Al-Adahi served in the Yemeni army for two years and was later employed as a security guard at the Yemeni state oil company. In July 2001 he took a six-month leave of absence from his job and left his wife and his two children to travel with his sister Amani to Afghanistan (by way of Pakistan). Amani had entered into an arranged marriage with Riyadh Abd A1-Aziz Almujahid, a Yemeni citizen then residing in Kandahar.
Riyadh was affiliated with al-Qaida. He arranged for Amani's and Al-Adahi's trip to Afghanistan. He helped them obtain passports from the passport agency in their hometown of Ta'iz. He then sent Al-Adahi to the Yemeni capital city of Sana'a. Al-Adahi was instructed to wear a red jacket and wait outside a specified building for a man he did not know. This man, Ali Yayha, recognized Al-Adahi and gave him two plane tickets and travel money. Yayha also arranged for Al-Adahi and Amani to obtain visas. The government presented evidence that al-Qaida paid for Al-Adahi's and Amani's trip. Al-Adahi admitted that the sort of arrangements that Riyadh made for him and his sister were the same as those al-Qaida used for bringing jihadist recruits to Afghanistan.' And he described how Riyadh had obtained Al-Adahi's travel funds from "the Saudi who handled the money" for al-Qaida in Kandahar. That Al-Adahi was an al-Qaida recruit is also supported by a witness's statement - not addressed bv the district court - that Al-Adahi was a [description classified and redacted from this public opinion].
Riyadh was "from mujahidin" - that is, those who fought against the Russians and in the Afghan civil war. Many mujahidin frequented the guesthouse Riyadh operated in Kandahar. Al-Adahi stayed at Riyadh's house, located in the same compound. Al-Adahi told interrogators that Riyadh "had achieved a very- hig-h status" in al-0aida.' Like Al-Adahi. Riyadh was described to interrogators as a [description classified and redacted from this public opinion]. And Al-Adahi admitted that Riyadh's compound was very close to the compound of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban.
Bin Laden hosted the male-only celebration of Riyadh's marriage to Al-Adahi's sister. Bin Laden held the celebration at his compound, which Al-Adahi described as "surrounded by a concrete fence further secured by a large metal gate." Inside the compound, a group of armed guards "draped in munitions belts, grenades, and Kalashnikov rifles" welcomed the wedding
guests. At the party, bin Laden gave a speech congratulating Riyadh. Al-Adahi and bin Laden were introduced and sat next to each other during the meal.
Several days later, bin Laden summoned Al-Adahi for another meeting. According to Al-Adahi, at his meeting bin Laden asked him about people he was connected with in Yemen - some of whom were involved in jihad. (The events following the meeting, including Al-Adahi's showing up at the al-Qaida training camp, suggest that more transpired in the meeting than what Al-Adahi related.) In the habeas proceedings, Al-Adahi tried to explain his personal audience with bin Laden on the basis that "meeting with Bin Laden was common for visitors to Kandahar." Mem. Op. at 17. This is, as the government points out, utterly implausible. Al-Adahi's story was "contradicted by the undisputed evidence that in 2001 Usama bin Laden, who knew he was a military target of the United States, had gone into hiding under tight security . . . ." Br. of Appellants at 64.
As to the latter point the district court said nothing, despite the well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence - often strong evidence - of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Penn, 974 F.2d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Meyer, 733 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1984). The court characterized the rest of the evidence about Al-Adahi's meetings with bin Laden as "sensational and compelling" but not "actual, reliable evidence that would justify" detention. Mem. Op. at 41.
The court's statements are incomprehensible. On what possible ground can the court say that the evidence on this subject was, on the one hand, "compelling," and yet say, on the other hand, that it was not "actual" and "reliable"? All that comes to mind is the idea that two personal meetings with bin Laden are not enough to prove that an individual is part of al-Qaida. If that is what the court intended, then it was once again engaging in the mistaken reasoning we mentioned in connection with conditional probability analysis. The court rounded off its discussion by characterizing the government's presentation as merely indicating that Al-Adahi had "familial ties to Usama bin Laden," a statement incorrect as a factual matter (Al-Adahi's family ties were to a top aide of bin Laden's) and one that misses the strong thrust of the evidence. The evidence derived its power not only from Al-Adahi's family relationships, but also from his meetings with bin Laden. That close association made it far more likely that Al-Adahi was or became part of the organization.
Rather than grasping this essential point, the district court called the evidence regarding the meetings a distraction - something that should not divert "the Court from its essential focus - the nature of Al-Adahi's own conduct, upon which this case must turn." Mem. Op. at 18. Here again the court's remarks are perplexing. If Al-Adahi's meetings with bin Laden were not his "own conduct," whose conduct were they?
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