on data from early in OIF (IE more at the high-intensity end of conflict) than at the COIN level (Stats about cluster munitions etc). As I read it he is advocating a lower footprint, more HN led model where you have less US forces and perhaps more advisors. It seems that would only work if the HN has the forces available and they are effective... He claims at the end to not be advocating replacing infantry but the arguements preceding that caveat seem to trend that way.
However, it does seem like he has some valid points about 3-24's view on airpower, which from my understanding (again this is second hand) have been borne out by events. The USAF and USN have worked very hard to make weapons that are extremely accurate, very precise, and minimize collateral damage. Parts of 3-24 (and the execution even prior to 3-24's publication) point to a misunderstanding of the effects achievable by air.
You have to look at effects and not who/what/why... focusing on the latter means that you may miss the unintended parts of the former. Can air engage the local tribes, collect humint, and provide the day to day presence that ground forces can? Certainly not! But at the same time it can have the effect of persistent surveillance (that leverages the humint collected), intimidation of the enemy/stiffen morale for friendlies (numerous cases in Afghanistan of Northern Alliance/ANA folks being emboldended to follow their SOF advisors due to the presence of US air), and when required precise firepower. Additionally, the ability to re-supply/reinforce by air (whether that is organic helos or tactical/strat airlift is immaterial) as well as maintain a logistical trail to a place like Afghanistan are also important, if not quite as germane.
Dunlap's arguements about the unintended effects (collateral damage effects) of increasing ground power in Iraq don't seem borne out by recent history; then again, 3-24's admonition against using air doesn't seem to make sense either. Most of the collateral damage effects like those mentioned in Metz's blog post (bombing wedding parties) are due to using air with bad intel - the very thing that would be fixed by better integrating air into the overall counterinsurgency plan.
I guess my whole point is that when you are planning counter insurgency operations, having an ALO and making sure he is fully dialed in to what you are doing is a good thing. Not to mention making sure that the folks at the higher echelons, especially in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) are in the loop. Anaconda is a good example of what happens when this ends up being a pickup game rather than a planned event.
Operation Redwing is perhaps another example, althought that seemed to be more a comms issue than anything... air was around, the SEALs just couldn't raise them. Amazing that even in this day and age we can have such comm problems.
Anyway, Tom, I think our opinions aren't too far apart.
V/R,
Cliff
Good posts Norfolk 13, Eden 19!
Sometimes I think that the best chance for the armed & intelligence services would be to reduce them by fifty percent. Lots of dogmas, intervoven multi-tier systems, clanish and self/career/budget-serving structures would have to vanish. Might produce the lean & mean machine that is needed.
Word on the General Staff issue: YESSS! But go the whole way to unified forces and include Navy and intelligence.
CliffI guess my whole point is that when you are planning counter insurgency operations, having an ALO and making sure he is fully dialed in to what you are doing is a good thing. Not to mention making sure that the folks at the higher echelons, especially in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) are in the loop. Anaconda is a good example of what happens when this ends up being a pickup game rather than a planned event.
Operation Redwing is perhaps another example, althought that seemed to be more a comms issue than anything... air was around, the SEALs just couldn't raise them. Amazing that even in this day and age we can have such comm problems.
Anyway, Tom, I think our opinions aren't too far apart.
I would agree. The key to Joint or Combinned operations has always been active cooperation versus inherent competition, a tendency that pops up too often with disastrous results.
Best
Tom
Thank-you Distiller, and some good ideas of your own, although I would disagree on the unification bit - we did that 40 years ago here in Canada, and it was a disaster - integration yes, unification no.
Cliff:
Good thoughts, and you describe much the role that the Air Force should be performing in COIN. Keeping an eagle-eye on things and giving folks on the ground a heads-ups when something stirs, and maintaining constant psychological pressure on the enemy, never knowing where or when they will be struck. Air transport and logistics are a given (or should be).
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