Is Irregular Warfare Really "Irregular" Anymore?

[UrsaMaior]

Do I go too far when I say regulars are soldiers, irregulars are everybody else who actively participates in fighting (ie militia, partisans, insurgents)?

[TROUFION]

UrsaMajor--there have been many irregular forces made up of soldiers in history. It isn't what the unit is, or who is in it, it is how the unit acts and is utilized. Historically some main line units have switched back and forth between regular and irregular styles of fighting--it is a mission, a mindset and objective thing.

I agree with many here in that it is the seeming need of western forces (perhaps all industralized militaries) to specialize and over specialize that prevents the flexibility of a multipurpose unit. It is almost as if we have a hidden referee waiting behind a bush who will jump out and penalize us "hey you, yeah you regular infantry that mission appears too much like a SOF mission, go to the penalty box for 5." Specialization has made us very good but the associated compartmentalization and turf wars have been detrimental to overall flexibility and coordination.

[charter6]

I would argue that calling "regular" warfare "regular" has always been a misnomer. Over the course of human history, what we now term irregular or asymmetric is in fact far and away the dominant form of conflict. That's a throw-away point in the context of this discussion though.

More importantly to my way of looking at things is the fact that our division of warfare into regular and irregular is itself entirely artificial and very, very modern. The idea that armies only fight armies within a limited sphere of engagement and that anything else constitutes an aberration only dates back a few centuries, and has only ever been applied selectively. Before that, the distinction between regular and irregular breaks down, and, more importantly, people didn't seem to have been thinking about warfare as being divisible in that way.

Strategikon XI is a great example of what I'm trying to say. Maurice contrasts there the fighting styles of the different races the Byzantine Empire was at the time facing. His section on the Slavs has decidedly "irregular" undertones. He speaks for example of campaigning in the winter when enemy food supplies will be at their lowest, of how to deal with Slavic guerrilla warfare, and of how to pacify villages (clear and hold, rather than sweeping, incidentally). Go back a couple pages though, and he's talking about how to come to grips with Persian archer superiority, or how to deal with Frankish infantry in close battle. What I'm trying to get at is that the hard and fast line between fighting armies and fighting peoples just wasn't there, even in the most professional of pre-modern armies.

Even getting into the modern era I don't think you see the same division that we've had over the last half century or so. The pacification of the Caribbean was a decidedly irregular affair, as was colonial expansion through the 18th and 19th centuries. The British colonial wars of the early half of the 20th century (Ireland and Palestine in particular come to mind) were considered to be at least partially military exercises, despite the lack of a regular opponent. We always considered the Marine Corps to be an expeditionary force, and used it very irregularly throughout Central and South America. Professional militaries don't seem to have fully shied away from the irregular until the last couple decades really, even if the irregular component of the military experience might not have been as heavily treated in doctrine as what we call the regular component.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

First, have I arrived at this debate a YEAR late...your post are all 2008?!

I've finished recently a paper on IW...can't release it yet but I'm presenting it soon. Having spent some time thinking about it - like the rest of you - may I offer:

The thing here is, I believe, that IW is a confusion of two issues...

- The first is UrsaMaior's point of Irregular Forces...

- The second is TROUFION's point of Irregular Actions.


Some definitions on which I build my analysis:
a. Definition: Regular forces belong to a nation state or some legally recognised entity (say UN).

b. Definition: Irregular forces don't!

c. For brevity I won't define Regular and Irregular Actions here, but I do in my paper.

My paper sets out that IW is related to the combinations of these...so the crux of my analysis is...

1. Regular Forces fighting Regularly (conventional state on state)...

2. Irregular Forces fighting Regularly (Hezbollah 06, Balkans militias)...

3. Regular Forces fighting Irregularly (I suggest SOF UW)...and

4. Irregular Forces fighting Irregularly (Insurgents)

The issue is then what is IW? 2..3..4 or some combination of two or all three? I argue for a specific combination, but I feel that the building blocks of a robust definition can be found above...

If any of you are at a particular meeting next week discussing this, perhaps we can chat over a beer?

LP

[George L. Singleton]

1. Use of human shields took place in the Korean War, Vietnam, and now today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of Pakistan.

2. Today I think intel does a good enough job to target insurgent leadership who have/use human schields, to include members of their own families.

3. If we are good enough to target insurgents off the so-called battlefield, at rest or at their "office" then the ways and means we target them suggests to me that we are doing much better at this war (irregular or whatever anyone wants to label it) than the media gives us credit for.

4. Finally, winning "Hearts and minds" of often blood kin Pakhtuns, some of whom are belligerant Taliban, some of whom are not belligerants but grew up with those who have become belligerants...then the so called winning of hearts and minds gets "muddled" and ethnic loyalties, in common religion and such makes specific actions in specific places a matter of deciding to kill off enemy terrorist leadership and forgetting about the so-called hearts and minds aspect.

5. The upside of such irregular actions by us against them is that the vast majority, over 85% of the Pakistan population (this is not true of course in Afghanistan) are not Pukhtuns, did not grow up and play with as children the terrorists, and would be glad to be rid of as many Puhtun terrorists as possible.

My two cents. We have developed sufficient tools, ways and means, but are hindered by the difference in populations between and among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the large "other areas" of Paksitan which are non-Pukhtun to repeat myself and shut down now.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry folks, but why is this important? Seriously? I argue it is not. The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.

Irregular or regular is mostly utterly irrelevant, if you have thought the problem through. Focussing on the question just forgives pre-conceived ideas and some stupidity. Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.

It may help to codify certain distinctions between the two, as concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops.

I now think, that for people at the policy level to be debating this stuff is verging on the embarrassing. It strongly implies that folks don't understand the problem.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

William,

A quick fire response, over my morning Joe. I feel that you have missed the point by some significant margin. Perhaps still early in the morning?

<The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.>
If you don't understand who, then you don't understand why.

<Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.>
Seriously? Is that where we are at?

<concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops>
In this age of Strategic Compression, the 24/7 Media, etc what happens tactically has significant implications at the Political level.

We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.

LP

[marct]

Hi LP,

If any of you are at a particular meeting next week discussing this, perhaps we can chat over a beer?

You wouldn't happen to be talking about a meeting in sunny Monterey on Tuesday and Wednesday, would you? If so, the I suspect we could definitely chat over a few pints.

Cheers,

Marc

[slapout9]

I would argue that calling "regular" warfare "regular" has always been a misnomer. Over the course of human history, what we now term irregular or asymmetric is in fact far and away the dominant form of conflict. That's a throw-away point in the context of this discussion though.

More importantly to my way of looking at things is the fact that our division of warfare into regular and irregular is itself entirely artificial and very, very modern. The idea that armies only fight armies within a limited sphere of engagement and that anything else constitutes an aberration only dates back a few centuries, and has only ever been applied selectively. Before that, the distinction between regular and irregular breaks down, and, more importantly, people didn't seem to have been thinking about warfare as being divisible in that way.

Some good stuff here.