Is Irregular Warfare Really "Irregular" Anymore?

[TheLapsedPacifist]

First, have I arrived at this debate a YEAR late...your post are all 2008?!

I've finished recently a paper on IW...can't release it yet but I'm presenting it soon. Having spent some time thinking about it - like the rest of you - may I offer:

The thing here is, I believe, that IW is a confusion of two issues...

- The first is UrsaMaior's point of Irregular Forces...

- The second is TROUFION's point of Irregular Actions.


Some definitions on which I build my analysis:
a. Definition: Regular forces belong to a nation state or some legally recognised entity (say UN).

b. Definition: Irregular forces don't!

c. For brevity I won't define Regular and Irregular Actions here, but I do in my paper.

My paper sets out that IW is related to the combinations of these...so the crux of my analysis is...

1. Regular Forces fighting Regularly (conventional state on state)...

2. Irregular Forces fighting Regularly (Hezbollah 06, Balkans militias)...

3. Regular Forces fighting Irregularly (I suggest SOF UW)...and

4. Irregular Forces fighting Irregularly (Insurgents)

The issue is then what is IW? 2..3..4 or some combination of two or all three? I argue for a specific combination, but I feel that the building blocks of a robust definition can be found above...

If any of you are at a particular meeting next week discussing this, perhaps we can chat over a beer?

LP

[George L. Singleton]

1. Use of human shields took place in the Korean War, Vietnam, and now today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of Pakistan.

2. Today I think intel does a good enough job to target insurgent leadership who have/use human schields, to include members of their own families.

3. If we are good enough to target insurgents off the so-called battlefield, at rest or at their "office" then the ways and means we target them suggests to me that we are doing much better at this war (irregular or whatever anyone wants to label it) than the media gives us credit for.

4. Finally, winning "Hearts and minds" of often blood kin Pakhtuns, some of whom are belligerant Taliban, some of whom are not belligerants but grew up with those who have become belligerants...then the so called winning of hearts and minds gets "muddled" and ethnic loyalties, in common religion and such makes specific actions in specific places a matter of deciding to kill off enemy terrorist leadership and forgetting about the so-called hearts and minds aspect.

5. The upside of such irregular actions by us against them is that the vast majority, over 85% of the Pakistan population (this is not true of course in Afghanistan) are not Pukhtuns, did not grow up and play with as children the terrorists, and would be glad to be rid of as many Puhtun terrorists as possible.

My two cents. We have developed sufficient tools, ways and means, but are hindered by the difference in populations between and among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the large "other areas" of Paksitan which are non-Pukhtun to repeat myself and shut down now.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry folks, but why is this important? Seriously? I argue it is not. The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.

Irregular or regular is mostly utterly irrelevant, if you have thought the problem through. Focussing on the question just forgives pre-conceived ideas and some stupidity. Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.

It may help to codify certain distinctions between the two, as concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops.

I now think, that for people at the policy level to be debating this stuff is verging on the embarrassing. It strongly implies that folks don't understand the problem.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

William,

A quick fire response, over my morning Joe. I feel that you have missed the point by some significant margin. Perhaps still early in the morning?

<The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.>
If you don't understand who, then you don't understand why.

<Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.>
Seriously? Is that where we are at?

<concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops>
In this age of Strategic Compression, the 24/7 Media, etc what happens tactically has significant implications at the Political level.

We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.

LP

[Jedburgh]

Chapter Two of the 27 Jan 09 RAND pub, Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, is focused on defining Irregular Warfare in the context of DoD efforts to define the term. Following a review of current doctrine, the authors present this conclusion:

...When one steps back from the details of a review of IW definitions, operation types, and LLOs, IW can be thought of in terms of two stylized, ideal types. The first of these, which we call population-centric IW, is perhaps best evidenced by typical counterinsurgency operations, such as those being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the focus is primarily on building indigenous public support (or tolerance) for U.S. aims. As described above, this type can involve a wide range of military missions, including, among others, combat and training of host nation security; but the outcome most often depends on the success of intrinsically political efforts to reach a stable political equilibrium underwritten by improvements to personal security for the population, restoration of essential services, and economic development and good governance. In this ideal type, the weight of effort is focused less on military than on political, psychological, informational, and related efforts, less on defeating enemy forces than on persuading those who can be persuaded to support the U.S.-supported aims and government.

As described in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the second ideal type is IW against “dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims.” This type focuses on the Al Qaeda organization umbrella of ideologically connected, cellular-structured groups; it targets specific individuals or small cells widely dispersed across the globe and requires an exquisite level of precision and timeliness in intelligence, targeting, and striking capability. This form of IW is highly tactical and technical in nature and generally does not rely on general-purpose forces. Instead, the principal application of military power consists of direct action by small numbers of SOF and, presumably, precision strikes by manned or unmanned aircraft. It also can be prosecuted by non-military partners, including law enforcement or paramilitary direct action.....

[William F. Owen]

William,

Lapsed, called me Wilf

A quick fire response, over my morning Joe. I feel that you have missed the point by some significant margin. Perhaps still early in the morning?

Perhaps. I wrote my response over a cup of Turkish coffee and a mouthful of sweet hala.

<The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.>
If you don't understand who, then you don't understand why.

So explain to me how this differentiates the Viet Cong from the North Vietnamese Army, the INLA from the IRA, or Hamas from Hezbollah? With limited resources, the ways and means of applying military force are not that varied.

<Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.>
Seriously? Is that where we are at?

If you are concerned about the moral dimension to conflict, of course it does. There was never any doubt the US was going to win in Fallujah. Enemy conduct was largely irrelevant (what could they really do?). The only question mark was who died, when and by cause.
It has more or less been conclusively proved that the IDF's not so great performance in the Lebanon in 2006 was due to their failings, not anything Hezbollah ever managed to do.
To paraphrase Foch, you don't so much win as the other guys looses.
To paraphrase the Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA, "we only have to get lucky once," meaning their entire MO was predicated on detecting lapses in British Army tactical doctrine, not an attempt to compete with it.

<concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops>
In this age of Strategic Compression, the 24/7 Media, etc what happens tactically has significant implications at the Political level.

Not true. Very rarely, some tactical action, have disproportionate effect when moral questions are framed around them. It's not a new phenomena, to anyone with a solid grounding in military history. I can cite numerous examples.

We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.

I'm not sure who the WE is here, but WHAT tactical and operational implications? That's THE game. It's not new. That IS the history of warfare. How you beat other armies is how you beat anybody. Only the detail changes.
The US couldn't beat the North Koreans and the PLA (big armies) and the if the US lost in Vietnam they lost to Main Force NVA, not the "VC", who they basically wiped out.
How you defeat a Motor Rifle Regiment is basically the same as how you defeat a Machine Gun Artillery Brigade, yet your enemy is using substantially varying methods. Insurgents on the other hand have very limited means and thus limited aims.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

Wilf,

I don't want to pick a fight, but I disagree with quite a few things you said. I'll argue one point and let's see where it takes us...

My point: We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.

Your comment: I'm not sure who the WE is here, but WHAT tactical and operational implications? That's THE game. It's not new. That IS the history of warfare. How you beat other armies is how you beat anybody. Only the detail changes.

If I ignore the the 'only the detail changes' cos you could hide a whole heap under that one statement...

Let's think about how we beat conventional forces. Two armies manoeuvring, attempting to secure a superior position on the battlefield. Terrain is important - there are key pieces of terrain to hold or seize. Say we're the offense, we need to dislodge an enemy force that is defending a hill, which overlooks some key town. I want to be able to suppress the enemy, close with him, and remove him from his defensive position. I want lots of firepower going down range - to keep his head down - I want machine guns, I want my soldiers to shoot a lot, I want grenades and bayonets for the trenches. So let's look at our soldier's rifle...this piece of kit is now optimised for a force on force conflict...get lots of rounds down range accurately. Effective fire, especially volume of it, is very important. We have, at least in the NATO nations, standardised to a 5.56mm round. It's a compromise - there's a presumed range that it will be used at, the size of the round means that our soldiers can carry lots of it (it might take a long time to dislodge our opponent), it's lethality assumes that a wounded enemy is as good - if not better - than a dead one.

Now let's look at an urban counter insurgency...predominately the enemy isn't holding any ground, so a rifle with capability to suppress is potentially pointless. If he is suppressed, he'll flee. We win the street. He comes back later. He's fleeting, if we get the chance to shoot at him, we must hit and we must incapacitate or kill. A wounded insurgent doesn't think he's going to be a POW, he isn't going to ask for quarter or wave a white flag. This calls for a different kind of rifle. It needs to be very accurate and highly lethal - we don't need to carry lots of ammunition. This might lead us to thinking about larger calibres... perhaps we can drop the bayonet.

There are lots of things that our soldiers have that are useful for force-on-force situations and much less beneficial for COIN. So beating armies and beating the anyone else might require quite different capabilities.

So we need to understand how our enemy manifests itself on the battlefield because this drives capability requirements...

[William F. Owen]

I don't want to pick a fight, but I disagree with quite a few things you said. I'll argue one point and let's see where it takes us...

I don't want to to pick a fight either, I just believe in holding arguments to rigour.

This calls for a different kind of rifle. It needs to be very accurate and highly lethal - we don't need to carry lots of ammunition. This might lead us to thinking about larger calibres... perhaps we can drop the bayonet.

Very happy talking light weapons doctrine.
a, this is not true, and b, history and operational analysis does not support it. No army I know of, has ever had a COIN rifle. Bayonets are largely irrelevant, and have been since about 1918. No army has ever suffered tactically through lack of bayonets. There is an extensive thread on Bayonets here. Nothing in the conduct of the Northern Ireland conflict changed when the British Army swapped it's 7.62mm L1A1 for the 5.56mm L85.

There are lots of things that our soldiers have that are useful for force-on-force situations and much less beneficial for COIN. So beating armies and beating the anyone else might require quite different capabilities.

Like what? The British Army has fired it's entire war store of Javelin Missiles (an ATGM) doing "COIN" in Helmand province. 35 years of operations in Northern Ireland saw virtually no specialised (with the exception of EW and search kits) equipment or weapons on general issue.

So we need to understand how our enemy manifests itself on the battlefield because this drives capability requirements...

We understand our insurgent enemies capabilities very well. There is no area of debate or mystery. Actually China is a bit more of a mystery, but not a big mystery.
Again the idea that "the enemy" drives our capability requirements, does not support characterising enemies as regular and irregular. What is more, I do not believe it to be true, unless you want to get into very simplistic equipment comparisons, like M1A2 v T-80U.
Warfare drives capability requirements, and the "enemy" is one tiny part of that. What is more you never know where and who you are going to fight, so the capabilities have to be pretty broad. This article tackles that very issue.

The simple fact is that no army can afford to have COIN equipment and WAR equipment. It's nonsensical, intellectually flawed and doctrinally lazy - so the grounds for making this A & B differentiation of Regular and Irregular, serves no purpose, once the basic flaws have been recognised. Are there differing conditions of warfare? Very much so, but they do not line up along regular v Irregular. They line up across every possible conflict.

How come the UK's excellent set of COIN skills did not translate into overwhelming operational success in Basra? All conflicts are different. I just can't see why saying "Irregular threat" or "regular threat" helps, especially as the latest fad of "hybrid" seems to blur the distinction to irrelevance.

[marct]

Hi LP,

If any of you are at a particular meeting next week discussing this, perhaps we can chat over a beer?

You wouldn't happen to be talking about a meeting in sunny Monterey on Tuesday and Wednesday, would you? If so, the I suspect we could definitely chat over a few pints.

Cheers,

Marc