Nagl and Yingling: Restructuring the U.S. Military

[Ken White]

in fact. My comments was directed at the mentality, not the tools but I did fail to clearly state that. Sorry...

Not least am I a digital fan because it eliminates the need for at least one of my two cited pet peeve radio calls. Which were mostly tongue in cheek in any event...

Realize also that my DAC experience was at USAARMS (6 yrs) and a couple of GO Hq (possibly 12 years too many ) and I know that micromanagement in units is less (thank Mars!). Both TRADOC Schools and big, upper level staffs have their own set of problems.

I can't recall back in my unigram days ever having a real micromanagement problem. I was attempting to point out that in my perception the Army has over the last 45 years or so generally drifted ever further into a mildly pernicious lack of trust of subordinates due mostly to centralization and over control which IMO is not a good thing. Hopefully, the current experience will reverse that trend -- and it seems to be doing just that.

Thanks for the insights. All good to hear. Thanks also for the info on Map use, really glad to hear that as well. Problem with being old and outa date is one says dumb things now and then. Neat thing about this place is I can get a lot of my minor concerns eliminated while getting less dumb.

[John T. Fishel]

I'm really glad you guys answered a question that had been bugging me for a long time and that the answer was not nearly as bad as I feared.

Cheers

JohnT

[Norfolk]

Digital is great as long as it doesn't get jammed or is in the hands of a a control freak; if either is present - especially the latter, it becomes a drag. Both can be mitigated, though, the latter through proper selection.

[Cliff]

Hi John,

It just takes me back to the question – are we changing the paradigm, or just massaging it? Will there be a few good ones who get up the dam and make it upstream to spawn – I think so, but aren’t we saying we want to build better swimmers early on – so that we can change our organizational culture? I guess there is also the argument of how much leadership is inherent in an individual and how much it can be infused, but I still feel like we can do better then we are in the shaping process.

Best, Rob

Pardon me for asking, but how does the Army debrief operations? In the AF at the tactical/operational levels, there is a "no rank" mentality... because your mission commander is usually a young Capt/Maj, occasionally a LtCol, you "leave rank at the door" when debriefing... This tends to get used even in non-tactical debriefs as well - the culture of the debrief is something that has been propogated, mostly as a result of the USAF Weapons School being the tactical/operational center of excellence, which allowed the Weapons Officers (Captains who are the chief instructors at the Squadron level) to propogate the debrief mentality to the rest of the AF... You learn very early how to tactfully tell the O-6 or General that he screwed the pooch and help him not screw it up next time... the good ones want to not look like clowns, the bad ones are just plain scared and usually avoid flying the hard missions. The system has disadvantages too though - sometimes you end up debriefing things to nitnoid detail and wasting time. It's a fine line. Also, the Weapons School standardization between units at times results in a dogmatic approach to things.

Is the Army system similar? IE, how are missions reviewed/debriefed at the tactical/operational level? Who is responsible for taking the debrief/lessons learned and instructing the folks present in what to do better next time? And can a junior person debrief/instruct his/her seniors? Are these processes used in non-operational settings (IE let's debrief how that meeting with the General went good/bad and why...?)

Is it the ability to think critically or the ability to criticise superiors that you are talking about when you refer to swimming skills, Rob?

Like I mentioned before I haven't worked with Army ground forces much... thanks for humoring me!

V/R,

Cliff

[Tom Odom]

I'm really glad you guys answered a question that had been bugging me for a long time and that the answer was not nearly as bad as I feared.

Cheers

JohnT

From my perch, the digital issues I see as strongest lay between the division, the BCT, and the battalions, especially the latter given the plus up of the BCT staff and the corresponding vacum of talent fromn the battalions.

I have tended to see the company as a much more independent as a result of the changes in the operational environment and the inherent self-centric focus at the BCT level. Hence the issue of battalions needing a liaison officer within the BCT staff to "monitor and develop the situation".

As for the company, that has been a plus and a negative. Plus in that in operations like Iraq and Afghanistan, the company, platoon, and squad win the fight--the battalions and the BCTs shape the conditions. One benefit of the BCT-centric trend is the BCTs are so busy with themselves and their battalions, the companies can exercise that independence.

The negative is that with all that BCT focus, getting improvements at the company-level is a dogass, bone-garing fight. But we have started to see some shifts--notably in improving a company's ability to run ops 24/7 in a non-linear environment. All of of or force structure from battalion to squad is based on a linear model with carefully echeloned C2 and log support. Transformation essentially ignored that reality but reality has been catching up. And that is a good thing.

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Cliff - what I was referring to is really about how the events, jobs, education, experiences, assignments, etc. that a leader can or might have put before him or take advantage of helps to shape him so that as he or she advances and is placed in greater positions to influence other leaders, they increase the number who reflect the types of values and traits we claim we want.

While the tactical debrief is important - or what we refer to as an AAR (After Action Review) - which is not to be confused with a Patrol Debrief (where questions pertaining to the patrol are asked and answered). In an AAR either a second party, or a member of the unit (usually a leader) can take the unit through a kind of peer review process where questions to understand how the unit did, where it could have done better and where it did well are asked. This is a time process where the unit gets stronger by understanding itself in relation to its environment - and the conditions that it faced there.

What I'm talking about is broader. It not only the collective development, but the individual development - because sometimes the decisions the leader has to make are his or hers alone.

So its neither just thinking critically, or teaching someone how to be critical (in this case going from the passive to the active). I don't think this is relative to ground forces leadership only - its leadership in general. An organization should ask itself who it thinks it is, who it thinks it needs to be, and in our case what does our civilian leadership think we need to be - the goal I think is to get those 3 things in line. Its my thought that its leaders that you leverage to do that. Here we may have a disconnect - on the one hand we say we need more leaders who are more multi-dimensional - who can adapt faster and can innovate - the new 3-0 has a whole chapter on what our leadership requirements are and how critical they are to the tasks we expect them to negotiate and lead others through - on the other hand our actions (not the topical, interval or sporadic ones - but the ones we do in small groups when nobody is listening or when we can justify backsliding by saying "hey, here is the real deal!") - those core actions - that really define who we are don't match the narrative of who we say we need to be publicly.

The only means we have to change that is through demonstrated leadership - the kind that shows and encourages what we say we believe in, and points the way toward where we say we need to be. Animate leadership that reaches down when they find out something like that a branch rep came forward with some tripe like that, and then takes action to prove its fallacy. That leadership has to be backed up by the leadership at the follow on boards that really looks at the person (deeper then the ORB and SR block) - and in a very transparent manner shows the judged what the criteria was for selection to command or promotion was, and that the things we are saying publicly are important really counted - so that its clear that our actions match the narrative.

If you don't take steps to get more people like that up stream - then the ones who do are only going to perpetuate the actions by which we govern ourselves right now - because they will be mostly copy cat products - minted in our self image.

Hoped that helped answer your question.
Best, Rob

[patmc]

land nav are still taught according to folks I know, albeit in reduced form. They are cognitive skills and once decently absorbed will return for most recipients fairly quickly if needed.

The bad news is that both are cognitive skills -- so it'll take a few hours practice to get them back up to speed. Can't speak to the fire direction side but the land nav side is generally marginally taught.

The worse news is that black boxes tend to fail at inopportune times and practice time may not be available...

In an Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, out of necessity, we keep manual plotting and gunnery alive (charts and darts), but digital has even moved into that (ie Centaur, a hand-held Fire Data computer). Our sister BN has fielded the new cannon system, with all its digital features, and from what I'm told, is giving up on manual gunnery. They teach both digital and manual at OBC, but manual is definately a dying skill. I have no experience with Paladins or MLRS, but from what I know, they are digital or nothing. When the digital goes down, the cannons check fire.

[Ken White]

In an Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, out of necessity, we keep manual plotting and gunnery alive (charts and darts), but digital has even moved into that (ie Centaur, a hand-held Fire Data computer). Our sister BN has fielded the new cannon system, with all its digital features, and from what I'm told, is giving up on manual gunnery. They teach both digital and manual at OBC, but manual is definately a dying skill. I have no experience with Paladins or MLRS, but from what I know, they are digital or nothing. When the digital goes down, the cannons check fire.

a backup capability; hopefully we won't let it die totally...

I know that Paladins used to digital or nothing and that makes sense with MLRS but the 119s and the 777s having at least a rudimentary emergency backup (even if its a battery operated hand held unconnected FD calculator) would seem to be a good idea.

Have had most Bns of the 319, 320, 321 put 'em where I wanted 'em at one time or other. You guys do good work.

Thanks for the update.

[Cliff]

Hi Cliff - what I was referring to is really about how the events, jobs, education, experiences, assignments, etc. that a leader can or might have put before him or take advantage of helps to shape him so that as he or she advances and is placed in greater positions to influence other leaders, they increase the number who reflect the types of values and traits we claim we want.

Got it. You're talking about not just building a way of thinking but molding the entire leader.

While the tactical debrief is important - or what we refer to as an AAR (After Action Review) - which is not to be confused with a Patrol Debrief (where questions pertaining to the patrol are asked and answered). In an AAR either a second party, or a member of the unit (usually a leader) can take the unit through a kind of peer review process where questions to understand how the unit did, where it could have done better and where it did well are asked. This is a time process where the unit gets stronger by understanding itself in relation to its environment - and the conditions that it faced there.

Is this a formalized process? I'd like to learn more, is there somewhere (FM or otherwise) I can read up on this?

An organization should ask itself who it thinks it is, who it thinks it needs to be, and in our case what does our civilian leadership think we need to be - the goal I think is to get those 3 things in line. Its my thought that its leaders that you leverage to do that.

Definitely agree - that is critical, especially when you are in a world like today's where things are constantly changing. The only constant is that there is no constant! Although at the same time it seems like you have to beware of change just for change's sake - in the AF the problem is often that the perception is that each senior leader has to "change" things to get promoted...

The only means we have to change that is through demonstrated leadership - the kind that shows and encourages what we say we believe in, and points the way toward where we say we need to be. Animate leadership that reaches down when they find out something like that a branch rep came forward with some tripe like that, and then takes action to prove its fallacy. That leadership has to be backed up by the leadership at the follow on boards that really looks at the person (deeper then the ORB and SR block) - and in a very transparent manner shows the judged what the criteria was for selection to command or promotion was, and that the things we are saying publicly are important really counted - so that its clear that our actions match the narrative.

Not sure what a branch rep is. I understand the last part I think - tough to do. I guess that is part of why I was asking about the AAR and such. Our promotion process isn't much more transparent than yours (feedback depends solely on the O-5/O-6/O-7+ giving his subordinates at the Wing/Group/Squadron feedback on where they stand (after the ratings are in) and why), but we do get a lot of operational/tactical level feedback, in extremely public forums. The public airing of your dirty laundry results in a fairly decent level of public understanding of where folks stand... at least on the operational/tactical side of things. You know who is a good leader in the air and who is not, and there is a sort of informal pecking order. We're different than the Army in that in the AF your leadership role on the ground is somewhat more divorced from your leadership role in the air... not always a good thing, as you end up with awesome pilots/instructor pilots who could lead the first push of the next big war, but couldn't lead a bunch of folks on the ground out of a paper bag... interesting dichotomy!

Anyway thanks for the answer to my questions! Appreciate you taking time to educate the ignorant!

V/R,

Cliff